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Of all instruments a will is least governed by form, the form
being unimportant, except as indicating intent.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Doubtless, it will surprise some people to learn that in at least
one context the preceding statement is accurate: the form of a will
does not require particular dispositive words such as "give," "devise,"
or "bequeath. '2 Stated differently, particular words are not essential
or constituent elements of a will. The statement evokes surprise because the words formality and formalism are derivatives of the word
"form"; it is widely an'd correctly understood that in every AngloAmerican jurisdiction a will must conform to that jurisdiction's wills
act (the concept of "formality"); and the courts historically have applied
the doctrine of strict compliance in addressing the issue of whether a
will complies with a particular jurisdiction's wills act (the concept of
"formalism").
For some time, scholars and practitioners have perceived wills act
formality and judicial formalism as troublesome, and they have often

1.
2.

Dixon v. Dameron's Adm'r, 256 Ky. 722, 724, 77 S.W.2d 6, 7 (1934).
Id.
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suggested it would be desirable to reduce the former and relax the
latter. As early as 1974, G.M. Bates was recommending that courts
enforce defectively executed wills in the absence of "suspicious circumstances" surrounding the execution of the will in order to "give
effect to the true intentions of the testator as expressed in the document."3 Some foreign jurisdictions have enacted statutes to accomplish
these ends. For example, in 1965 Israel enacted a statute granting
courts the power to dispense with certain wills act formalities. 4 The
Israeli statute is a harmless error rule which predates similar measures
incommon law countries by ten years.5 Since 1975, the state of South
Australia has granted probate courts the power to dispense with the
requirement of strict adherence to the wills act in instances in which
6
the proponent of the will can establish testator intent by other means.
Subsequently, other Australian states and Canadian provinces have
followed suit.7
In July 1990, the annual Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved and recommended for enactment in all the states,
a provision modifying the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).8 The provision

incorporates within the UPC wills section a rule permitting defective
wills executed with testamentary intent to be admitted to probate.
Such wills are admitted under the new provision through application
of a dispensing power9 modeled on the South Australian harmless
error rule and other similar provisions.' 0 New UPC section 2-503 provides:
Although a document or writing added upon a document was
not executed in compliance with Section 2-502 [will execution
requirements], the document or writing is treated as if it
had been executed in compliance with [the execution requirements] if the proponent of the document or writing estab-

3. Bates, A Casefor Intention, 124 NEW L.J. 380, 382 (1974).
4. Succession Law 5725-1965 in Ministry of Justice, 19 Laws of the State of Israel 62, ch.
1, § 25 (1965).
5. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errorsin the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's
Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 CoLuM. L. REV. 1, 48 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein,
Harmless ErrorRules].

6. For discussion of the 1975 changes in the South Australian Statute of Wills, see infra
text accompanying notes 744-87. For text of rule, see infra text accompanying note 758.
7. For discussion of statutory harmless error rules in various foreign jurisdictions, see infra
notes 788-924 and accompanying text.
8. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990).
9. Id. (creating a harmless error rule).
10. See id. § 2-503 comment.
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lishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
intended the document or writing to constitute . . . the
decedent's will. ....
11
The stated purpose of new section 2-503 is to extend "to will formalities
the harmless error principle that has long been applied to defective
'
compliance with the fornal requirements for nonprobate transfers,'12
(such devices as the revocable trust, the tentative or Totten trust, or
the payable-on-death bank account).13
Any recommendation that a harmless error rule be incorporated
into the wills act presupposes acceptance of certain assumptions respecting the role of wills act formality in general, and the various
functions served by specific wills act formalities in particular. First

and foremost, incorporation of a harmless error rule into a statute
which sets out certain execution requirements raises serious questions

about the underlying utility of the formalities to which the dispensing
power or harmless error rule apply. Under the South Australian dispensing power, for example, the statute of wills requires the ceremony
of attestation. However, because proponents are more or less routinely
permitted to show that unattested wills were executed with testamentary intent, the attestation requirement as such essentially has been
abolished.1 4 Once a proponent demonstrates testamentary intent such

wills routinely are upheld. 15 In South Australia, omitting attestation
apparently has the effect of merely shifting the burden of proof to
the proponent to show that the testator intended the document to be

a will.16
11. Id. § 2-503. The provision also applies to partial or complete revocations of wills,
additions or alterations to wills, and partial or complete revivals of wills. Id.
12. Id. § 2-503 comment.
13. The American Law Institute has discussed incorporating a harmless error principle in
its revisions to the wills provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Property.
In view of the validity of various substitutes for a will that do not comply with
the statutory formalities for a will, a donative document of transfer that is not
intended to be legally operative during the donor's lifetime should be treated as
though it met the statutor formalities for a will in the controlling jurisdiction, if
it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the
document of transfer as his or her will.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 33.1 comment g (Tent. Draft No. 12,
Mar. 28, 1989) [hereinafter Draft Restatement 33.1].
14. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 19 (discussing three South Australian
cases in which courts admitted wills to probate despite their lack of attestation).
15. See, e.g., Estate of Hodge, 40 S.A. St. R. 398 (1986); Estate of Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R.
413, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (193). Courts in both the Kelly case and the Hodge case admit
to probate wills that were deliberately left unattested.
16. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 19.
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Attempts to formulate harmless error rules to save defective wills
demonstrate the impossibility of creating an exception to formalism
in applying the wills acts which does not by a logical and inevitable
progression undermine the integrity of the statutes of wills. Moreover,
adoption of a harmless error rule to cure defective wills does nothing
to resolve the logical and practical inconsistencies of having two separate systems of passing property at death. Adoption of a harmless
error rule resolves only the very narrow issue, specific to documents
characterized as wills, of whether the rule of strict compliance with
the formal requirements serves any policies that justify the refusal of
courts to give effect to intent in cases in which the wills act requirements have not been observed. It does not address the issue of whether
and to what extent requiring a higher level of formality to transfer
property by will than is required to transfer property by various will
substitutes serves any useful purpose. More important, it does not
logically resolve the inconsistencies in the subsidiary law, such as the
availability of assets transferred by will substitute rather than by will
to claims of creditors or the spouse. 17 The newly revised UPC article
II provisions do address the spousal issue through substantial revision
of the elective share provisions to allow a surviving spouse to "recapture" certain donative dispositions as part of the "reclaimable estate."''
The UPC thus looks beyond the narrow issue resolved by adoption
of a harmless error rule toward a more unified approach to the law
of donative transfers.
This two-part article has four purposes: first, to examine the problem of wills act formality and judicial formalism in historical context;
second, to compare the UPC solution to other measures that have
been adopted or proposed in mitigation of the problem; third, to
evaluate the UPC solution in light of existing problems in the law of
donative transfers; and finally, to suggest that the UPC solution is at
best a quick fix for problems created by uncritical acceptance of the
historical formalities for creating a will that is likely to result in further
increasing the complexity, unreality, and incoherence of the present
system.
17. See Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession,
97 HARV. L. REv. 1108 (1984) (discussing the lack of unity in the probate and nonprobate
systems) [hereinafter Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution].
18. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to -207 (1990) (treating certain transfers made within
two years of the date of death, including transfers by means of the will substitutes, as the
decedent's "reclaimable estate" for purposes of calculating the elective share and expanding the
UPC concept of the "augmented estate"). See generally Langbein & Waggoner, Redesigning
the Spouse's ForcedShare, 22 REAL PROP., PROB., & TR. J. 303 (1987) (providing an influential
discussion of forced-share statutes by the Director of Research for the Joint Editorial Board of
the Uniform Probate Code and by one of its most eminent members).
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It is my position that the development of a logical, internally consistent system for transferring property at death requires a rethinking
of the doctrinal foundations of the present system, as opposed to the
use of piecemeal "solutions" such as the incorporation of a harmless
error standard into the wills act to solve the problem of wills act
formality and judicial formalism. The very fact that a harmless error
rule is needed to avoid injustice and to effectuate intent indicates that
a comprehensive rethinking of the law of gratuitous dispositions is in
order.
Part one of this article reviews the substantial body of scholarly
commentary, case law, and legislative history from which new UPC
section 2-503 has developed, with particular emphasis on Langbein's
seminal work on harmless error rules in general and the 1975 innovation in South Australian probate law that provides the model for the
UPC harmless error rule. In addition, part one examines in depth the
problem of wills act formalism and the policies which support or perpetuate formalism. Finally, part one discusses proposed and adopted
solutions to these problems with an emphasis on the various forms of
harmless error rules.
Part two of this article, which will be in a subsequent issue of the
Florida Law Review, analyzes the new UPC harmless error rule.
Further, part two examines in detail Langbein's functional substantial
compliance doctrine and the South Australian dispensing power statute
that provides the model for new section 2-503 and the differences in
their scope and probable application. The comments of the drafters of
new section 2-503 are carefully scrutinized in light of the South Australian courts' interpretation of the provision upon which section 2-503 is
modeled.
The combined purpose of parts one and two is to challenge the
concept of a harmless error rule as an appropriate solution to the
problem of wills act formalism. It is my belief that the perceived need
for a harmless error rule indicates the need for a general revision of
the law of donative transfers. If formality is primarily useful as a
means of avoiding the need for every will proponent to put forth
evidence that a particular document offered to probate was intended
to transfer property at the decedent's death, a harmless error rule
inevitably undermines that purpose. This is especially true since will
substitutes can be enforced to achieve will-like results without requiring a high level of statutory formality 19 and therefore, without needing
the creation of a power by statute to dispense with the requirements.
19. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990) (citing Annotation, Change of Beneficiary in Old Line Insurance Policy as Affected by Failure to Comply with Requirements as
to Manner of Making Change, 19 A.L.R.2d 5 (1951)).
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The drafters of the new UPC provisions state in the comment to
section 2-503 that it "unifies the law of probate and nonprobate transfers" by extending to the wills act "the harmless error principle that
has long been applied to defective compliance with the formal requirements for nonprobate transfers."20 However, this statement does not
accurately reflect reality, since the formalities involved in executing
will substitutes generally are not a matter of statutory law so that,
strictly speaking, no requirements exist. Defective execution of a will
substitute prevents the device from being self-enforcing and requires
court intervention to determine whether the maker intended it be
given effect. In making this determination, the courts typically do not
concern themselves with issues as to the harmlessness of the error,
but strictly with the question of transferor intent.21 Unification of the
law of donative transfers would require that the standard of formality
for wills and will substitutes and the consequences of error be given
treatment that is consistent not only in effect, but consistent in principle and theory. The revised UPC provisions do not accomplish this
end. If there is an issue as to when a court ought to permit the
proponent of a document to put in evidence that the document was
intended to transfer the property of a decedent, the law of donative
transfers ought to be revised to address that issue directly. However,
the law should not continue to require different standards for transferring property, depending on whether the transfer is classified as testamentary or as some other form of disposition. Although the UPC
currently represents the most comprehensive approach to the present
disunity in the law of donative transfers, the effect of the Commissioners' solution is to bridge, not repair, the chasm.
II.
A.

THE RITE OF TESTATION

The Wills Act Formula and the "Nonprobate Revolution"
1. The Will as Magical Rite

A number of devices exist for implementing a decedent's wishes
for disposing of property at death. The will, however, is the sole

20. Id. See generally Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 17, at 1134-40 (arguing
for application of the subsidiary law of wills to nonprobate transfers).
21. See McGovern, The Payable on Death Account and Other Will Substitutes, 67 N.W.
L. REv. 7, 9 (1972); Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 17, at 1134-40; RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 33.1 comment g (1989 draft). For full text of comment, see
supra note 13.
22. Langbein, NonprobateRevolution, supra note 17, at 1108 (quoting from the title of the
article).
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means by which a testator may "in a single stroke transmit real and
personal property of every kind and description, wherever located,
by means of a single document, with no requirement that the assets
be assembled and transmitted," and with no obligation to the beneficiaries during the owner's lifetime. A will has literally no effect
until the maker is dead, and is therefore commonly regarded as ambulatory and, in consequence, revocable.- Therefore, the maker of
the will, the testator, retains all incidents of ownership in property
disposed of by will until death, including the right to alter the will
itself or to make inconsistent dispositions of the property. The will
truly does not come into being until a probate court accepts it for
implementation after the testator's death.
Even today, the will is the sole legitimate channel through which
a deceased person may communicate his or her testamentary wishes
to the living, with a court serving in the capacity of medium by interpreting and effectuating the decedent's intentions. Every jurisdiction
in the United States recognizes some form of witnessed will.- The
wills acts have "deep historical roots"; 26 specific formal requirements

23. Rohan, The Continuing Question of Delivery in the Law of Gifts, 38 IND. L.J. 1, 16
(1962). See also Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession,
and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 340, 352-55 (discussing the attributes of wills and freedom of
testation).
24. Bordwell, Testamentary Dispositions, 19 Ky. L.J. 283, 283-84 (1931).
A will may be defined as the means whereby one disposes of his property at
his death or appoints an executor or a guardian for his orphan child or does any
combination of these things. It does not affect the property until his death and is
revocable until then. These two factors, ineffectiveness until death and revocability
until that time, are in some respects different aspects of the same requirement
that the disposition of the property to be testamentary must not bind the disposer
until his death, but the two factors are by no means identical. The first relates to
the effect of the transaction on the property itself while the second concerns the
power . . . to revoke. The first relates to the property, the second to the
person .... The two factors are summed up in the word ambulatory. The characteristic thing about a will as compared with other instruments is that it is ambulatory, binding neither the testator nor his property until his death. Whether a
disposition of property is testamentary or not is said to depend on testamentary
intent but testamentary intent goes back to these two factors. If the disposition
of property is intended to bind neither the disposer nor his property until his
death, the transaction is properly testamentary although no conscious thought of
the act of disposition amounting to a will has entered the disposer's mind and its
form be that of a deed or some other transaction quite different from a will.
Id.
25. For citations to various wills acts, see infra note 191.
26. Friedman, supra note 2:3,
at 366.
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for giving power over property to the dead can be traced to an English
statute enacted in 1540 and subsequent amendments.2
In comparison to other statutory law, the wills acts have proved
to be extraordinarily resistant to change. In most jurisdictions, the

wills acts still closely resemble the original sources: the Statute of
Wills of 1540, the Statute of Frauds of 1677, and the Statute of Wills
of 1837.2s It has been judicially observed that "[t]he statute concerning
wills . . . is unique, in the fact that it stands as one of the few
legislative products of an early generation which neither the reforming

temper of advancing progress, nor the iconoclastic hand of an all-pervading cacoethes for improvement, has seen proper to disturb." The
first major innovation in probate reform, the 1969 UPC, retained the

basic formula for executing a will set forth in the 1837 Statute of
Wills, but reduced the ceremoniousness of the ritual or rite involved.30
The 1969 UPC thus effectively demystified the process of will-making

without analyzing to any great extent the practical or functional aspects of the retained formalities.
A fundamental requirement of magical or mystical rites is that the

procedures are accepted with unquestioning faith and with the notion
that only strict adherence to the formula will procure the desired
result.3' In order for the probate courts to give force to the words of
a dead man or woman and preserve the power over property after

27. The history of the Wills Act is discussed infra notes 64-203 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
29. In re Hale's Will, 21 N.J. 284, 296, 121 A.2d 511, 518 (1956) (quoting In re Sage's
Estate, 90 N.J.Eq. 580, 581, 107 A. 445, 445 (1919)). For discussion of Hale's Will, see infra
notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
30. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1969). For discussion of the UPC, see infra notes
183-203 and accompanying text (discussing attested wills) and infranotes 249-63 and accompanying text (discussing holographic wills).
31. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 373-74.
In English history, one branch of the law of succession derives from ecclesiastical
practice and ecclesiastical law.... A religious, magical element.., had an impact
upon the customary language of wills. Singsong, half-poetical phrases abound, such
as "give, devise, and bequeath." The traditional manner in which wills used to
open reflects a sense of mystery in phrases without any legal or economic significance: "In the name of God Amen. .. I commend my soul into the hands of God
my Creator . . .and my body to the earth whereof it is made." The ceremony
surrounding the execution of the will tries to be noble and solemn. In the office
of a large law firm, the ceremony is likely to be brief, brisk, and accurate; nonetheless, many clients will giggle in an embarrassed way, and make some self-conscious
joke touching on their close mortality.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting from Shakespeare's will, reprinted in V. HARRIS, ANCIENT,
CURIOUS, AND FAMous WILLS 306 (1911)).
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death, the law presently requires the decedent to adhere strictly to
the statutory formula.32 Other than in the Canadian and Australian
jurisdictions that have enacted harmless error rules,- no principle of
statutory construction in a common law jurisdiction presently provides
the proponents of an improperly executed will with the opportunity
to show that the violation of the legislative mandate is harmless error
in light of the evidence of intention that is available.- If it is shown
that the document through which the testator attempts to speak and
act is flawed, the dead hand has no vitality and the testator's voice
is not heard. Friedman speculates that there is a mystical or superstitious element underlying the traditional reverence for the principle
that the formalities of the wills act must be strictly followed.Considered in this cabalistic fashion, the admission of a will to
probate is akin to a seance, with the court serving as channeler. To
some extent, the tendency of courts to close their eyes in holy dread
and refuse to permit a testator's wishes to come through when confronted with documents not properly executed according to the ancient

32. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489
(1975) [hereinafter Langbein, Substantial Compliance]; Mann, Self-Proving Wills and Formalism in Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH. L.Q. 39 (1985); Nelson & Starck, Formality and
Formalism: A Critical Look at the Execution of Wills, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 331 (1979).
See generally Friedman, supra note 23, at 370-71, 374 (explaining the economic and historical
rationales for modern-day will formalities). For discussion of the rule of formalism applied to
the wills acts, see infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
33. For discussion of statutory harmless error rules in Canadian and Australian jurisdictions,
see infra notes 788-924.
34. Israel has had a harmless error rule in effect since 1965. Succession Law 5725-1965, in
Ministry of Justice, 19 Laws of the State of Israel 62, ch. 1, § 25 (1965).
35. Friedman, supra note 23, at 373-74. Friedman states:
[W]ills are more than economic documents, institutionally processed. They have a
noneconomic, noninstitutional side. The will is an instrument of gift, the product
of love and affection, or perhaps baser motives; in any event, a document of
sentiment and emotion, embodying too (from the standpoint of the testator) a sense
of mortality - the precision and proximity of death ....
In the history of the law
of wills, the magical and the economic natures of the document reinforced each
other at least in one regard: they both tended toward standardization and uniformity
of text and toward formality in execution and procedures. Undoubtedly, too, the
sense of the supernatural in the law of wills reinforced the popularity of the document....
The will is the sole, authentic voice of a man who is dead. Its vitality
begins when his life ceases. and it is an almost mystical extension of his personality
after death. All the more reason why the text must be treated with great caution
and not tampered with or explained by external, mundane testimony. Here too
the emotional and the formal reinforced each other.
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ceremonies set forth in the statute of wills, may be a product of some
vestigial sense of the will as something qualitatively different from
any other legally enforced transaction. Clearly, the threshold question
in implementing a will today is not whether the testator intended it
be given effect, but whether the testator has taken care to follow the
preserve a channel through which
statutorily described ritual and thus
36
to communicate with the court.
The purpose of the UPC's new section 2-50337 is to temper the
requirement of the execution provision - that every will must adhere
to certain prescribed formalities - in those instances in which the
evidence shows that the testator intended the defective will be given
effect.as The effect of the new standard is to eliminate a traditional
and demonstrably false assumption underlying the statute of wills:
that formal compliance with the execution requirements of the statute
of wills is the sole reliable criterion for determining whether a decedent
intended to execute a will.
From a policy standpoint, incorporating a harmless error rule into
the wills act effectively reverses a tradition which from its inception
has tended to elevate form at the expense of substance. The formalism
of the wills acts, the insistence of modern courts on strict compliance
with formalities even in circumstances in which there is no issue either
as to the authenticity of the document or the intent of the testator,
has been characterized as a limitation on the principle of free testation 9
- a limitation that seems to serve no policy other than that of promoting efficiency in the probate process. 40 Furthermore, even the argu36. This strict insistence on ritual has not always been an aspect of wills act jurisprudence.
See infra notes 449-51 and accompanying text (providing an historical overview of the evolution
of the formalities, illustrating fluctuations in the level of formality required for a disposition of
property at death).
37.

See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990). For text of new § 2-503, see supra

text accompanying note 11.
38. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990) and discussion infra notes 925-49 and
accompanying text.
39. See Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES, AND
FAMiILY PROPERTY 9, 12, 14 (E. Halbach, Jr. ed. 1977) (discussing the principle of free testa-

tion). But see Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (stating that there is no
constitutional right to pass property at death); Estate of McGurrin, 113 Idaho 341, 343, 743
P.2d 994, 996 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing the importance of the right of freedom of
testation in American legal history but emphasizing that the right is legislative in origin and
historically conditioned upon compliance with legislatively prescribed formalities); Halbach, An
Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH, TAXES, AND FAMILY PROPERTY 3-6 (E. Halbach,
Jr. ed. 1977) (pointing out that a private property system need not necessarily result in freedom
of testation and discussing the arguments offered in support of the institution of inheritance).
40. Although a number of policy limitations on the privilege of free testation have been
identified, see Friedman, supranote 23, at 357; Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills
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ment that the rule of strict compliance promotes efficiency in the
postmortem distribution of decedents' property to their selected successors is undercut by the emergence during this century of the so-called will substitutes and nonprobate devices for transferrring property
at death.
2. The Rise of the Will Substitutes
Although generally courts strictly construe wills act requirements,
many or perhaps most courts adopt any of several alternative
rationales for achieving substantially all of the incidents of a will without the wills act formalities or the necessity of implementation through
the probate court. Under present law, owners of property may select
among a number of nominally inter vivos modes of donative disposition
that permit them to retain virtually all of the incidents of ownership
during their lives, yet still exercise the privilege of selecting their
successors at death. These testamentary-like inter vivos donative
transfers have the additional advantage of being self-enforcing, so that
probate is not required to effectuate the transfer of property.
A will substitute exists when a property owner effectively creates
a nontestamentary disposition that takes effect at death based on the
theory that the owner relinquishes some infinitesimal fraction of power
42
1
over the property. The so-called will substitutes4 - revocable trusts,

Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 500-12 (1977), the purely formalistic limitation imposed by the
doctrine of strict compliance is difficult to justify. The theory that the requirement actually
accomplishes the traditionally cited purpose of preventing fraud is generally rejected by contemporary scholars. See infra notes 518-22 for a discussion of the protective function of formality.
Langbein suggests that strict compliance serves a role similar to that of the dead man
statutes in the law of contracts in that strict compliance is intended to preclude extrinsic evidence
of a decedent's intentions with respect to a will. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note
32, at 501-03; for discussion, see infra notes 405-24 and accompanying text.
Mann suggests that the traditionally inferior status of the probate courts has had the effect
of maintaining the policy of construing the wills act requirements strictly to avoid inferior courts
engaging in factfinding on the issue of intent. Mann, supra note 32, at 77-83; for discussion,
see infra notes 449-67 and accompanying text.
None of these grounds seems sufficient to account for the persistence of the rule of strict
compliance as a limitation on free testation. Wills act formalism gives a very limited meaning
to the concept of freedom of testation. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 365-66 (discussing the
conflict between the freedom of testation and the highly formal nature of the American law of
succession).
41. A number of very diverse devices are generally lumped together into the general
category of will substitutes. With the exception of the revocable trust, all of the commonly used
will substitutes inevitably involve a contract between the transferor and a corporate entity. The
doctrinal origins of the various will substitutes differ substantially and may affect the applicable
subsidiary law. For discussion of the origins of the will substitutes, see Browder, Giving or
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Leaving -

What is a Will?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 845 (1977); Gulliver & Tilson, Classizwation of

Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941); Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note
17, at 1108; Ritchie, What is a Will?, 49 VA. L. REv. 759 (1963). These differences in the
subsidiary law may involve issues such as the access of spouses and creditors to the transferred
property if the probate estate turns out to be insufficient to meet their claims. The 1969 UPC
attempted to deal with the problem of the disinherited spouse through the concept of the
"augmented estate." See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 (1969). The revised provision expands the
concept to take in the decedent's "reclaimable estate," including certain transfers made by means
of will substitute. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-201 (1990).
The formalities for transfers by will substitutes have generally emerged from principles
applicable to trusts and contracts; no uniform standard such as that applicable to wills exists.
The forms of will substitutes can differ greatly in formality among themselves, from a very
formal contract which can only be revoked in the manner set out within the document that is
strictly construed by the courts (life insurance contract) to a purely oral declaration of trust
that can be revoked in any manner specified by the transferor. The informality of the will
substitutes is purely relative and in practice depends upon the specific device employed. However, Langbein argues that the applicable formalities for will substitutes are functionally equivalent to those required for will execution. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32,
at 505-09. Langbein also argues that the alternative formality of the will substitutes satisfies
the purposes of the wills act. Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 17, at 1130-32.
42. For discussion of revocable trusts, see, e.g., 1 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 57.1
(3d ed. 1967); Bordwell, supra note 24; Browder, supra note 41, at 870-74; Clark, Inter Vivos
Trust Valid Despite Testamentary Objections; the Border Line, 3 KAN. B.A.J. 270 (1934);
Gulliver & Tilson, supranote 41, at 24-25; Kornfield, New York's Highest Court Lifts Injunction
on Dacey's "How to Avoid Probate"Book, 107 TR. & EST. 104 (Feb. 1968); Langbein, Nonprobate
Revolution, supra note 17, at 1113; Langbein, SubstantialCompliance, supra note 32, at 505-08;
Love, Imperfect Gifts as Declarations of Trust: An Unapologetic Anomaly, 67 Ky. L.J. 309
(1979); Lowe, Some Remarks Concerning the Revocable Self-Declaration of Trust, 32 Mo. L.
REV. 199 (1967); Lynn, Estate Planning:Good-bye to Wills, Trusts, and Future Interests, 39
OHIO ST. L.J. 717 (1978); Ritchie, supra note 41, at 763-65; Schuyler, Revocable Trusts Spouses, Creditors, and Other Predators,8 INST. ON EST. PLAN. § 74.1300 (1974); Scott, The
Effects of a Power to Revoke a Trust, 57 HARv. L. REV. 362, 368-77 (1944); Scott, Trusts and
the Statute of Wills, 43 HARV. L. REV. 521, 522 (1930) [hereinafter Scott, Trusts]; Seftenberg,
The Border Lines of Agency, Living Trusts, and Testamentary Disposition, 5 Wis. L. REV.
321 (1930); Wellman, The New Uniform Probate Code, 56 A.B.A. J. 637 (1970) [hereinafter
Wellman, New UPC]; Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate
Avoidance, 44 IND. L.J. 191 (1969); Note, The Uniform ProbateCode - A RefreshingApproach
to ProbateReform, 46 N.D. L. REV. 327 (1970); Comment, Will Substitutes in Mississippi, 41
Miss. L.J. 177, 185-86 (1969); Comment, Validity of Revocable Trusts in Kansas, 11 U. KAN.
L. REV. 375 (1963) [hereinafter Revocable Trusts]; Comment, Will Substitutes in Kansas, 23
WASHBURN L.J. 132, 157-58 (1983) [hereinafter Will Substitutes]. For discussion of revocable
trusts, see infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text. For a more general discussion of revocable
trusts, see T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 177-83 (2d ed. 1953); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 22 (6th
ed. 1987).
For the work that is usually credited with setting off the "nonprobate revolution," by promoting use of revocable trusts, see the infamous N. DACEY, How TO AVOID PROBATE (1965)
[hereinafter N. DACEY, 1965]; N. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE NEWLY UPDATED! (1980)
[hereinafter N. DACEY, 1980]. For responses by the legal profession to Dacey's attack, see
Zartman, How to Void Dacey 1980, 17 LAW NOTES FOR GEN. PRAc. 73 (1981).
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joint and survivor bank accounts, 43 tentative or Totten trusts,4 pay-

43.

The UPC recognizes joint accounts as one of three distinct forms of multi-party accounts.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 6-101(5) (1969). See also id. § 6-101 (defining joint account); § 6-103(a)

(dealing with issue of lifetime ownership); and § 6-104(a) (dealing with rights of survivors). For
discussion of joint accounts, see Annotation, Creation of Joint Savings Account or Savings
Certificate as Gift to Survivor, 43 A.L.R.3d 971 (1972).
For further discussion of joint accounts, see T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 167-70; Boyce,
Joint Bank Accounts with Right of Survivorship: A Conceptual Maze, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 477
(1977); Browder, supra note 41, at 855; Hines, PersonalProperty Joint Tenancies: More Law,
Fact and Fancy, 54 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1970); Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank
Account Muddle, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 376 (1959) [hereinafter Kepner, Joint Account Muddle];
Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account - A Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF.
L. REV. 596 (1953) [hereinafter Kepner, Joint Account Concept]; Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 17, at 1112; Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 504-05;
McGovern, supra note 21, at 15-18; Virden, Joint Tenancy with Right of Survivorship
("JTWROS") Accounts in Texas: Caveat Depositor, 51 TEX. B.J. 455 (May 1988). See generally
Note, Probate - Person: Absent Clear and Convincing Evidence of a Different Intent, During
the Lifetime of All Parties a Joint Account Belongs to the Partiesin Proportion to the Net
Contributions by Each to the Sums on Deposit, and Upon the Death of a Joint Tenant the
Surviving Tenants Succeed to the Interest of the Decedent in Equal Shares, the Right of Survivorship Continuing Among Them, In re Estate of Thompson, 66 Ohio St. 2d 433, 423 N.E.2d 90
(1981), 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 852 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Joint Account Ownership]; Comment,
Texas Probate Code Section 439(A): Conclusive or Rebuttable Presumption of Survivorship?,
35 BAYLOR L. REV. 837 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Presumption of Survivorship].
44. The UPC recognizes the trust account as one of three distinct forms of multi-party
accounts. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 6-101(5) (1969). See also id. § 6-101(14) (defining "trust account");
§ 6-101(2) (defining "beneficiary"); § 6-103(c) (dealing with issue of lifetime ownership); § 6-104(c)
(dealing with right of survivorship).
For discussion of trust accounts ("Totten" or "tentative" trusts), see T. ATKINSON, supra
note 42, § 41, at 173-77, §§ 13.01(a)(4), 13-22-23; G. BOGERT, supra note 42, § 20, at 44-48;
Bogert, The Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits, 1 CORNELL L.Q. 159 (1916);
Browder, supra note 41, at 856; Clark, supra note 42, at 278-82; Cohan, PennsylvaniaTentative
Trusts: Problems and Problem Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 972 (1962); Estes, In Search of a
Less Tentative Totten, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 21 (1977); Friedman, supra note 23, at 368-69;
Graubert, Tentative Trust Deposits, 39 DICK. L. REV. 37 (1934); Gulliver & Tilson, supra note
41, at 32-39; Langbein, SubstantialCompliance, supra note 32, at 505-08; Langbein, Nonprobate
Revolution, supra note 17, at 111; Larremore, JudicialLegislation in New York, 14 YALE L.J.
315 (1905); Lynn, supra note 42, at 10-12; Moynihan, Trusts of Savings Deposits in Massachusetts, 22 B.U.L. REV. 271 (1942); Scott, Trusts, supra note 42, at 540-44; Wittebort,
Savings Account Trusts: A CriticalExamination, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 686 (1974); Note,
Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L. REV. 1189 (1963); Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: The
Poor Man's Will, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 103 (1953); Note, Savings Bank Trusts, 8 TEMP. L.Q.
87 (1933); Note, Tentative Trust Deposits, 39 DICK. L. REV. 37 (1934); Note, Testamentary
Uses of Bank Accounts, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 737 (1933); Comment, Matter of Totten - An
Anomaly in the Law of Trusts, 6 DE PAUL L. REV. 117 (1956); Comment, Revocable Trusts,
supra note 42, at 375; Comment, Savings Bank Trusts in New York, 37 YALE L.J. 1133 (1928);
Comment, Savings Deposit "in Trust" CreatingTentative Trust Not Testamentary in Character,
85 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1937); Comment, Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will, 42 N.C.L. REV.
214 (1963); Comment, Trusts - Deposit in Name of Depositorin Trust for Another - Testamen-
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able-on-death accounts, 45 insurance contracts, 46 pension plans, 47 and

even oral trusts of personalty4

-

accomplish the primary effect of a

tary Disposition, 14 MINN. L. REV. 701 (1930); Comment, Trusts - Tentative Trust Doctrine
- Cal Civ. Code (1931), Section 2280, 7 S. CAL. L. REV. 116 (1933); Comment, Trusts: Totten
Trusts and the Viability of P.O.D. Dispositions as Non-Testamentary, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 194
(1975) [hereinafter Comment, Viability of P.O.D. Dispositions]; Comment, Will Substitutes,
supra note 42, at 153-57. See generally In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904) (creating
the Totten Trust).
45. The 'P.O.D." account is one of the three forms of multi-party accounts recognized by
the UPC. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 6-101(5) (defining "multiple-party account"); § 6 101(10) (defining
'P.O.D." account); § 6-101(11) (defining "payee"); § 6-103(b) (dealing with issue of lifetime
ownership); § 6-104(b)(1) (dealing with right of survivorship).
The 'T.O.D." bank account is often denied recognition on the grounds that it is a testamentary
disposition subject to the wills act. See, e.g., Truax v. Southwestern College, 214 Kan. 873, 522
P.2d 412 (1974); Compton v. Compton, 435 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1968); Blais v. Colebrook Guaranty
Say. Bank, 107 N.H. 300, 220 A.2d 763 (1966). For discussion of P.O.D. accounts, see Annotation,
Payable-on-DeathSavings Account or Certificate of Deposit as Will, 50 A.L.R.4th 272 (1989).
For additional discussion, see McGovern, supra note 21, at 7; Comment, Viability of P.O.D.
Dispositions,supra note 44, at 194.
46. For discussion of insurance contracts, see T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, § 69, at 161-63;
G. BOGERT, supra note 42, § 22 (life insurance trusts); M. CRAWFORD & W. BEADLES, LAW
AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT (6th ed. 1989); Browder, supra note 41, at 854, 872
(life insurance and insurance trusts); Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 25-26 (life insurance
trusts); Kimball, The Functions of Designations of Beneficiaries in Modern Life Insurance:
U.S.A. in LIFE INSURANCE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 74 (J. Hellner & G.
Nord eds. 1969); Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 17, at 1110-11; Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 508-09; Mohan, Life Insurance in Estate PlanningTaxation & Uses Today, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 773 (1986/87); Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest
in a Life InsurancePolicy, 31 YALE L.J. 343 (1922); Note, The Blockbuster Will: Effectuating
the Testator's Intent to Change Will Substitute Beneficiaries, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 719, 723-24,
730-34 (1987); Note, The Testamentary Life Insurance Trust, 51 MINN L. REV. 1118 (1967);
Comment, Life Insurance Settlement Options and the Statute of Wills - A Survey and a
Suggestion, 50 N.W. U.L. REV. 796 (1956).
47. See Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988) (discussing use of pension plans as will substitutes); Lynn, supra
note 42, at 725-26, 730-33.
48. Under present law, oral declarations of trust in personal property are generally permitted. The effect of the oral declaration of trust is to give to the beneficiary of the trust a revocable
interest in the property that will come into the beneficiary's possession and enjoyment on the
transferor's death. 1A. SCOTr, supra note 42, § 28; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 28.
See also Love, supra note 42, at 317 (discussing the use of oral trusts as a rationale for upholding
attempted but imperfect gifts that failed because the donor died before completing delivery).
Courts and commentators criticize oral trusts as a fictional transfer of an ethereal present
interest. See, e.g., Richards v. Delbridge, 18 L.R. Eq. 11 (1874) (stating that oral trusts are
rare and trust law usually prevents courts from construing imperfect (undelivered) gifts as
declarations of trust); Browder, supra note 41, at 876; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at
16-17 (suggesting that the oral declaration of trust in personal property without delivery is an
abandonment of the policies served by formalities of transfer, but concluding that this device
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will: the transfer of property to the owner's selected successor at
death. The juridical fiction by which these transfers are upheld, even
though they do not meet the formal wills act requirements, relates to
the timing of the supposed transfer. 4 9 The will substitutes are treated
as creating an interest in the intended transferee during the lifetime
of the transferor, specifically at the time the transferor relinquishes
the requisite fraction of control, notwithstanding the transferor's express or implied reservation of a virtually unlimited right to reclaim
the interest that was transferred.50 The will substitutes, characteristically revocable, are thus in effect also ambulatory because the transferee has neither possession, enjoyment, nor any ownership interest
permitting any degree of practical control over the property. 51 This
in the property
is true despite the ubiquitous fiction that an "interest"
2
disposition.5
the
of
time
the
at
is transferred
Courts regard the use of a will substitute to create a property
interest in the owner's designated successor as the act of a living
person. Thus, so goes the rationale, a will substitute can effectuate
the owner's intentions respecting the disposition of property at death
without the need for a will to channel these intentions or for a court
to interpret them. The relatively informal procedures for transferring
property by means of the will substitutes and the relatively flexible
approach of courts in giving them effect,5 makes the ritualistic em-

is rarely employed "since laymen would not normally think of using a declaration of trust unless
they had previously consulted an attorney, and, . . . the attorney would probably recommend
that the trust be committed to writing").
49. Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 17, at 1126-29.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The actual dynamic involved in a disposition by will substitute seems to be relinquishment by the owner of some nominal fraction of the right to absolute control over the property,
rather than the transfer of any identifiable property interest. See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 5
Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955) (holding that all that is required to create a trust is some
transfer of an immeasurably small amount of interest in property); In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112,
71 N.E. 748 (1904). For discussion of will substitutes and their doctrinal foundations, see
Browder, supra note 41, at 845; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 1; Langbein, Nonprobate
Revolution, supra note 17, at 1108; Ritchie, supra note 41, at 765.
53. The informality and flexibility are relative. Life insurance contracts, for example, are
quite strictly construed. Oral declarations of trust, although permitted in theory, are seldom
used in practice. Generally speaking, the transferor using a will substitute must have observed
the procedures required to implement these transfers in order to ensure enforceability. See
Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 17, at 1130-33 (stating that will substitutes require
"alternative formality"). Failure to observe the requisite formalities does not, however, automatically raise a conclusive presumption of invalidity as is the case for formally defective wills. For
discussion of this presumption in its application to wills, see Langbein, Substantial Compliance,
supra note 32, at 512, 520; Mann, supra note 32, at 59-62.
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phasis on form when the transferor has elected to dispose of property
by will seem unjust and irrational. Will substitutes allow property
owners to select their successors at death without attempting to make
a will, yet the individual who attempts to make a disposition by will
must strictly comply with the requirements of the wills act or risk
disposition under the state's scheme of succession 4
3.

Formalism

In considering the insistence on strict formality that characterizes
the law of wills, commentators distinguish the concepts of formality
and formalism. Probate scholars generally concede that a certain level
of formality in disposing of property serves the useful purpose of
creating evidence of what property the owner specifically intended to
give away, the conditions under which it was given, and the person
or persons intended to benefit.5 A number of eminent scholars convincingly argue that the form of a properly executed and witnessed will
is well adapted to serve its primary functions, which are (1) to serve
as a substitute for extrinsic proof of the testator's intent to make the
disposition; and (2) to preserve reliable evidence of authenticity.5
The properly executed and attested will is immediately identifiable
by its format and obviates the need for factfinding respecting the
intentions of testators who can no longer speak for themselves. Although courts and commentators differ as to the optimum level of
formality needed to accomplish these purposes, no one recommends
abolishing the statutes of wills in favor of an approach which gives
effect to intentions established solely by means of extrinsic evidence.
Although some commentators ascribe to the minimalist philosophy of
the UPC which reduces the procedures for executing attested and
holographic wills to their bare essentials, 57 and one commentator pro-

For articles discussing the impact of transferor's intentions on interpretation and enforcement
of will substitutes, see Estes, supra note 44, at 23-24; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 1;
Love, supra note 42, at 309; McGovern, supra note 21, at 7; Virden, supra note 43, at 455;
Comment, Presumption of Survivorship, supra note 43, at 852.
54. Langbein, Nojprobate Revolution, supra note 17, at 1134-35; Langbein, Substantial
Compliance, supra note 32, at 504-05.
55. For discussion of the functions of the formalities of transfer, see infra notes 470-615
and accompanying text, especially infra notes 470-522.
56. For discussion of the role of formality as a substitute for proof of extrinsic circumstances,
see infranotes 470-615 and accompanying text. For discussion of the role of formality in ensuring
the authenticity of the transfer, see infra notes 505-11 and accompanying text.
57. The UPC provisions are discussed infra in notes 183-203 and accompanying text (discussing attested wills) and in notes 249-63 and accompanying text (discussing holographic wills).
For articles discussing the minimalist philosophy of the UPC, see Kossow, ProbateLaw and
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poses abolishing the attestation requirement altogether,- no one
suggests a practical substitute for formality as evidence of intent and
authenticity.
However, although scholars generally accept the utility of statutorily mandated standards of formality, they question the insistence of
courts on strict, literal compliance with the wills act, particularly in
instances in which the circumstances indicate the testator's error or
omission does not raise any real issue as to the document's authenticity
or the existence of testamentary intent.5 9 The probate courts themselves and the appellate courts that supervise them and review their
decisions are criticized severely for their "mechanical, literal" application of the wills act formalities.- ° The appellate courts in particular
bear criticism for their reluctance to apply "techniques of judicial
reasoning and statutory interpretation" to issues concerning due execution in wills cases. 61 While acknowledging the need for formality in
wills execution, the commentators are very critical of formalism in
the courts' interpretation of the requirements.
In considering the problem of wills act formalism, it seems that
some attention should be given to the link between formality and
formalism (the process by which the doctrine of strict compliance has
developed in the courts). The extent of the problem also needs to be
examined. While it is true that any defect in execution, no matter
how minute, technically violates the requirements of the wills acts,
courts frequently develop rationalizations, on a more or less ad hoc
basis, for saving those instruments containing only slight departures
from the strict requirements of the wills acts. 62 This approach only

, 61 GEo L.J. 1357 (1973); Kornfeld, supra note 42;
the Uniform Code: One for the Money ...
Wellman, New UPC, supra note 42; Wellman, Recent Developments in the Struggle for Probate
Reform, 79 MICH. L. REV. 501 (1981); Wellman & Gordon, Uniformity in State Inheritance
Laws: How UPC Article H Has Fared in Nine Enactments, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 357.
58. Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement, 68 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1990).
59. See, e.g., Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 1; Langbein, Substantial
Compliance, supra note 32, at 489; Mann, supra note 32, at 39.
60. Mann, supra note 32, at 64-66.
61. Id. at 66.
62. Friedman, supra note 23. at 372-73 (explaining the willingness of some courts to avoid
application of the strict compliance doctrine to wills). Friedman remarked that
Students of the law of wills know, however, that many rigid rules are not quite
so rigid as they seem ....
How often and why do courts use this power of evasion? Hard statistics are
not available. Over the course of the century there has been, perhaps, some decay
in rigid rules of interpretation. We can speculate on the reasons. The mass, middleclass market for testation has led to a decline in the level of artifice necessary for
drafting and administering the average will. The legal profession has lost its mastery
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saves wills in those instances in which the court finds that the arguably
defective conduct in fact achieves compliance with the intention of the
statutory requirements, and differs radically from a harmless error
rule that permits concededly defective wills to be admitted to probate
if the document satisfies the testator's intent63 In the first instance,
the court is relying on factual distinctions and statutory interpretation
to find that marginal conduct in fact meets the wills act requirements.
A harmless error rule, however, permits the court to dispense with
the execution requirements if other evidence establishes the requisite
intent.
B. The Rule of Strict Compliance and the Function of Formality
in the Law of Wills
1. Historical Function of Formality

a. Attested Wills
(1) Origins and evolution of the statutes of wills6"
(a) The Anglo-Saxon period
Very little is known about succession of property prior to the
Norman Conquest, although scholars agree that the power to name

of the fine points of inherited property law. Both of these factors put pressure on
courts and legislatures to continue only those formalities and rigidities which are
or seem to be useful under the conditions of the market demand for the use of the
law of succession. As far as the courts are concerned, their role in the legal system
in general has changed; state courts in particular no longer are or can imagine
themselves to be a major force in building up and maintaining legal doctrine. The
temptation is therefore great to cease expounding grand principles and pay more
attention to bandaging small wounds, making minor adjustments, correcting specific
deficiencies, and curing tiny injustices in the particular case. Furthermore, the
development and mass use of all sorts of will substitutes influence the legal system
to adopt a relatively permissive attitude toward the formalities of any one of the
accepted modalities of transfer.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
63. For discussion of "quantitative" substantial compliance as applied in the courts, see
infra notes 320-94 and accompanying text. For discussion of 'unctional" substantial compliance
as applied to deem execution defects harmless, see infra notes 695-712 and accompanying text.
For comparison, see infra notes 713-15 and accompanying text.
64. For historical background of the wills acts and the evolution of the right of testation,
see ANGLO-SAXON WILLS (D. Whitelock ed. 1930); T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 6-36; T.
PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 712-46 (5th ed. 1956); 2 F. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 240-60,
314-63 (2d ed. 1968); A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND
OF THE LAW OF WILLS 1-66 (1928); Bordwel, The Statute Law of Wills, 14 IowA L. REV. 1
(1928); Hazeltine, General Preface to ANGLO-SAXON WILLS vii-xi (D. Whitelock ed. 1930);
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successors to personal property was recognized during the AngloSaxon period. 65 The major issue was whether a property owner could
deprive the heirs of the -property by any form of transfer, regardless
of whether it took effect inter vivos or at the death of the owner.6

The modern concept of testation developed "in the realm of personalty";67 there were different rules for land and chattels, "although the
distinction was neither of the kind nor to the degree which developed
after the Conquest." The concept of the testament of personal property may have been an innovation derived from Roman law69 intro70
duced in Britain through the medium of the Roman Catholic Church
although the form which these dispositions assumed were clearly not
imported from Rome.71 Instead, the Anglo-Saxons used devices that
were already familiar to them - the contract, the grant of a revision,
and the post obit gift 2 -- and adapted documents based on Roman
models to their native Germanic customs, 7 3 with their emphasis on
"spoken words and manual acts. 7 4

Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 332-47; Comment, An Analysis of the History and Present
Status of American Wills Statutes, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 293 (1967); see also Atkinson, Brief
History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction, 8 Mo. L. REV. 107 (1943); Helmholz, Debt
Claims andProbateJurisdictionin HistoricalPerspective, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 68 (1979).
65. For discussion of Anglo-Saxon "wills," see T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 11-12; T.
PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 733-35; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, &upranote 64, at
314-22; A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 5-7; Atkinson, supra note 64, at 107-09.
For examples of the Anglo-Saxon "will," see ANGLO-SAXON WILLS, supra note 64.

66. T.

ATKINSON,

supra note 42, at 11.

67. Id. at 15.
68. Atkinson, supra note 64, at 108.
69. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 9. Over time, the Roman will evolved into a
written instrument, signed by the maker and seven witnesses, that was ambulatory and revocable. 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, REVISED TREATISE: PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 2.6
(1901). But see F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 316-17. "[T]he connexion
between the Anglo-Saxon will and the Roman testament is exceedingly remote. . . . The
Anglo-Saxon 'will,' or cwide as it calls itself, seems to have grown up on English soil, and the
Roman testament has had little to do with its development." Id.
70. T. PLUCKNE'Tr, supra note 64, at 734.
71. Id.
The eagerness of converts to endow the clergy of the new religion certainly induced
them to seek for testamentary machinery, but it seems quite clear that they did
not in fact import that machinery from abroad ... [though the] Roman form was
still common down to the ninth century on the continent.
Id. For discussion, see Hazeltine, supra note 64, at viii-ix. Hazeltine emphasizes the Germanic
character of the Anglo-Saxon "will," with its "oral, formalistic, and symbolical features." Id. at ix.
72. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 734. For discussion of the contractual aspect of
Anglo-Saxon "wills," see infra note 93.
73. Hazeltine, supra note 64, at ix.
74. Id.
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The earliest form of "will" was probably the post obit gift. 75 By
modern standards, the post obit gift seems inherently ambiguous, consisting as it did as an irrevocable present gift of property which did
not take effect until the death of the donor. 76
The verba novissima, or deathbed distribution, developed later.7
This consisted of a statement on the part of the dying man
... usually made to his confessor, directing what disposition
should be made of his property. As these dispositions depended, for effectiveness, upon the power of the Church,
some portion of the dying man's chattels were usually given
to the Church for pious uses. 78
The deathbed distribution was part and parcel of the deathbed confession "with its accompanying effort to wipe out past sin." 79 The verba
novissima differed from the post obit gift in that it was truly a deathbed disposition; whereas the maker of a post obit gift might reasonably
have expected to live many years, the verbanovissima "are essentially
words spoken by one who knows himself to be passing away." 0 The
disposition was oral and was part of the religious service performed
for the dying. 1 In order to avoid challenges to the priest's account of
the intended distribution, he was encouraged to "take with him one
or two, so that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word
may be established, for perchance the avarice of the kinsfolk of the
dead would contradict what was said by the clergy, were there but
one priest or deacon present."'
During the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, these two modes
of disposition "coalesce[d] in the written cwide,"' the Anglo-Saxon
75. A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 5; Hazeltine, supra note 64, at xi-x.
76. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 317. Hazeltine argues that the post
obit gift is irrevocable because the donor contractually promises in making the will (an inter
vivos transaction) that the donees are to have conveyed to them the subject-matter of the gift.
"In the Germanic gift contract and conveyance are in truth closely interwoven; but in that
species known as the donatio post obitum contract predominates." Hazeltine, supranote 64, at
xi.
77. A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 6.
78. Id. The effect of this transaction was that the dying property owner appointed the
confessor or some other person to see to the distribution of the chattels that were the subject
of the verba novissima. The modern concept of the executor may have developed from this
practice. Id.
79. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 318.
80. Id. at 319. For discussion, see Hazeltine, supra note 64, at xii.
81. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 319.
82. Id. at 318-19.
83. Id. at 319.
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"will." The Anglo-Saxon concept of the cwide differed in several fundamental respects from "the later juridical meaning" of the term
"will, '" but was nevertheless the predecessor of the modern will.The Anglo-Saxon cwide seems to have been in essence an oral transaction;8 the written documents were apparently mere memorials of
the essential jural act in which the author of the intended disposition
cwaeth his cwide, that is, says his say. 7 The written will "was an
exotic in England," probably originating out of the desire of the
church to preserve evidence of dispositions for the benefit of the church
in a writing.89
The cwide was an "exceedingly formless instrument," usually written in the vernacular (or common tongue) rather than in the Latin
typically used in ecclesiastical writings.- The language memorializing
the dispositions of property is imprecise and extremely various.

84.
85.
86.

Hazeltine, supra note 64, at vii.
Id.
Id. at x, xiv-xv.

87. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 733. "[T]hese words still survived into middle English
as 'quoth,' and into modern English as 'bequeath' and 'bequest."' Id.
The oral character of the Anglo-Saxon will is proved by many statements found
not only in the written wills, but also in documents which recount the history of
transactions in regard to certain properties. The donor, using the vernacular, "bequeathes in spoken words"; and no doubt some of these words are spoken formally
in order that the oral disposition may be strengthened or confirmed. The donor
... "speaks his cwide": and his cwide, spoken in Anglo-Saxon, is reproduced in
the written will. The very fact that the written wills are in the vernacular is some
proof, although of course not conclusive proof, that the scribe has merely taken
In one way or another the written wills disclose to us
down what he heard ....
the fact that the will itself, in contrast with the writing which enshrines it, is a
will declared orally in the presence of witnesses: the writing is merely documentation of the oral will.
Hazeltine, supra note 64, at xiv-xv (emphasis added). For arguments in support of the oral
character of Anglo-Saxon wills, see id. at vii-xi.
88. Hazeltine, supra note 64, at xii.
89.

Id.

At least from the beginning of the eighth century onwards ecclesiastical policy
furthered the idea that spoken words were sufficient for gifts and contracts. Lest,
however, spoken words fade from the memory, declare ecclesiastical draftsmen in
the preambles to eighth-century Anglo-Saxon charters, it is best to have evidence
of these words in a writing. To the proof of oral acts furnished by transactions-witnesses, which was already a feature of Anglo-Saxon law, there was now the added
evidence of writings. ...
Id.
90.

F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 319-20.
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So informal and untechnical are these documents that it
is impossible to draw any certain conclusions as to their
mode of operation. Frequently they merely say, "I give" this
and that - without further qualification, although it is clear
that the donor is not in fact immediately divesting himself

of his property. 91

91. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 733. 'The structure of the Anglo-Saxon will is...
variable. Sometimes it is in narrative form relating that 'this is the quide that Aelfric bequoth
ere he fared over sea. . .' the substance following in the first person. Sometimes the whole
document may be in the third person; frequently it is in the form of an address, and sometimes
reads almost like a letter." Id.
The several parts of the written will correspond in fact to the several stages in
the oral and formal act of making the will. The declaration or announcement,
characteristic of the opening part of the instrument, corresponds to the oral declaration or announcement; the written grant is a copy of the verbal grant; the written
sanction is a report of the spoken sanction. The fluctuation in the personal pronoun
and in the tense, which is a marked feature of the writings, is to be explained
only if we remember that the scribe, acting a passive role, has sometimes taken
down the words as from dictation; while, at other times, giving perhaps his own
version of the transaction, he has indicated the grantor by using the third personal
pronoun and has employed the past tense instead of the present in referring to
the transaction as a whole.
Hazeltine, supra note 64, at xxx-xxxi.
In a typical Anglo-Saxon cwivde, we find the property owner or donor giving
his various lands specifically, providing for his kinsfolk, remembering his dependents, freeing some of his slaves and bestowing lands and rents upon various
churches. He also makes gifts of specific chattels, his precious swords, cups and
vestments are distributed. He says how many swine are to go with this piece of
land and how many with that. He sometimes gives what we should describe as
pecuniary legacies.... Occasionally... we see residuary gifts of chattels and lands.
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 320.
An example of a "typical" Anglo-Saxon "will" follows.
Wynflaed declares how she wishes to dispose of what she possesses, after her
death. She bequeathes to the church her offering -

.

. and the better of her

offering-cloths, and her cross; and to the refectory two silver cups for the community; and as a gift for the good of her soul a mancus of gold to every servant of
God....

And she bequeathes to her daughter Aetheliflaed her engraved bracelet and her
brooch, and the estate at Ebbesborne and the title-deed as a perpetual inheritance
to dispose of as she pleases....
And Wulfwaru is to be freed, and she is to serve whom she pleases .... And
Wulfflaed is to be freed on condition that she serve Aethelflaed and Eadgifu. And
she bequeathes to Eadgifu a woman-weaver and a seamstress. ...
And to Aelfwold her two buffalo-horns and a horse and her red tent. And she
bequeathes to Eadmaer a cup with a lid, and another to Aethelflaed, and prays
that between them they will furnish two fair goblets to the refectory for her sake,
or augment her own ornamented cups. . . worth one pound. Then she would like
half a pound of pence to be put into each cup, and that Eadwold should be given
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It is often impossible to determine whether a given document was

intended as a will, testament, grant, or gift. 2 Hazeltine argues that
many or "perhaps most" of these transactions had a contractual aspect, 93 since the concepts of "grant" and "contract" were not clearly

back his own two silver cups. And she bequeathes to him her gold-adorned
cup in order that he may enlarge his armlet with the gold, or that he may
sixteen mancuses of red gold in exchange; that amount has been put on
she bequeathes to him two chests and in them a set of bed-clothing, all that
to one bed.

wooden
receive
it. And
belongs

And with regard to the estate at Chinnock, the community at Shaftesbury
possess it after her death, and she owns the stock and the men; this being so, she
grants to the community the peasants who dwell on the rented land, and the
bondmen she grants to her son's daughter Eadgifu, and also the stock . . . and
she wishes that six oxen and four cows with four calves be allowed to remain on
the estate....
And she bequeathes to Aetheflaed . . . Aelfhere's younger daughter, and her
double badger-skin gown, and another of linen or else some linen cloth. And to
Eadgifu two chests and in them her best bed-curtain and a linen covering and all
the bed-clothing which goes with it, . . . and her best dun tunic, and the better
of her cloaks, and her two wooden cups ornamented with dots, and her old filagree
brooch ... and a long hall-tapestry and a short one and three seat coverings. And
she grants to Ceolthryth whichever she prefers of her black tunics and her best
holy veil and her best headband; and to Aethelflaed the White her ... gown and
cap and headband, and afterwards Aethelflaed is to supply from her nun's vestments
the best she can for Wulfflaed and Aethelgifu and supplement it with gold so that
each of them shall have at least sixty pennyworth ....
And there are two large
chests and a clothes' chest, and a little spinning box and two old chests.
Then she makes a gift to Aethelflaed of everything which is unbequeathed,
books and such small things, and she trusts that she will be mindful of her soul.
"The Will of Wynflaed," reprinted in ANGLO-SAXON WILLS, supra note 64, at 11-15.
92. A. REPPY & L. TOMPKrNS, supra note 64, at 6.
93. Hazeltine, supra note 64, at xviii. Hazeltine argues that the line between contract and
gift during Anglo-Saxon times was extremely vague. Id. at xix.
In Anglo-Saxon law, as in other Germanic customary systems, gift is not gratuitous;
gift requires counter-gift or counter-performance. When, therefore, lay folk and
clerical folk bargain, they exchange gifts. The gift of the laymen is land; the gift
of the clergy is the care of the soul by spiritual services. In these gifts and
counter-gifts there is the intermingling of conveyance and contract; and sometimes
these two inherent qualities, or aspects, of gift seem almost inextricably interwoven.
Id. at xx.
[Liet us consider a notable feature of many wills. The writings in which wills are
embodied prove to us that in fact many a donor, or quasi-testator, confirms by
his will agreements which he has already concluded with . . . other persons, in
regard to the devolution on their death of properties which belong to them. These
contracts . . . were concluded orally in the presence of witnesses; and they were
confirmed by the parties by formal acts, such as solemn promises to God and the
saints or the mutual delivery of symbolic pledges (wedd). The written wills leave
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distinguished during the period.9 In any event, the Anglo-Saxon will
was "concluded in such a way as to be not only capable of being heard
and seen, but actually heard and seen by witnesses," and thus "complied with the general requirements of Germanic custom in regard to
' 95
legal transactions.
A fundamental difference between the cwide and the modern will
is that in the cwide the dispositive act consisted in the oral disposition
before witnesses.96 The writing itself served a purely evidentiary function;9 the writing or recording of the cwide was no part of the "ritual"98
serving to affirm and effectuate the intent of the property owner to

make the disposition. The document was therefore not an instrument
of disposition in the sense of modern wills, but merely a memorial of
a disposition9 which, once spoken before witnesses, 1' seems to have
been considered to be irrevocable. 10'

us in no doubt as to the nature of these contracts: they were "spoken" agreements
made binding by the use of formalities and symbols.
Id. at xxi.
94. Id. at xix. "In Anglo-Saxon times Grant, or Gift, included within itself both the idea
of conveyance and the idea of contract. Conveyance and contract were aspects of Grant; and in
some grants one or the other of these two characteristics predominated." Id.
95. Id. at xxi.
Early Germanic custom demanded that these transactions be not only capable of
being heard and seen, but that they be actually heard and seen; and, hence, spoken
words and manual acts that were formal and symbolical dominated the law in
regard to the formation of contracts and the conveyance of property.
Id. at ix. "[W]ith the firm support of the Church, the Anglo-Saxons continued on their own
traditional Germanic course and made their wills, just as they concluded all their other jural
acts, by word of mouth." Id. at xiv.
96. Hazeltine presents a number of arguments supporting the essentially oral character of
the cwide in the "general preface" to Whitelock's translation of Anglo-Saxon wills. Hazeltine,
supra note 64. "[T]heir very name, cwide, is a warning that whatever forms may clothe them,
it is an oral institution which lies beneath." T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 734. Cf. F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 320.
97. Hazeltine, supra note 64, at xxxi.
98. For discussion of the ritual function of formality, see infra notes 490-92 and accompanying text.
99. Hazeltine, supra note 64, at xxv; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 733. 'These documents were not the wills themselves, the dispositive acts in the law. The wills were the oral
declarations before witnesses; the writings were merely evidentiary." Hazeltine, supra note 64,
at xii.
100. See Hazeltine, supra note 64, at xii, xvii; F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
64, at 318-20.
It is ... possible that in some cases the will in its written form was read out to
those who had witnessed the making of the oral will; but under these circumstances
the oral reading of the writing would appear to have constituted what one may
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The nature of the dispositions contained in the cwide is uncertain.
According to Pollock and Maitland, most of these dispositions lacked
not only the quality of revocability, one of the fundamental characteristics of the modern will, 102 but also the characteristic ambulatoriness
of truly testamentary dispositions.103 The relative vagueness of concepts of property and contract that prevailed at the time may explain
the considerable inconsistency and imprecision of the dispositive language.l°- The makers of at least some of the surviving documents seem
to have contemplated dispositions that were not intended to become
effective until death and that applied to property acquired after the
time the cwide was made, or that could have been revoked at pleasure. 105 While many of the documents had some features of a modern
will, it is questionable whether any one of them had all of the characteristics. 0 6

describe as a secondary orality which, although not part of the jural act of making
the will, had as its purpose the strengthening of the earlier oral declaration, or
announcement, of the will.
Hazeltine, supra note 64, at xvii.
101. T. PLUCKNET, supra note 64, at 734; see also F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra
note 64, at 320. "[I]t seems that the majority of Anglo-Saxon wills were irrevocable whatever
their form. Alfred indeed burnt his earlier wills - but he was a king; occasionally a subject
expressly reserves the right to vary his will." T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 734.
102. See Bordwell, supra note 64, at 10-17 (discussing the fundamental aspects of a will).
But see "The Will of Bishop Aelfsige," reprinted in ANGLO-SAXON WILLS, supra note 64, at
17, which concludes by invoking curses against anyone who interferes with the dispositions set
out in the cwide "unless I myself change it" and "The Will of Aelfgar," reprinted in ANGLOSAXON WILLS, supra note 64, at 9, which contains similar language.
103. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 320. "We must.., assume that the
Anglo-Saxon will was not in its nature ambulatory, and it is very rarely that a testator attempts
to make it so." T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 734. But see "The Will of Wynflaed," reprinted
in ANGLO-SAXON WILLS, supra note 64, at 10-15, quoted in supra note 91, in which Wynflaed
appears to be making dispositions of her property that are not intended to be effective until
her death, since in several instances the disposition is of the donee's choice of one or more of
several items. The notion that after Wynflaed's death her successors are to choose what property
they would like to have seems inconsistent with the notion of a present gift. In addition, the
will contains a disposition of what seems to be the residue of her chattels, presumably including
property acquired after the making of the cwide.
104. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
105. See A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supranote 64, at 6; Hazeltine, supra note 64, at vii.
106. Hazeltine, supra note 64, at vii.
The true will is not only a unilateral written disposition of property to take effect
on the death of the testator; it possesses also the qualities of revocability and
ambulatoriness; and, in addition, it names an executor. While the germs of one or
more of these features of the later will are to be found in some of these Anglo-Saxon
documents, no one of them possesses all the requisite qualities.
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The cwide differed from the modern will in yet another important
respect: the making of a ewide was a privilege that was extended to
the maker outside the bounds of ordinary law.'07 Pollock and Maitland

conjecture that the ewide was a practice which originated among the

wealthy and important people of the day 08 and that to ensure that
the cwide would "stand" at the property owner's death, the consent
of the king had to be obtained in return for payment. 10 9 The language
used by some of the property owners reflects apprehensiveness respecting the ultimate effectiveness of the disposition." 0 Some of the

documents resemble supplicatory letters to the king or lord, asking
that the will be carried out.',' Many conclude with language asking
the king or some other person to ensure that the property is distributed
as the owner desired, and conclude by roundly cursing any person

who interferes." 2

107. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 64, at 734; F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
64, at 321-22.
108. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 321. "With hardly an exception these
wills are the wills of very great people, kings, queens, king's sons, bishops, ealdormen, king's
thegns." Id. at 320. "It is plausible to suppose that the purely oral novissima verba served the
purpose of ordinary folk, while the magnate would seek royal permission to use the written
cude." T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 735.
109. T. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 320. The devisability of real property
depended on the kirg's consent; "[it was an exceptional privilege which the crown could grant
or withhold.... ." T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 735.
110. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 733-34; see F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra
note 64, at 320-21. See, for example, 'The Will of Aelfgar," reprinted in ANGLO-SAXON WILLS,
supra note 64, at 7-9.
. Bishop Theodred and the Ealdorman Eadric told me,
This is Aelfgar's will ...
when I gave to my lord the sword which King Edmund gave to me, which was
worth a hundred and twenty mancuses of gold and had four pounds of silver on
the sheath, that I might have the right to make my will; and God is my witness
that I have never done wrong against my lord that I may not have this right.
Id. at 7.
111. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 64, at 733-34; F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
64, at 320-21.
112. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 734. See, for example, 'The Will of Aelfgar" and
'The Will of Bishop Aelfsige," reprinted in ANGLO-SAXON WILLS, supranote 64, at 7-9, 16-17.
Aelfgar
beseech[es] whoever may then be king, for the love of God and all his saints, that
let my children do what they may, they may never set aside the will which I have
declared for my soul's sake. And if anyone alter it, may he have to account for it
with God and the holy saints to whom I have bequeathed my property, so that he
who shall alter this will may never repent it except in the torment of hell, unless
I myself alter it before my death.
Id. at 9. Bishop Aelfsige concludes:
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(b) Wills after the Norman Conquest
(i)

Succession to land

The Norman Conquest did not result in any sudden changes in the
law of succession,113 although one effect was the ultimate disappearance
of the cwide.114 "[A] complicated set of interdependent changes"115 eventually resulted in the rules pertaining to succession. The establishment
of the common law courts brought an end to the post obit gift of land
because the king's court insisted that "a boundary must be maintained
against ecclesiastical greed and the other-worldliness of dying men"
and that in order to effectuate a disposition of property, there must
be "a real delivery of real seisin. '1 1 6 With respect to land, the law
evolved a rigid system of primogeniture succession of the freehold.117
Glanville, writing in about 1188,118 states that "only God, not man,
can make an heir."11 9 While the law permitted a person "to give freely
'
in his lifetime a reasonable part of his land to whom he pleases, 120
the dying were no longer permitted to do so on the grounds that they
were likely to make unreasonable distributions of property not reflective of their intentions if they had been in a state of mind to deliberate. 121 Gifts of land by a last will were permitted only if made and
confirmed with the assent of the heir.1 -

Then I pray you, my dear friend Aelfheah, that [you] will watch both over the
estates and those who are my kinsmen, and that you will never permit anyone to
alter this in any way. If anyone do so, may God destroy him both soul and body,
both here and in the future, unless I myself change it.
Id. at 17.
113. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 13; F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64,

at 323; A.

REPPY

& L.

TOMPKINS,

supra note 64, at 6.

114. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 735.
115. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 325.
116. A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 7, 12-13. Wills were invalid because they
lacked what had come to be regarded as the essential element of a gift, transfer of possession.
Id. at 12.
117. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 13-14; F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
64, at 325.
118. Atkinson, supra note 64, at 110.
119. THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 71 (G. Hall ed. 1965).
120. Id. at 70.
121. Id.
[T]his liberty [to dispose of land] has not hitherto been extended to those about
to die, because there might be an extravagant distribution of the inheritance if it
were permitted to one who loses both memory and reason in the turmoil of his
present suffering, a common enough happening. Therefore if anyone mortally sick
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This limitation on the ability to transfer land by will resulted in

"chicanery [being] employed to devise one's real property."'m The
equitable device known as the "use" permitted the property owner to
get around the rule of primogeniture by conveying his property to
eldest son A ("feofee") for the use of younger son B ("cestui que use"),

whom the property owner wished to benefit. The equity courts would
enforce such a conveyance against all but a bona fide purchaser on
the theory that A had a moral and enforceable obligation to B in

accordance with the provisions of the gift.m From the fifteenth to the
early sixteenth century, the use was the most common form of own-

ership.,?- The rise of the use, however, deprived the king of the incidents of tenure, a reliable source of revenue. 126 In 1535 Parliament
enacted the Statute of Uses,m which abolished the use and declared

that the person for whom the use was created had full legal title.m'
The enactment of the Statute of Wills of 1540 was a direct result of

the resentment of land owners at the loss of the power to determine
succession to their land.'
(ii) Succession to chattels

In contrast, the right of property owners to make testaments of
chattels was firmly established during this period, as the church asserted the right to protect and execute the dispositive plans of dece-

dents.'13 During this period, jurisdiction over the probate of wills became vested in the ecclesiastical courts. 131 The evolution of the testa-

began to distribute his land, which he had not in the least wished to do while he
was well, this would be presumed to result rather from turmoil of the spirit than
from deliberation of the mind.
Id.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 334.
Id.; A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 13-14.
T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 14; A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supranote 64, at 14.
W. HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH LAW 66 (1925).
Statute of Uses and Wills, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10, reprinted in A. REPPY & L.
TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 184-88.
128. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 14.
129. IW. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 126, at 66. "The Statute of Uses never represented
popular desires and its stormy legislative history indicates that it was more a means of accumulating revenue than a concerted structuring of the property system." Nelson & Starck, supranote
32, at 335.
130. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 325.
131. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 15; A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at
7; Atkinson, supra note 64, at 109-10; see L. CROSS & G. HAND, RADCLIFFE AND CROSS THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 231 (5th ed. 1971). It is possible that the church courts exercised
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ment of personalty in the ecclesiastical courts profoundly affected the
development of formalities. The laity were under considerable pressure
from the church to make testaments of personal property. During this
period, there developed "an intense and holy" fear of intestacy.132 To
die intestate was considered a sin, tantamount to dying unconfessed."'
The church was reluctant to insist on formalities for testaments of
personalty, since technical defects would result in intestacy. '3
Testaments of personalty could take a number of forms, from nuncupative wills to wills attested by a notary. 3 5 Written wills were
usually in the first person; either the entire will or the attestation
clause might be signed and sealed, although neither the signature nor
seal was necessary if the will could be proved otherwise. 13 6 The will
might be phrased in the form of a "solemn notarial instrument," a
letter or request, or even a deed poll. 137 Apparently wills could be

considerable testamentary jurisdiction from the time of the separation of ecclesiastical and lay
jurisdiction by royal ordinance, although the exact date is unknown. Atkinson, supra note 64,
at 109. The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts over testaments of personal property seems
to have developed over two hundred years. Id. at 110. Cf. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
supra note 64, at 341 (stating that "it seems probable that not until the age of Glanvill did the
Christian courts succeed in establishing an exclusive right to pronounce on the validity of the
will"). By the thirteenth century, the ecclesiastical courts seem to have obtained exclusive
jurisdiction over testation. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 15; L. CROSS & G. HAND, supra;
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 341; A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note
64, at 4.
132. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 356.
133. Id. The prevailing attitude was that "God's mercy is infinite; but we can not bury the
intestate in consecrated soil." Id. Some of the lords argued that the goods of an intestate ought
to be subject to forfeiture. Id. To say that someone had died intestate was considered a hideous
insult. Id. at 358. One decedent was described as having been found "dead, black, stinking and
intestate." Id.
134. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 739. In considering medieval wills,
[i]t is plain that the church has succeeded in reducing the testamentary formalities
to a minimum. . . . The dread of intestacy induces us to hear a nuncupative
testament in a few hardly audible words uttered in the last agony, to see a testament
in the feeble gesture which responds to the skilful [sic] question of the confessor....
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 337.
135. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 337; 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 538 (5th ed. 1942).
136. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 135, at 538. "Sometimes it was stated that as the
testator's seal was not well known the seal of some better known man had been affixed." Id.
137. Id. Plucknett notes:
The nuncupative will was recognised, although not common among the upper classes
of society. The written will might be in Latin, French or English. The higher
clergy often had it drawn in notarial form, or at least attested by a notary, but
this seems to have been in no way necessary. Signatures are, of course, very rare
in the middle ages, and the usual mode of authentication was by the testator's
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partly written and partly verbal, and a written will could be amended
by a verbal codicil. 138 The nuncupative will was proved by the testimony
of witnesses, preferably "two honest witnesses who can clearly depose
to the testator's dispositions.' 1 39 By the thirteenth century, a characteristic feature of wills was the. appointment of an executor. 140
(c) Development of the formal attested will
The original Statute of Wills, enacted in 1540,'14 seems to have

resulted from popular resentment of the Statute of Uses in combination
with political and economic changes tending to undermine feudal no-

tions of land law.'4 In response to these pressures, the statute provided that real property could be devised by means of a writing. There

was little emphasis on formalities of transfer, other than the requirement of a writing.' The writing was not truly ambulatory, in contrast
to the testaments of personalty permitted in the ecclesiastical courts:

although revocable and ineffective until death, it could not operate on
property acquired after the time of execution44 It seems to have been
treated as a conveyance evidencing a transfer of ownership. 45 Nuncupative testaments of personalty were still permitted after the 1540

Act,

46 though

in practice most testaments were put in writing unless

47
the testator was in extremis1

seal, sometimes accompanied by the seals of the executors or witnesses. Although
there were no necessary formal clauses, most wills run on the same lines - the
testator bequeaths his soul to God and the saints, his body to a particular church;
there follow details of the funeral arrangements (often very elaborate).... [Tihere
was often an express direction for the payment of debts, sometimes with provisions
as to how this was to be done; long lists of chattels bestowed on friends and
relatives,... gifts of the residue of the estate only became frequent in the fifteenth
century....
T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 64, at 739-40. For discussion of the phrasing and substance of the
medieval will, see 3 W. HOLDSWORTH,supra note 135, at 545-50; F. POLLOCK &F. MAITLAND,
supra note 64, at 337-41.
138. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 135, at 537-38.
139. Id. at 539.
140. Id. at 536-37; F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 334-36. Cf. T.
PLUCKNETr, supra note 64, at 741-42.
141. Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1, reprinted in A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS,
supra note 64, at 188-90.
142. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 126, at 66.
143. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 18. The statute did not require attesting witnesses
or require the testator to sign or handwrite the will. Id.
144. Id.
145. Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 336.
146. T. ATKINSON,supranote 42, at 19-20; A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 8.
147. T. ATKINSON,supra note 42, at 19.
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The requirement of an attested will first appeared in 1677, the
''
date of enactment of the statute to "prevent frauds and perjuries. 148
A major impetus for the Statute of Frauds appears to have been the
complications connected with the enforcement of the nuncupative wills
in personalty, which for obvious reasons were particularly vulnerable
to fraudulent claims,149 along with the rampant land sales fraud that
apparently existed prior to the statute's enactment.'"0 "By imposing
writing requirements on real estate transactions and writing and witnessing requirements on wills, the Statute made it easier to determine
who actually owned property."'' Moreover, the Statute of Frauds set
the standard of evidence required to prove the validity of a transfer
by will, thereby providing for uniform enforcement. 152 The Statute of
Frauds specifically stated that no disposition of property by will would
be valid unless the testator complied with the statutory requisites.M

148. Statute of Frauds, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, reprinted in A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS,
supra note 64, at 195-97. The statute was the last of four attempts to draft a law preventing
frauds and perjuries. For legislative history, see 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 380-84 (2d ed. 1937).
149. E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 269 (2d ed. 1922). The ecclesiastical
courts were criticized for their "scandalous laxity" in permitting enforcement of oral wills. Id.
Some scholars attribute the wills provisions of the Statute of Frauds, which makes it "practically
impossible to make an oral will," Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 338, to the attempted
fraud of an elderly decedent's young wife in the case of Cole v. Mordaunt, discussed in A.
REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 9 (citing a note to Mathews v. Warner, 4 Ves. Jr.
186, 31 Eng. Rep. 96 (1798)). In that case an elderly testator had married a wife of questionable
character. At his death he left a substantial portion of his property to charity. His wife produced
nine witnesses who perjured themselves in an attempt to prove that he had made a nuncupative
deathbed testament, leaving his entire property to her. The fraudulent scheme was exposed on
appeal. At the hearing before the King's Bench, Lord Nottingham remarked that he hoped one
day to see legislation enacted that would prevent revocation except in writing. Id. Nottingham
is credited as one of the major authors of the Statute of Frauds, 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 148, at 384, which was enacted the following year. A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note
64, at 9. Certain sections of the statute relating to testaments were supposedly designed to
meet the dangers emphasized in Cole v. Mordaunt. Id.
150. Lindgren, supra note 58, at 550. There were few controls on the sale of land at this
period: land was sometimes sold more than once by its owners, and sometimes by people who
did not own it at all. Buyers had no means of determining whether they were actually purchasing
an enforceable title. Id.
151. Id. at 551.
152. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 148, at 388-89 (the Statute of Frauds made certain
kinds of evidence necessary for the proof of certain transactions).
153. Statute of Frauds, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, reprinted in A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS,
supra note 64, at 195-97. The Statute of Frauds applied both to realty and personalty.
[A]ll devises and bequests of any lands or tenements, devisable either by force of
the statute of will, or by this statute, or by force of the custom of Kent, or the
custom of any borough, or any other particular custom, shall be in writing, and
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The Statute of Frauds' formalities thus served two purposes:
facilitating proof of wills'5 and reducing the chances of fraudulent

claims against decedent's estates. Unfortunately, while the statute
successfully eliminated "blanket assertions of nuncupative wills,"'' the
formal requirements of the statute also produced, very early on, instances in which well-intentioned wills were held invalid for failure to
meet the technical requirements of the statute. 5 6 In 1757, Lord Mansfield wrote in the case of Windham v. Chetwyndis7 that he was convinced that more "fair wills have been overturned for want of the

form, than fraudulent have been prevented by introducing it. I...
hardly recollect a case of a forged or fraudulent will, where it has not

been solemnly attested."'5
By more or less limiting the oral will out of existence, 159 the Statute
of Frauds was fairly successful in achieving the prophylactic purpose
of eliminating fraudulent claims.160 With oral wills eliminated and litigation over fraudulent conveyancing significantly reduced, the problem
of the invalidation of well-intentioned but defective wills became

paramount. Judicial manipulation of the Statute's formalities, particu-

signed by the party so devising the same, or by some other person in his presence
and by his express directions, and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence
of the said devisor by three or four credible witnesses, or else they shall be utterly

void and of none effect.
Id. (emphasis added). For discussion of the provisions of the statute, see 6 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 148, at 384-87.
154. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 148, at 388-89.
155. Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 339. The circumstances in which a testator could
make an oral will were severely limited. To be valid, a nuncupative will (limited to the testator's
chattels) had to be made in the presence of three witnesses in the testator's own habitation or
where the testator had been resident for ten days, unless the person was taken ill or injured
suddenly while away from home. A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 9-10. The
testimony of the three witnesses had to be received within six months of the making of the
will, unless it had been committed to writing within six days after the execution of the will. T.
ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 19-20; A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 9-10. No
written will could be revoked by an oral will, unless certain requirements of the statute were
observed. A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 10.
156. See Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 340.
157. 97 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1757).
158. Id. at 381. For discussion, see 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 148, at 394-95; Nelson
& Starck, supra note 32, at 340.

159. H.

SUGDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF WILLS AS ALTERED BY THE

1 VICTORIA,

ch. 26, 181 app. (1837).
160. See Lindgren, supra note 58, at 551 (stating that within a few decades the statute
had accomplished its purpose, fraudulent real estate transactions and fraudulent conveyance
actions became rare, and recording of deeds became commonplace); Nelson & Starck, supra
note 32, at 339-40.
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larly in the ecclesiastical courts, to give effect to intent in instances
in which the testator had not observed the statutory mandate, produced enough confusion and distortion in the law to prompt a third
reform: the Statute of Wills of 1837.161 Before 1837, the English courts
often took considerable liberties with the formalities of the Statute of
Frauds in order to find defectively executed wills "in compliance" with
61 2
the formal requirements of the statute.
In Windham, Lord Mansfield went so far as to say that "Judges
should lean against objections to the formality [of attestation]. They
have always done so, in every construction upon the words of the
statute ....
And still more ought they to do so, if that system would
spread a snare, in which many honest wills must unavoidably be entangled. . . ."
The result of this concept of substantial compliance applied to the
formalities of the statute was that in many cases the English courts,
satisfied that testamentary intent existed, admitted to probate wills
that were incomplete, unexecuted, or both. 16 In Mathews v. Warner,16
the court said,
[I]f such things are to be established as wills, it loudly requires the interference of the legislature to prevent such a
latitude in that respect, as makes the disposing of all a man's

fortune the most slight and trivial act, attended with much
less of form, solemnity, and precision, than any act he could
do with regard to any part of his property during his life.' 6 6

161.

Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 340 (citing E. EDWARDS, THE NEW STATUTE
Vict. ch. 26, 2 (1846)). The 1837 Act represented a rethinking of the formalities
required for making a will. Statute of Wills, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. ch. 26, reprinted in A.
REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, supra note 64, at 211-20. For relevant text, see infra note 172.
162. See, e.g., Allen v. Manning, 162 Eng. Rep. 374 (1825) (upholding unexecuted draft
will on the grounds that testator had only been prevented from executing by an "act of God"
upheld in instance in which testator had given attorney instructions respecting intended will
but died without executing it); Huntington v. Huntington, 161 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1814) (upholding
draft will dictated to attorney by testator and specifically approved by him, though he died
before he could execute it); Scott v. Rhodes, 161 Eng. Rep. 898 (1809) (upholding will though
will was neither complete nor executed). The Chancery courts were likewise biased "against a
too literal construction of the statute; and naturally that bias was also found in the decisions of
judges like Lord Mansfield, who aimed at improving the law by the recognition of equitable
principles." 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 148, at 393-94. As a result of this liberal construction
of the Statute of Frauds, many exceptions to the strict requirements developed. Id.
163. Wivdham, 97 Eng. Rep. at 381.
164. See supra note 162 for examples.
165. 31 Eng. Rep. 96 (1798).
166. Id. at 106. Other judges also lamented the latitude with which the statute was applied
in various contexts. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 148, at 395.
OF WILLS, 1
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In 1833, a royal commission (the Fourth Royal Commission) undertook to study wills and probate and to recommend changes in the
law. 167 One purpose of the 1837 Wills Act was an amendment intended
"to remove all doubt and latitude of interpretation" respecting procedures for executing wills. 1e Nelson and Starck note that the Commission's ultimate recommendations indicate that their primary concern
was "to create practical formalities to assure adequate evidence would
be available at the testator's death, while at the same time not unduly
burdening the courts with formalities which would only serve to defeat
true wils."'169 There was a shift in emphasis "from restrictions upon
testation to formalities which are designed to implement and facilitate
testamentary intent.... The only mention of the prevention of fraud
and perjury as a realistic goal of the Statute was made when the
Commission discussed its reasons for recommending the nonrecognition of holographic and nuncupative wills."17°
The Commission's recommendations were incorporated in the Statute of Wills of 1837.Y17 Section IX of the 1837 Act requires a writing
subscribed by the testator and two witnesses, and signed or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of both in order for a will to
be valid and enforceable. 7 2 Section II of the Act specifically repeals
the Statute of Frauds provision authorizing nuncupative wills under
certain circumstances. rs The Commission stressed the importance of

167. See H. SUGDEN, supra note 159, at 177 (setting out extracts from the reports of the
Fourth Real Property Commission); see also 15 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 172 (1965) (discussing the Fourth Report).
168. E. EDWARDS, THE NEW STATUTE OF WILLS, 1 Vict. ch. 26, 2 (1846), quoted in
Nelson & Starch, supra note 32, at 340 n.67.
169. Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 344.
170. Id. at 344-45.
171. Id. at 343.
172. Wills Act, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., ch. 26, § IX, reprintedin A. REPPY & L. TOMKINS,
supra note 64, at 215-16.
[N]o will shall be valid unless it shall be in Writing and Executed in manner
herein-after mentioned; (that is to say,) it shall be signed at the Foot or End
thereof by the Testator, or by some other Person in his Presence and by his
Direction; and such Signature shall be made or acknowledged by the Testator in
the Presence of Two or more Witnesses present at the same Time, and such
Witnesses shall attest and shall subscribe the Will in the Presence of the Testator,
but no Form of Attestation shall be necessary.
Id. Publication was not required. Id. § XIII, at 216.
173. Id. § II, at 212-13. The Commission thought that "if nuncupative or irregular wills
were allowed ... the property of every person who died away from his family would be liable
to be fraudulently taken from them by the perjury of persons who were, or might pretend to
have been, near him at the time of his death. H. SUGDEN, supra note 159, at 182 (reprinted
in Nelson & Starch, supra note 32, at 343 n.83).
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having wills attested by two competent witnesses. 7 The Commission
did, however, show concern about the possibility of invalidation of
well-intentioned wills on technical grounds due to noncompliance with
the formalities in proposing that the Statute of Frauds requirement
that the witnesses sign the will in the presence of the testator be
repealed.17 5 The Commission thought that "the additional security
which may be obtained by requiring the witnesses to sign in the
testator's presence, is of so much importance as the burthen [sic] and
' 76 The legislature
danger of imposing such a restriction."1
rejected this
recommendation, however, and the requirement remained in force.
M

(2) The Model Probate Code of 1946
Until promulgation of the 1969 UPC, 178 the formalities required in
all United States jurisdictions for a formal will were those derived
from an English model, either the Statute of Frauds of 1677 or the
1837 amendment of the Statute of Wills. 1 79 In 1941, the American Bar
Association made a comprehensive attempt to reform American probate law through the Model Probate Code (MPC).' s0

174.

See H. SUGDEN, supra note 159, at 179-80, 187.
175. Id. at 183-84.
176. Id. at 184.
177. For text of the 1837 act., § IX, see supra note 172.
178. For discussion of the 1959 UPC attested wills' provisions, see infra notes 183-203 and
accompanying text.
179. Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 345 (stating that "Today every state in the union
and the District of Columbia have statutes requiring essentially the same formalities as the
Statute of Wills of 1837."); but see T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 21 (stating that changes in
English law after the Revolutionary War did influence American law but are not part of the
American legal heritage and detailing various discrepancies).
180.

L. SIMEs & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE

CODE (1946). In 1939, the Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law Section of the American Bar
Association started a research project that culminated in the publication of the Model Probate
Code of 1946 (MPC). Uniform Probate Code Approved by Council, 4 REAL PROP., PROB., &
TR. J. 206, 207 (1969); Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1037, 1038-39 (1966); Wellman, New UPC, supra note 42, at 637; see L. SIMES & P. BASYE,
supra at 4-13. Under the direction of Professor Lewis Simes of the University of Michigan, the
project was intended to modernize probate procedures among the states. Uniform ProbateCode
Approved by Council, supra, at 207; see L. SIMES & P. BASYE, supra, at 10-11; Fratcher,
supra, at 1070-73; Wellman, supra note 42, at 637. The Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law
section studied state probate statutes, legislative history, and case law to identify major problems
in probate practice. In addition, they also considered and to some extent incorporated provisions
adapted from other Model Acts, including a 1940 Model Act for execution of wills. L. SIMES
& P. BASYE, supra, at 10-12. The MPC was intended to provide a guideline for the improvement
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In many respects, the MPC was quite innovative; its provision for
the execution and revocation of wills, however, was less than revolutionary. It preserved all of the traditional formalities - publication,
testator signing in the presence of both witnesses, and attestation by
the witnesses in the presence of the testator and each other - except
the requirement that the will be signed at the end.18' Mechem sharply
criticized the provision and argued that the philosophy of the wills
acts "should be to impose only such requirements as seem so unmis-

takably essential to a safe will-making process as to justify running
the known risk of defeating meritorious wills through failure of testators to know or comply with the requirements. ' ' 18

of probate practice in the states. The MPC was not directed toward promulgation of uniform
laws; its objective was "not the attainment of uniformity among the several states, but the
improvement of probate procedure wherever revision of probate legislation is sought." Id. at
10. The MPC was intended to serve as "a reservoir of ideas, and of acceptable legislative
formulations of those ideas," id., and to this extent differed from the UPC, with respect to
which eventual uniformity among the states has always been an objective. See Weliman, supra
note 42, at 639.
No state adopted the MPG in its entirety, but several states enacted parts of it, and others
were influenced by the MPC. Fratcher, supra, at 1039; see Wellman, supra note 42, at 637
(stating that the MPC had "significant effect" on probate code changes adopted in several states
after 1966).
For background, see Atkinson, Old Principles and New Ideas Concerning Probate Court
Procedure,23 J. Am. JUDICATURE Soc'y 137 (1939) (suggesting recommendations for improving
the administration of estates); Atldnson, Wanted - A Model Probate Code, 23 J. Am. JUDICATURE Soc'y 183 (1940) (calling for the drafting of a nationally uniform probate code).
181.

MODEL PROB. CODE § 47, reprinted in L. SIMES & P. BASYE, supra note 180, at

81-82. The MPC attested wills' provision reads as follows:
(a) Testator. The testator shall signify to the attesting witnesses that the instrument
is his will and either
(1) Himself sign, or
(2) Acknowledge his signature already made, or
(3) At his direction and in his presence have someone else sign his name for
him, and
(4) In any of the above cases the act must be done in the presence of two or
more attesting witnesses.
(b) Witnesses. The attesting witnesses must sign
(1) In the presence of the testator, and
(2) In the presence of each other.
MODEL PROBATE CODE § 47, reprinted in L. SIMES & P. BASYE, supra note 180, at 81-82.

The Code included a provision for nuncupative wills similar to that in the Statute of Frauds of
1677, as well as a provision for holographic wills requiring that the signature and all the material
provisions of a holographic will be in the testator's handwriting and that the handwriting be
proved by two witnesses. MODEL PROB. CODE § 48 (holographic will) and § 49 (nuncupative
will), reprintedin L. SniES & P. BASYE, supra note 180, at 81-82.
182. Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act?, 33 IOwA L. REV.501, 503 (1947). In rebutting
another commentator's description of the MPC as the product of 'the fairness, the imagination,
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In 1962, the American Bar Association Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Laws appointed a special committee on revision of
the MPC. 1' This committee joined with the Special Committee on
Uniform Probate Code appointed by the National Conference on Uniform State Laws in 1962,1- and the two committees agreed to revise
the MPC with the objective of eventual promulgation by the National
Conference of a Uniform Probate Code.'5 The wills execution provisions that eventually developed out of the work of these committees
were designed according to a philosophy very similar to that expressed
by Mechem. 6 The preface to the 1969 UPC announced: "If the will
is to be restored to its role as the major instrument for disposition of
wealth at death, its execution must be kept simple. The basic intent
of these sections is to validate the will whenever possible."'- Although

the resourcefulness and the restrained audacity of the draftsmen," Niles, Model Probate Code
and Monographs on Probate Law: A Review, 45 MICH. L. REV. 321 (1947), Mechem stated:
The draftsmen here seem ... to have displayed anything but imagination, resourcefulness, or audacity, restrained or otherwise. On the contrary, these provisions
seem . . . almost incredibly reactionary, unimaginative, and timid. The Statute of
Frauds was passed in 1677. One is asked to think either that that famous enactment
was so perfect as to need no improvement or that the framers of the Code have
learned nothing from the experience of the intervening 270 years.
Mechem, supra., at 501.
183. The process began with a preliminary study of the MPC. Fratcher, supra note 180,
at 1039; Uniform Probate Code Approved by Council, supra note 180, at 207. For discussion
of the development of uniform probate legislation by the Research Director in charge of the
preliminary studies, see Fratcher, supra note 180, at 1037. For additional articles discussing
the evolution of the UPC, see Langrock, Uniform Probate Code: What Price Certainty?, 6
TRIAL 23 (1970); Wellman, New UPC, supra note 42, at 637; Note, supra note 42, at 327.
184. Fratcher, supra note 180, at 1039; Uniform Probate Code Approved by Council, supra
note 180, at 207.
185. Fratcher, supra note 180, at 1039; Uniform Probate Code Approved by Council, supra
note 180, at 207.
186. For discussion of Mechem's views on the Model Probate Code, see supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
187. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. 2, pt. 5 general comment (1969). The Code was in part a
response to growing criticism of the probate process. See, e.g., N. DACEY, 1965, supra note
42, at 1 (describing how to use will substitutes to avoid probate); Straus, Is the Uniform Probate
Code the Answer?, 111 TR. & EST. 870 (1972); Wellman, UPC and Probate Avoidance, supra
note 42, at 191; see also Bloom, The Mess in Our Probate Courts, READER'S DIGEST, Oct.
1966, at 102 (describing problems with our probate system).
188. See Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprintfor Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN.
L. REV. 453 (1970); Wellman & Gordon, supra note 57, at 357. For other articles discussing
the impact of the 1969 UPC, see, e.g., Crapo, The Uniform Probate Code - Does it Really
Work?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 395; DuPont, The Impact of the Uniform Probate Code on Court
Structure, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 375 (1975); Kossow, supra note 57; Parker, No-Notice Probate
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the UPC has not achieved universal acceptance during the twenty
years following its inception, it has had a profound impact on probate
law in every jurisdiction, and has continued slowly to gain ground
over the years.'88
To date, fifteen states have adopted the UPC.19 Moreover, article
II of the UPC has significantly influenced the interpretation of probate
law and probate reform in virtually every state.' 9° Today, only a few
American common law jurisdictions retain the more arcane wills act

formalities.

91

It is difficult to overstate the significance of the UPC

to probate reform in the United States.

and Non-Intervention Administration Under the Code, 2 CONN. L. REV. 546 (1970); Straus,
supra note 187, at 870; Wellman & Clark, Multiple Party Accounts: Georgia Law Compared
with the Uniform Probate Code, 8 GA. L. REV. 739 (1974); Zartman, An Illinois Critique of
the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 U. ILL. L. REV. 413; Comment, Non-Probate Transfers Provisions Relating to Effect of Death: Will UPC § 6-201 Be "Effective" in Nebraska, 12
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1173 (1979).
189. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Utah. For
statutory code sections, see infra note 191.
190. L. AVERILL, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE IN A NUTSHELL 8-9 (1987). Averill explains,
The influence and the use of the Code is growing in a variety of ways. The laws
of nearly all if not all states have been affected by the Code. The primary vehicles
of influence are as follows:
(1) Enactment as a Code in full with some amendments....
(2) Piece-meal enactment of segments or sections of the Code for inclusion into
another probate code or law. Nearly all the other states have enacted some part
or section of the Code. Sections of article 2 [Wills Act] have been particularly
popular....

(3) Referred to as a model of modern policy by a court interpreting its own
Code provision....
(4) Referred to as secondary or persuasive authority for determining proper
rules of construction for the common law.... Even if comprehensive enactment
does not continue, the Code's influence over the law of probate and related matters
will continue to increase.
Id. at 8-9.
191. Fifteen states require essentially the same execution formalities as the 1969 UPC.
ALA. CODE § 43-3-131 (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.155 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14-2502 (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-502 (1990);
IDAHO CODE § 15-2-502 (1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 2-502 (1989); MICH. COMIP.
LAWS § 700.122(1) (1991); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-502 (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-302
(1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2327 (1989); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3B:3-2 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE

§ 30.1-08-02 (Michie 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.235 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-502
(Law. Co-op. 1991). For the relevant text of UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1969), see infra note
192.
Fifteen states require only that the will be in writing, signed by the testator and attested
by two witnesses in the presence of the testator. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-161 (1990); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 202 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-40 (1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110
ANN.
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The 1969 UPC provision for formal wills minimized the level of
formality required for attestation.192 Under the 1969 UPC provision,

1/2, para. 4-3 (1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-102 (1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 191, § 1 (West 1991); MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.320 (1990);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.040 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:2 (1990); TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
11.12.020 (1990); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 853.03 (West 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-112 (1991).
All but two statutes require two witnesses. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5 (1990); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 1584 (West 1990).
Twenty-seven states require that the witnesses sign the will in the presence of the testator.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-25-103 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-161 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12 § 202 (1990); FLA. STAT. § 732.502 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-40 (1991); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 4-3 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE §
633.279 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.040 (Michie 1991); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. § 4-103 (1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.320 (1990);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.040 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:2 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN.
ch. 45 § 2-502 (1991); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney 1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 31-3.3 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 84, § 56 (West 1990); S.D. CODFIED LAWS § 29-2-6 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-104
(1990); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. 59 (Vernon 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-502 (1991); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
11.12.020 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.03 (West 1990).
Thirteen states require the testator to sign the will or acknowledge the signature in the
presence of both witnesses. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-25-103 (1991); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110
(West 1991); FLA. STAT. § 732.502 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3 (Burns 1990); IOWA
§ 633.279 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.040 (Michie 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch.
45 § 2-502 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-5 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29-2-6 (1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 32-1-104 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-502 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49
(1991); W. VA. CODE § 43-1-3 (1991).
Eight states require that the witnesses sign in the presence of each other. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 28-25-103 (1991); FLA. STAT. § 732.502 (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3 (Burns
1990); IOWA CODE § 633.279 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.040 (Michie 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. ch. 45 § 2-502 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-104 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §
75-2-502 (1991).
Seven states require the testator to sign the will at the end. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-25-103
(1991); FLA. STAT. § 732.502 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-606 (1990); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2107.03 (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 56 (West 1990); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2502 (Purdon 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-2-6 (1991).
In two states the witnesses must also sign at the end of the will. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
84, § 56 (West 1990); S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 29-2-6 (1991).
In eleven states the testator must publish the will. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-25-103 (1991);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110 (West. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE
§ 633.279 (1989); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1584 (West 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.3 (1990);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 56 (West 1990); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1
(McKinney 1991); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (Purdon 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 29-2-6 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-104 (1990).
192. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1969). The UPC requires the following for attestation:
Every will shall be in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name by
CODE
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a will was validly executed if the testator: (1) put directions for property disposition, estate administration, or guardianship in writing; (2)
signed the document or directed someone to sign the document in his
or her presence; and (3) obtained the signatures of two witnesses each
of whom had either witnessed the testator's signing of the will or the
testator's acknowledgment of the signature. 193 The 1969 provision did
not require the testator to sign the document at the foot or end,
publish the will, or witness the signature of the witnesses. 194 The

witnesses were not required to sign the will in one another's presence.195
One commentator suggests that the 1969 UPC requirements for a
formal will might be literally fulfilled if the testator simply signed the
will, acknowledged the fact by telephone to two friends, and then

mailed the will to them to be signed. 9 An Idaho court recently construed Idaho's modified version of the 1969 UPC provision to require
an "in-person contact" between the testator and witnesses, even

though the original provision does not seem to require such contact. 197

some other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and shall be
signed by at least 2 persons each of whom witnessed either the signing or the
testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the will.
Id.

193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Kossow, supra note 188, at 1380. Kossow considered such a construction to be undesirable because 'the possibility of fraud or substitution of the wrong document would render
unreliable the document being offered to probate" and would "negate the basic policy of the
Statute of Frauds." Id.
197. Estate of McGurrin, 113 Idaho 341, 743 P.2d 994 (Ct. App. 1987). The testator dictated
his will while in the hospital and asked the person who prepared the writing to take it to her
home and have it witnessed by her mother and sister. This was done, and the testator then
telephoned the intended witnesses and thanked them. Id. at 342, 743 P.2d at 995. The Idaho
court distinguished between the "signatory" and "observatory" functions of witnesses. Id. at
345, 743 P.2d at 998 (citing Estate of Peters, 107 N.J. 263, 526 A.2d 1005 (1987), discussed
infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text). The court said that although the Idaho Legislature
had intended by adopting the UPC requirement 'to eliminate several burdensome requirements
found in many state statutes," they still retained the requirement that the witnesses sign in
the presence of the testator. Id. The court cited legislative history indicating that the Idaho
Legislature deliberately drafted the provision to clarify the need for 'inperson contact" and for
some act by the testator that could be actually "witnessed" in order for the will to be valid.
Id. "[W]itnessing meant more than merely perceiving the existence of a document and signing
it. Witnessing meant perceiving an act of the testator - signing or acknowledging the will and memorializing this perception by subscribing the document." Id. The court concluded that
Idaho testators are required to declare their acknowledgments in the presence of their witnesses,
even though they are not actually required to sign in the presence of the witnesses. Id.
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A further question left unanswered by the language of the 1969 provision is whether the witnesses are required to sign the will at the
time that they witness the testator's signature or acknowledgment.
Cases have arisen in which the witnesses did not actually sign the
will until after the testator's death. A New Jersey court recently
suggested that such wills may be valid if the witnesses sign the will
within a "reasonable period of time" after witnessing the testator's
signature or acknowledgment, 198 though the court held that fifteen
months after the testator died was too long a delay to be reasonable. The 1990 UPC provision for formal wills2 ° resolves certain interpretation issues, but does riot alter significantly the formalities required
by the 1969 provision. However, new section 2-502(a) does subject its
requirements to the new harmless error rule in section 2-503, thus
creating in section 2-503 an exception to the execution requirements
of section 2-502.201 New section 2-502(a) requires every formal will to
be:
(1) in writing,
(2) signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some
other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by
his [or her] direction, and
198. Estate of Peters, 107 N.J. 263, 275, 526 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1987). For discussion of this
case, see Note, Failure of Witnesses to Sign Otherwise Valid Will Within a Reasonable Time
After TestatorsExecution Bars Admission to Probate, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 772 (1989).
199. Peters, 107 N.J. at 283, 526 A.2d at 1011. The trial court found that the will had been
signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses. The trial court considered the fact that
the witnesses did not sign the will until 15 months after the testator's death, "a mere quirk,
which should not be allowed to frustrate the obvious testamentary intent." Id. at 268, 526 A.2d
at 1007.
The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the legislature did not intend to eliminate the
requirement that the execution of a will be witnessed. Id. at 274, 526 A.2d at 1010. The court
distinguished the "observatory" and "signatory" functions of witnesses to a will and held that
in this instance the signatory function was not met. The court concluded that "the statute
requires that the signatures of witnesses be affixed to a will within a reasonable period of time
from the execution of the will." Id. at 275, 526 A.2d at 1011.
In determining that the time period in this case was unreasonable, the court considered two
factors: "(1) the fact that the witness signed after the testator's death; and (2) the fact that
some eighteen months passed between the observatory and signatory functions of the witness."
Id. at 278, 526 A.2d at 1012. The court found that "the interval between the signing of the
testator and the signing of the witnesses was too long to have been reasonably within the
contemplation of the statute." Id. at 279, 526 A.2d at 1013.
200. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) (1990).
201. Id. § 2-502(a) (In addition, UPC § 2-502(a) is expressly subject to § 2-513, which
provides that a writing disposing of tangible personal property not disposed of by will is admissible at probate despite noncompliance with the execution requirements under certain circumstances, and to § 2-506 which determines choice of law in wills cases.). Id.
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(3) signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed
within a reasonable time after he [or she] witnessed either
the signing of the will as described in paragraph (2) or the
of that signature or acknowledgtestator's acknowledgment
2
ment of the will. 02
The revised version requires that the witnesses sign the will "within
a reasonable time" after the witnessed act, but does not expressly

address the issue of whether the witness must be in the testator's
presence at the time of the testator's signature or acknowledgment.
The comments imply that "in-person contact" between the testator
and the witnesses is not required; whether this is intended depends
on what is meant by the requirement that the signing or acknowledgment be witnessed - in other words, on the interpretation of the

verb "witness."
b. Holographic wills
(1) Traditional statutes

Holographic wills represent an alternative mode of testation derived from the civil law.0 The holographic form is not recognized in

202. Id.
203. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) comment (1990). The comment elaborates on the meaning
of "to witness."
The testator may sign the will outside the presence of the witnesses, if he or she
later acknowledges to the witnesses that the signature is his or hers (or that his
or her name was signed by another) or that the document is his or her will. An
acknowledgment need not be expressly stated but can be inferred from the testator's
conduct ....

The witnesses must sign as witnesses .

within a reasonable time

after having witnessed the signing or acknowledgement. There is, however, no
requirement that the witnesses sign before the testator's death.
Id.
For a discussion of the interpretation of "witness" by the 1969 courts, see supra text accompanying notes 196-99.
204. Bird, Sleight of Handwriting:The HolographicWill in California, 32 HASTINGS L.J.
605 (1981).
The more remote origins of the holographic will are obscure; however, scholars
are sure that it is a fairly ancient legal device with its roots in civil rather than
common law. The holographic testament was recognized under certain circumstances in Roman law; by the seventh century, the Visigoths had developed a
form substantially identical to the modern version. Thereafter, the holograph dropped out of use for several centuries, reappearing in the customary law of France.
It found its way into the Code Napoleon, and thence to the New World, where it
initially surfaced in Louisiana and Virginia.
Id. at 606 (citations omitted).
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England or in common law jurisdictions that have a purely English
tradition; during the deliberations that produced the Wills Act of 1837,
the Fourth Real Property Commission rejected the notion of permitting holographic wills.2 °5 Apparently, due to the influence of French
and Spanish civil law in North America, certain jurisdictions in the
United States and Canada have traditionally permitted the holograph. 2- Where authorized, the holographic form is invariably allowed
as an alternative to the formal attested will. 207 One policy underlying
civil law recognition of the holographic form was apparently to prevent
the invalidation of wills that were left unattested because the testator
was for some reason either unwilling or unable to procure witnesses. 208
Traditionally, a holographic will was a signed but unattested testamentary document written entirely in the testator's own hand. 2 °0
For a history of holographic wills, see Parker, History of the Holographic Testament in the
Civil Law, 3 JURIST 1 (1943); Comment, Holographic Wills and their Dating, 28 YALE L.J.
72 (1918).
205. H. SUGDEN, supra note 159, at 342.
206. Fratcher, supra note 180, at 1053. At present, twenty-six states permit some form of
holographic will. ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.160 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2503 (1990);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-25-104 (1991) (added requirement of three witnesses and entire document
must be handwritten); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503
(1990); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-503 (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.040 (Michie 1991) (entire
document must be handwritten); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1588 (West 1990) (entire document
must be handwritten); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-503 (1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS
CODE ANN. § 4-103 (1990) (only permits soldiers and sailors to make holographic wills); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 700.123 (1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (1990) (entire document must be
handwritten); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-303 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2328 (1989); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 133-090 (1989) (entire document must be handwritten); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3B:3-3
(1990); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.2 (McKinney 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4
(1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-03 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 54 (West 1990)
(entire document must be handwritten); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29-2-8 (1991) (entire document
must be handwritten); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-105 (1990); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 60
(Vernon 1991) (entire document must be handwritten); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (1991);
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (1987); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1991) (entire document must be
handwritten); Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-113 (1991) (entire document must be handwritten).
207. For discussion of policies supporting holographic formality, see Bird, supra note 204,
at 609; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 14; Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note
32, at 511-12, 519; Maxton, Execution of Wills: The Formalities Considered, 1 CANT. L. REV.
393, 396-99 (1985); Note, Validity of Signaturefor Holographic Wills, 28 ARK. L. REV. 521,
521-22 (1975).
208. See Bird, supra note 204, at 609 n.22.
209. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 355. The following states require that the entire
document be handwritten: ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.160 (1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.040
(Michie 1991); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1588 (West 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (1990);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133-090 (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
84, § 54 (West 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-2-8 (1991); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §
60 (Vernon 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1991); Wyo. STAT.
§ 2-6-113 (1991).
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Strict construction of the handwriting requirement could invalidate a
holograph containing typed or preprinted matter, even if the
nonhandwritten material was unrelated to the substance of the will.210
Langbein has remarked that "[sitatutes directing that the will be
'entirely' in the testator's handwriting have produced a large and ugly
case law voiding wills which contained some innocuous printed matter."211 In the case of holographic wills, however, the courts have often
permitted less than literal compliance with the handwriting requirement. In jurisdictions requiring that the will be entirely handwritten,
the courts typically have applied one of two theories to determine the
validity of holographic wills containing nonhandwritten matter either the "intent theory" or the more recently developed "surplusage
theory," each of which is discussed below.
(a) Nonliteral compliance with the handwriting requirement: "the intent
theory"
If a court determines that the testator did not intend for the portion
of the document which is not written in his or her hand to be a part
of the will itself, the "intent theory" permits the court to treat the
2
document as valid.

2

Courts apply the intent theory to save wills written on hotel or
letterhead stationery, and in other very limited circumstances.23 A
court applying this approach examines the language of the will to
determine whether the testator intended the printed inclusions to be
part of the wil. 214 Although the courts speak in terms of "intent,"
most courts seem to apply an objective rather than subjective stan21 5

dard.

210. Comment, The New HolographicWill in California:Has it Outlived its Usefulness?,
20 CAL. W.L. REV. 258, 258 (1984); Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 519.
See T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 357-59. See generally Bird, supra note 204 (discussing
cases construing holographic wills).
211. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 519.
212. Bird, supra note 204, at 621.
213. E.g., Estate of Baker, 59 Cal. 2d 680, 381 P.2d 913, 31 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (upholding
holographic will written on hotel stationery when testator had crossed out name of the hotel
but not the address, finding the testator had no intent to incorporate the address and the
address was irrelevant to the validity of the will). But see Estate of Thorn, 183 Cal. 512, 192
P. 19 (1920) (invalidating holographic will on the basis that it-was not entirely in the testator's
hand when testator had written will by hand but had used a rubber stamp bearing the name
of a piece of property when referring to that property).
214. See Bird, supra note 204, at 621.
215. Id. at 623.
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In determining whether the testator "intended" the nonhandwritten matter to be incorporated into the will, courts typically have
considered factors such as the location of the nonhandwritten matter
and whether the handwritten portions of the will referred to the
nonhandwritten matter. 216 Under a holographic wills provision that
since has been amended, 217 the California Supreme Court in Estate of

Bernard2 s refused to enforce a holographic will because the testator
had handwritten the will on letterhead stationery and the handwritten
date appeared on the same line as the nonhandwritten matter in the
letterhead material . 219 The Bernard court concluded that the
nonhandwritten words had been "incorporated in and doubtless were
intended to be made a part of the heading of the document"' 0 and
were therefore "part and parcel of the will. '"- Obviously, unattested,
handwritten, signed, and dated dispositions of property executed without witnesses on preprinted will forms routinely would meet the same
fate under the Bernard court's application of the intent theory.-

216. See, e.g., Estate of De Caccia, 205 Cal. 719, 273 P. 552 (1928) (upholding will entirely
handwritten on stationery with preprinted words "Oakland, California," finding the testator did
not intend the preprinted words as part of the will because there was no reference to the
preprinted words).
217. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1277 (1872) (repealed 1931) (permitting a holographic will if "entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself"). The statute was repealed in
1931 and replaced by CAL. PROB. CODE § 53 (West 1956). Section 53 was itself repealed by
Stats. 1983, C.842, § 18, operative Jan. 1, 1985. The repealed section, pursuant to § 6103 of
this Code, continues to apply to estates of decedents who died before Jan. 1, 1985. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 53 (West 1984). The new statute provides that an unattested will is valid if the signature
and material provisions are handwritten. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111 (West 1991). The new rule
is a "surplusage statute" along the lines of UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990). For a discussion
of the surplusage approach and the UPC provision, see infra notes 226-40 and notes 249-63 and
accompanying text.
218. 197 Cal. 36, 239 P. 404 (1925).
219. Id. at 42, 239 P. at 406.
220. Id.
221. Id. But see Estate of De Caccia, 205 Cal. at 724-25, 273 P. at 554 (holding that
placement of date in relation to the nonhandwritten matter is factor of slight importance standing
alone and would not support conclusion that decedent intended to make nonhandwritten words
part of the document); Estate of Durwelanger, 41 Cal. App. 2d 750, 107 P.2d 477 (1940) (upholding
will in case in which testator used paper on which the first two digits of the date were printed
and handwrote the last two).
222. See, e.g., Estate of Bower, 11 Cal. 2d 180, 181-82, 78 P.2d 1012, 1013-15 (1938)
(invalidating a document offered for probate which was handwritten on a preprinted will form,
finding that writing in the blanks "definitely indicate[d] that the decedent intended to include
and incorporate in his will the printed portions among which the written inserts appear").
For discussion of preprinted will forms as holographs, see Bird, supra note 204, at 617-18.
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The intent theory predictably has produced a case law which is
based upon arbitrary and tenuous distinctions.2 3 Although application
of the intent theory operates in some instances to save a will from
invalidation despite the inclusion of extraneous nonhandwritten matter, the testator's intent to incorporate nonhandwritten material into
the will in violation of the statute is often inferred from such arbitrary
factors as the testator's choice of stationery and the placement of the
words on the paper. Prior to a recent amendment to the California
holographic wills provision,m the convolutions of the rule in California
for unattested wills containing nonhandwritten material was explained
as follows:
The presence of printed (that is, nonhandwritten) matter
will not invalidate a holographic will in California, provided
that no more than the first two digits of the date are printed,
and the printed matter appears wholly above or wholly below
the handwritten provisions and is not in the same line as
any handwritten words, unless the printed matter is an address, in which case juxtaposition is immaterial.(b) Nonliteral compliance with the handwriting requirement: the "surplusage
theory"
An alternative approach to extraneous nonhandwritten matter in
holographic wills is the so-called surplusage theory. This theory permits the probate court to disregard nonessential typed or printed
material in an otherwise properly executed holographic will.226 According to the surplusage theory, a court considers only the handwritten
portions of the document to be the actual will. If the nonhandwritten
matter does not affect the sense of the operative provisions and if the
essential or material elements of a holographic will are present and
in the testator's handwriting, a court applying the surplusage theory

223. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 519-20.
224. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111 (West 1991). For a discussion of the California law on
holographic wills, see supra note 217 and accompanying text.
225. Bird, supra note 204, at 620-21.
226. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 358-59; Bird, supra note 204, at 628-29; Comment,
supra note 210, at 260-61.
227. Comment, supra note 210, at 260-61 (stating that no part of the document that is not

handwritten may be treated as the actual will and all of the elements of the will must be
identifiable in the handwritten provisions). See generally Estate of Black, 30 Cal. 3d 880, 641
P.2d 754, 181 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1982) (finding a valid holographic will although testator incorporated
some of the preprinted language on the stationery). For further discussion of this case, see

infra text accompanying notes 238-40.
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would treat the nonhandwritten portion as surplusage and read it out
of the will, thus treating only the handwritten matter as the actual
will.- This theory, liberally applied, can be used to validate dispositions on printed will forms as long as the essential provisions are
handwritten2 9 that is, as long as the portion that is necessary to make
out the will is entirely handwritten.
The surplusage approach significantly expands the range of documents that a court can validate under a statute that literally requires
wills to be entirely handwritten. It does not, however, prevent invalidation of instruments executed with testamentary intent in which any
of the essential provisions or terms are not in the testator's hand.The court must be able to make out all of the elements of a valid
holographic will without reference to any typed or printed matter.
Atkinson noted two principal objections to the application of the
surplusage doctrine to save partially handwritten and unattested wills:
first, the surplusage theory "makes hash of the statute . . . if [the
statute] requires that the will be entirely in the handwriting of the
testator";23 1 second, "while the courts may carefully omit the nonholographic words on probate, they may be tempted to give them effect
in the process of construction. ''1 3 2 Moreover, the rule raises an issue
as to what sort of provisions are "essential" or "material" with the inevitable consequence that "[w]hat is surplusage to one court may be
essential to another."=
Courts applying the surplusage theory have differed, for example,
as to whether preprinted administrative provisions are an essential

228. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 358.
229. The "surplusage theory" actually grew out of a reformulation of the "intent approach."
See Bird, supra note 204, at 616, 623-24; Comment, supra note 210, at 258-59, 263-64. In Estate
of Baker, 59 Cal. 2d 680, 381 P.2d 913, 31 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), the California Supreme Court
laid the foundation of the surplusage theory by tying the issue of intent to two questions: (1)
relevance of the nonhandwritten matter to the substance of the document; and (2) materiality
of the nonhandwritten matter. The court concluded in Baker that immaterial, irrelevant matter
"may not be held to have been incorporated so as to render the document ineffectual as a will
and thereby defeat the decedent's declared testamentary intent." Id. at 684, 381 P.2d at 913,
31 Cal. Rptr. at 35. But see Estate of Black, 30 Cal. 3d 880, 641 P.2d 754, 181 Cal. Rptr. 222
(1982). For discussion of Black, see infra text accompanying notes 238-40; Comment, supra
note 210, at 265, 267-70. For further discussion of Baker, see Comment, supra note 210, at
263-65, 267-70 and discussion supra note 213.
230. See infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
231. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 358 (emphasis in original).
232. Id.
233. Bird, supra note 204, at 629.
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or material part of the will.23 In Estate of Christian,2 a California

appeals court held that "[s]ince the nomination of a personal representative to carry out the terms of a will is exceedingly important to a
testator, and because the nomination is effective at death and is pertinent to the administration of the testator's estate, it must be deemed
a part of the will ... .. The Christian court said that the administrative provisions in question, designating a personal representative,
made no sense unless the preprinted portion was read into the will.
Further, the court said that the designation of the personal representative is "exceedingly important" to a testator. The court consequently
to be part of
held that the decedent intended the preprinted matter
237
invalid.
was
will
the
that
result
the
with
will,
the
In Estate of Black,m however, the California Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Christian court, and upheld the validity

234. See Comment, supra note 210, at 263-65. The surplusage rule can be 'Invoked to
disregard printed words in a clause, giving effect to the remaining written words, or [the court]
may disregard the entire clause." Id. at 267. "In the former [situation], . .. courts are forced
to make a case by case determination as to whether the written words, standing alone, are
sufficient to be given effect. If the written words are intelligible after the court's editing, they
will be given effect." Id. 267-68. If the testator uses a preprinted will form, the court may read
out the entire clause if it contains insufficient handwritten matter to be subject to interpretation
after the printed matter is disregarded. Id. The type of distinctions these cases turn on are
the nature of the form (such as, what blanks are left open for the testator to fill in) and the
testator's inclination to rely on the words in the form. See id.
The court can read out 'mmaterial" printed matter, but the definition of what is 'material"
wavers, and contrary results are reached within the same court regarding the materiality of a
printed executor clause. Id. at 269-70. "[I]f courts cannot agree on the test to be used in
determining materiality, it is doubtful whether their decisions will have any semblance of uniformity. As a result, the validity of a holograph will often depends on the court in which the
instrument is offered for probate." Id. at 270.
If a court determines that a certain clause is or is not "material," the court is
forced to substitute its judgment and biases for that of the decedent. . . . The
importance of clauses in a will may vary in importance to the validity of the will.
However, seemingly insignificant clauses may be of utmost importance to the decedent. . . . Every clause in a will must be considered . . . important to the
decedent or they would not have been included.
Id.
235. 60 Cal. App. 3d 975, 131 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1976). For discussion, see Comment, supra
note 210, at 265, 267-70.
236. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 983, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
237. Id. at 981, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 844. The court concluded that applying the surplusage
approach did not mean that a court could "exclude as surplusage any provision not pertinent
to the decedent's disposition of his property or essential to the validity of the document as a
will." Id. at 982, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
238. 30 Cal. 3d 880, 641 P.2d 754, 181 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1982).
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of a holographic will executed on a will form containing preprinted
language relating to the appointment of an executor.2 "[T]he 'testatrix'
use of the printed clause referring to a personal representative is
patently irrelevant to the 'substance' - or dispositive provisions...
of her will and is not essential to its validity. In the absence of such
a designation, the probate court will name an administrator. . "?40
(c)

The date requirement

Traditional holographic will statutes sometimes require that the
document include a handwritten date as well as a signature., It is
generally accepted that the principal reason for requiring a date is to
"establish the sequence of instruments if the testator leaves multiple
conflicting wills. ' ' 22 In instances in which this rule applies, the document must be dated to be valid and (at least in a jurisdiction that
applies the intent theory), the date must be entirely handwritten.? 3
In older cases, the courts tended to be strict with respect to the
"entirely handwritten" requirement.- The rule is very complex and
failure to include a "complete" and unambiguous date has sometimes
led courts to invalidate the document.- 5 Langbein observed that the
dating requirement has produced a "notorious case law, in which holo' 6
graphic wills have been voided for abbreviated or omitted dating."'
The date need not be correct and it may appear anywhere on the
8
document, ' 7 but if it is omitted or incomplete, the will is not validA
(2) The Uniform Probate Code holographic will provision
The 1969 UPC holographic will provision essentially incorporated
the reasoning behind the surplusage theory into its definition of a

239. Id. at 885, 641 P.2d at 757.
240. Id. Both Black and Christian were decided under a California statute requiring that
holographic wills be entirely handwritten. CAL. PROB. CODE § 53 (West 1956) (repealed 1983).
This statute has since been amended. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111 (West 1991). For discussion of
the statute, see supra note 217.
241. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 359; see Bird, supra note 204, at 612-14; Note,
Holographic Wills: Extrinsic Evidence Admissable to Prove Uncertain Date, 21 Loy. L. REV.
973 (1975).
242.
243.

Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 512.

246.

Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 512.

T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 359; Bird, supra note 204, at 612-14.
244. See Bird, supra note 204, at 613.
245. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 360.
247. T.

ATKINSON,

supra note 42, at 360.

248. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss2/1

52

Miller: Will Formailty, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Ex
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE "HARMLESS ERROR" RULE

holographic will. 9 One commentator observes that this provision represented a "codification of the surplusage theory in its most liberal
form" because it required only that the material provisions of the will
and the signature be in the testator's handwriting and eliminated the
date requirement. ° Section 2-503 of the 1969 UPC dispensed with
the traditional requirement that the document be written entirely in
the testator's hand.?- Further, it expanded the definition of a holographic will to include unattested documents executed on printed will
forms if the material provisions were handwritten and the court could
discern the testamentary plan without reference to any typed or pre-

printed matter. 2
The substance of the UPC holographic will provision has not been
revised; however, the drafters shift the provision from section 2-503
to section 2-502(b) to accommodate the new harmless error rule.m

249. The following states require only the material provisions of the will to be handwritten:
ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.160 (1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2503 (1990); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 6111 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-503
(1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-503 (1989); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 700.123
(1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-303 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2328 (1989); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 30:3-3 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08-03 (Michie 1991); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 32-1-105 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (1991).
250. Bird, supra note 204, at 629. Langbein is critical of the elimination of the dating
requirement, commenting that
[t]he main reason for requiring dating is to establish the sequence of instruments
if the testator leaves multiple conflicting wills. The dating requirement has given
rise to a notorious case law, in which holographic wills have been voided for
abbreviated or omitted datings, even when there was no question of sequence or
genuineness. The UPC draftsmen, caught in the dilemma between no formality or
literal enforcement, opted for no formality and eliminated the requirement of dating
altogether.... [Ulseful formal requirements such as dating need not be eliminated
if the proponents are permitted to validate a defective instrument by proving that
the defect is functionally harmless. The UPC has confused the formality with the
formalism, and needlessly sacrificed the former for failure to remedy the latter.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 512.
251. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1969). The "material provisions" language of the Code
should permit a holding for holographic wills executed on printed will forms if the printed
portions can be eliminated and the testamentary scheme made out from the handwritten portions.
See Bird, supra note 204, at 629 n.127 (quoting UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (Working
Draft No. 5, 1969)) (recommending elimination of holographic wills in the interest of uniformity
and simplicity because they are not recognized in the majority of jurisdictions and result in
frequent litigation). Further consideration of the issue resulted in § 2-503 of the UPC on the
grounds that "for persons of modest means who may anticipate no likelihood of controversy, and
for persons who are unable to secure professional assistance, the holographic will may be valuable." Id.
252. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1969).
253. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-502(b), 2-503 (1990).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

53

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

New section 2-502(b) provides: "A will that does not comply with
subsection (a) [requirements for an attested will] is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material
portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting."' Under
this provision, a holographic will is valid even if "immaterial parts
such as the date or introductory wording are printed, typed, or
stamped" 5 or if written on a printed will form, "if the material portions
'' 6
of the document are handwritten. 1
Standing alone, the UPC holographic will provision is subject to
the same objections that arise when the surplusage theory is applied
to traditional entirely handwritten writing requirements. 7 Determining whether the nonhandwritten portions of a document can be disregarded and the handwritten portions enforced as the testator's will
obviously requires a case-by-case determination. The UPC provision
provides no reliable guide for determining whether nonhandwritten
provisions are material.
Random factors such as the testator's choice of will form and the
way that the testator fills in the blank spaces may still determine
validity, because some will forms may not encourage a sufficient degree
of handwriting. In such cases, the court may hold that it cannot interpret the will without reference to the preprinted matter, and thus
hold the will invalid. The major impact of the UPC provision is to
qualify a wider range of conduct as due execution of a holographic
will. Defective compliance still invalidates the document; however, the
provision, although liberalized, is therefore under-inclusive to the extent it still permits documents executed with testamentary intent to
fall through the statutory cracks.
In Muder v. Muder,- 9 the Arizona Supreme Court solved the problem of under-inclusiveness by holding that the printed portions of a
will form could be incorporated into the handwritten portions if testamentary intent was clear.2- The Muder court stated that the handwritten provisions may "draw testamentary context from both the
printed and the handwritten language on the form. '26' The Muder

254. Id.
255. Id. comment b.
256. Id.
257. For discussion of problems with the surplusage approach, see supra notes 226-40 and
accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 283-40 and accompanying text (for discussion of these difficulties).
259. 159 Ariz. 173, 765 P.2d 997 (1988).
260. Id. at 176, 765 P.2d at 1000.
261. Id.
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court saw "no need to ignore the preprinted words when the testator

clearly did not, and the statute does not require us to do

So. ''262

New

UPC section 2-502(b) does not expressly permit the court to give
effect to the nonhandwritten portions of a holographic will even if the
court determines that the document was executed with testamentary
intent. However, the effect of section 2-502(b), the section 2-503 harmless error rule, and new section 2-502(c), which permits a proponent
to establish testamentary intent by reference to the preprinted portions of a holographic will, could have a similarly expansive result in
cases in which a court determines that a testator intended to integrate
the preprinted portions of an unattested form will into the actual will.26
2. The Doctrine of Strict Compliance: Application and the Sufficient
Compliance Principle
a. Formalism and Borderline Conduct
The purpose of harmless error rules, such as new UPC section
2-503, is to prevent invalidation on purely formal grounds of documents
demonstrably intended by testators to operate as wills. Harmless error
rules make it possible for the proponent of a formally defective will
to present evidence showing that the testator intended the document
be given effect, despite the testator's failure to comply with the statute. The well-intentioned and often creative attempts of courts to
avoid the rule of strict compliance in order to implement testator
intent have inevitably resulted in "a vast, contradictory, unpredictable
and sometimes dishonest case law. .. ,"26 The rule of strict compliance
"occasions silly and sometimes dishonest litigation to determine
whether particular conduct constitutes compliance ... .,1 The effects
of the strict compliance rule on the law of donative transfers forcefully
illustrates the truth of the maxim "hard cases make bad law."
In his seminal 1975 article proposing that courts adopt a standard
of substantial compliance, Langbein describes the consequences of the

262. Id. The majority pointed out that the present version of the Arizona wills statute
states that one of its purposes is "to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in
distribution of... property." Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-1102(B)(2) (1990)). The dissenting
judge, however, said that he was "unable to discern such expansiveness in the statute," and

that reading the statute so broadly defeated legislative intent. Id. at 178-79, 765 P.2d at 1002-03
(Moeller, J., dissenting).
263. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(c) (1990). For discussion of the effect of applying a harmless
error rule to a defective holographic will, see supra notes 203-42 and accompanying text.

264.

Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 525.

265.

Mann, supra note 32, at 64.
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strict compliance doctrine as "harsh and relentless. ' 266 He notes, however, that courts vary to a great extent in how strictly they apply
the doctrine. 267 In cases involving minor violations of the statute, the
courts in some jurisdictions loosely interpret the statutory requirements in order to save dispositions that otherwise would be invalid
because of the testator's failure to comply with the wills act. 26 Similarly, will substitutes, and the so-called nonprobate system, arose
largely as the product of judicial attempts to avoid applying the wills
acts to essentially ambulatory dispositions that do not comply with
269
the wills acts.
The 1969 UPC did not address the strict compliance rule and thus,
did nothing to alleviate the problem of formalism. Prior to the 1990
adoption of the UPC harmless error rule, the UPC approach was
merely to simplify the will-making process to minimize the likelihood
of formal defects, but not to provide any device for saving defective
wills.270 Only to the extent that the UPC reduced the number of defective wills could it be said to have solved the problem of formalism.
That testators in UPC states nevertheless manage to commit error
in meeting the formal requirements of both attested and holographic
271
wills is amply demonstrated by the case law.
(1) Application of the strict compliance doctrine to specific errors
or omissions
(a) Attested and holographic wills
(i) Defects in attestation
Cases dealing with ordinary attested wills sometimes turn on purely
technical noncompliance with the attestation formalities. In these
cases, there is no question as to the testator's intent, but probate is
denied because of the testator's failure to comply with presence or
publication formalities. In the famous case of In re Hale's Will,- 2 the
testator, who was eighty-eight years old and physically infirm, had
assembled witnesses at his attorney's office, signed the will in their

266. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 489.
267. Id.
268. For discussions of cases in which courts have saved wills containing formal defects,
see infra notes 320-94 and accompanying text.
269. For discussion of will substitutes, see supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
270. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 510-12.
271. See supra notes 183-203 (discussing attested wills) and notes 249-63 (discussing holographic wills).
272. 21 N.J. 284, 121 A.2d 511 (1956).
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presence, and observed the witnesses signing the will, but had not
declared to the witnesses that the document was his will.Y 8 The Hale
court held the will invalid, stating that "[a] literal construction of the
statute with regard to the formal requisites is demanded and we have

no right to accept anything short of positive proof of conformity with
the statutory requirements."' 4 The New Jersey court in Hale further
stated that strict compliance with the publication requirement ensures
"knowledge by the testator that his solemn act is a testamentary

disposition of his bounty," and thus serves three purposes: (1) to
forestall "fraud by the living upon the dead," (2) "to discourage imposition upon the unwary," and (3) to give "the person who is being

compelled consciously against his will an opportunity to cry out."'

5

Estate of Wait76

In re
is a particularly egregious example of strict
enforcement of the presence requirements. In Wait, the testator was
old, feeble, and, at the time her will was witnessed, unable to complete

the signature because her hand was shaking.

7

She signed the will a

day or so later and showed the will to one of the witnesses, remarking,

"At last I got to where I could control my hand and I signed this
will.''2 8 Although there was no doubt that the testator signed the
document and intended it to be enforced as her will, the Tennessee
court held that it was invalid because she did not sign it in the presence

of the witnesses.? 9

273. Id. at 291, 121 A.2d at 514.
274. Id. at 295, 121 A.2d at 518 (citations omitted). The court found the will invalid because
there was no "proof that there was some communication from the mind of the testator to the
minds of both witnesses present at the same time, of the event about to take place," even
though both witnesses seemed to have understood the document was the testator's will. Id. at
299, 121 A.2d at 519-20.
275. Id. at 297, 121 A.2d at 519.
276. 43 Tenn. App. 217, 306 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).
277. Id. at 221, 306 S.W.2d at 347.
278. Id. at 222, 306 S.W.2d at 347.
279. Id. at 226-27, 306 S.W.2d at 349. In invalidating the will, the court stated,
[W]e think the evidence shows that [the testator] complied with a portion of the
statute by signifying to the attesting witnesses that the paper writing was her
will and that she then set about to sign the will by writing her usual signature
thereon; that due to her physical infirmity her hand shook so that she decided to
defer her signature until a later date and asked the attesting witnesses to go ahead
at that time and sign their names to the will which they did; that the testatrix
did not consider that she had signed the will until after the attesting witnesses
had signed the will and had left her presence. At some later date her hand became
more steady and she did actually sign the will but not in the presence of either
attesting witness though at a later date she did acknowledge her signature to one
of the attesting witnesses.
Id. at 226, 306 S.W.2d at 349.
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The latitude courts have exhibited with respect to the presence
requirements has varied widely over the years and among various
jurisdictions.- 0 In re Weber's Estate-, is a classic case of strict compliance applied to the presence requirements. In Weber, a 1963 decision, the Kansas Supreme Court held by a four-to-three margin that
the proximity between the testator and witnesses was not sufficient
to establish "presence. '" The seriously ill testator in Weber was en
route to a hospital and attempted to make a will while in his car
parked in front of a bank. The president of the bank had prepared
the will on a printed form from notes taken while talking with the
testator.2
Three bank employees stood at a closed window in the bank to
watch the testator sign the will.- The testator waved to them to
indicate that he saw them, and the witnesses waved back.- The
testator placed the purported will on the steering wheel where the
witnesses could see it and signed.- 7 The purported will then was taken
into the bank and signed by the witnesses, who were still standing
in front of the window. The Weber court held the purported will
invalid, stating:
The table upon which the signing occurred was against the
window but the table top was a foot to a foot and a half
beneath the window sill. Hence [the decedent] could see the
witnesses in the window as they signed but could not see
the pen or the purported will on the table at the time of
signing. Only that portion of the body of each witness in the
window could be seen by him.- 9
The Weber court stated that the Kansas statute required (1) that the
will be attested and subscribed by two witnesses in the presence of
the testator, and (2) that the witnesses either must have seen the
testator subscribe or heard the testator acknowledge the will.- The

280. See infra notes 328-44 and accompanying text (discussing decisions which take a more
liberal approach).
281. 192 Kan. 258, 387 P.2d 165 (1963).
282. Id. at 264-65, 387 P.2d at 170.
283. Id. at 259-60, 387 P.2d at 167-68.
284. Id.at 259, 387 P.2d at 167.
285. Id. at 259-60, 387 P.2d at 167-68.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 260, 387 P.2d at 168.
290. Id. at 261, 387 P.2d at 169.
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Weber court concluded that this means there must be presence and
sight, or presence and hearing.2 1 "Presence only, sight only, hearing
only, or sight and hearing only are not sufficient";

2

to establish pre-

sence, "[t]he testator must be able to see the witnesses attest the
w ill. ,,m
The minimal formality required for an attested will under the UPC
has been fairly successful in preventing the invalidation of wills due
to technical defects in the attestation ceremony, although such cases
do exist. In In re Estate of Peters,2 for example, a New Jersey court
remarked that "it is arguable that as the number of formalities have
been reduced, those retained by the Legislature have assumed even
greater importance, and demand at least the degree of scrupulous
adherence required under the former statute."' - In a recent Idaho
case, however, the court invalidated a will executed under a wills
provision modeled on the UPC because the testator had not signed
the will nor acknowledged the will or signature in the presence of the
witnesses, but merely had someone take the will to the witnesses to
be signed and then telephoned the witnesses afterward to thank
them.2
(ii) Defective signature
Although courts typically do not require literal compliance with
the handwriting requirement for holographic wills, court have invalidated holographic wills due to the testator's failure to include a date,
even in instances in which failure to date the will raised no issues
respecting intent or authenticity, and no other documents were offered
for probate.m
Courts also have invalidated both holographic and attested wills
because of a testator's failure to sign the will at the end of the disposi-

291. Id.
292. Id. For other decisions strictly construing the presence requirements, see Jefferson's
Will, 349 So. 2d 1032 (Miss. 1977) (one witness signed in presence of testator, the other did
not); Morris v. Estate of West, 643 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); In re Hill's Estate, 349
Mich. 38,84 N.W.2d 457 (1957); In re Palmer's Estate, 255 Iowa 428, 122 N.W.2d 920 (1963).
293. 192 Kan. at 263, 387 P.2d at 170.
294. 107 N.J. 263, 526 A.2d 1005.
295. Id. at 274, 526 A.2d at 1010.
296. In re Estate of McGurrin, 113 Idaho 341, 342, 743 P.2d 994, 995 (Ct. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 113 Idaho 499, 746 P.2d 85 (1987); contra Estate of Peters, 107 N.J. 263, 265, 526 A.2d
1005, 1007 (1987) (testator signed the will and acknowledged the signature in the presence of
witnesses; however, witnesses never signed the will).
297. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 359-60; supra notes 241-48 and accompanying
text (discussing the date requirement).
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tive provisions. A number of statutes specifically require that the will
be signed at the end or subscribed. 298 Decisions in these jurisdictions
require that the decedent's signature appear at the logical end of a
material or dispositive provision.
Pennsylvania courts have been notoriously strict in this respect.2
In In re Coyne's Estate,300 a 1944 case, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court appeared uncomfortable with the consequences of applying the
strict compliance doctrine to an improperly signed will, but reasoned:
It is perhaps unfortunate that decedent's testamentary intentions are frustrated. The strictness with which this section
of the Wills Act must be enforced is a matter of legislative
mandate. . . . "The Wills Act requires signing at the end.
The purpose of the Act was to remove all possibility offraud.
. . . Even if the testamentary intention of this particular
testatrix is frustrated, it is much wiser to refrain from
weakening the sound and well established mandate of the
legislature. Were we to do so, we might in future cases,
facilitate fraudulent or unauthorized alterations or additions
to wills."301

Therefore, the Coyne court held that the question in the case as to
whether decedent signed the writing at the end thereof is not one of
decedent's intention but of what decedent actually did or failed to do.Later cases continued to follow this rationale. In In re Estate of
Weiss,303 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a will that had
been signed by the testator in the left-hand margin next to the dispositive provisions.3 04 In In re Estate of Proley,30 5 a 1980 case, the testator
signed only the portion of a printed will form normally intended merely
to identify the will when properly folded. 3 ° As a result, her name

298.

See supra note 191 for a discussion of Wills Act formalities in various states.

299. See, e.g., In re Estate of Knupp, 428 Pa. 409, 430, 235 A.2d 585, 586-87 (1967) (The
will was subscribed by the witnesses but never signed by the testator. The court held a will
found in an envelope bearing the testator's signature which had been signed by her in the
middle of the attestation clause did not comply with the Wills Act and that to honor it would
be to violate legislative intent.).
300. 349 Pa. 331, 37 A.2d 509 (1944).
301. Id. at 334, 37 A.2d at 510-11 (emphasis added) (citing In re Brown's Estate, 347 Pa.
244, 46, 32 A.2d 22, 23 (1943)).
302. Id. at 334, 37 A.2d at 510.
303. 444 Pa. 126, 279 A.2d 189 (1971).
304. Id. at 127, 279 A.2d at 190.
305.
306.

492 Pa. 57, 422 A.2d 136 (1980).
Id. at 58, 422 A.2d at 137.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss2/1

60

Miller: Will Formailty, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Ex
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE "HARMLESS ERROR" RULE

appeared only beneath the words "Will of" in the endorsement section
of the document. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated the
will due to the testator's failure to comply with the requirement that
the will be signed at its foot or end.3° An evenly divided Proley court
stated that "[t]he frustration of decedent's apparent testamentary intent by her own failure to observe the proper formalities may seem
at first a harsh result, but it is a result that is required by our
Legislature and which this Court may not alter.'1308 Some courts adopt

a modified approach, insisting on strict compliance with the requirement only to the extent of invalidating provisions which follow the
signature.m
In all of these instances, the strict interpretation of the holographic
wills statutes leads to under-inclusiveness, because the courts refuse
to enforce wills even when they have no doubt as to the testator's
intent.
(b) Self-proving wills
In a notorious line of cases, Texas courts invalidated self-proving
wills because the testator or witnesses mistakenly signed only the
affidavit intended to make the will self-proving and failed to execute
the will itself.310 These cases are particularly disturbing, because in
307. Id. The dissenting judge stated that because the will form was ambiguous concerning
where the testator should sign, the will should have been held valid. Id. at 66-67, 422 A.2d at
140 (Flaherty, J., dissenting); cf. In re Panousseris's Will, 52 Del. 21, 151 A.2d 518 (Orphans'
Ct. 1959) (Delaware court invalidated a will executed in Greece because, although it satisfied
Greek law, the signatures of the witnesses on the sealed envelope containing the will were not
part of the will under Delaware law).
308. 492 Pa. at 59, 422 A.2d at 138. The dissenting judge remarked that the lower court's
holding was understandable in light of its findings that "[ijn
the instant case, the decedent
substantially complied with the requirements of the Wills Act. There is no doubt in the court's
mind that this was intended to be her Last Will and Testament. The sole defect is that she
signed the document in the wrong place." Id. at 66, 422 A.2d at 140 (Flaherty, J., dissenting)
(quoting the lower court's opinion). The dissenting judge continued:
Apart from a rather blatant frustration of testatrix's intent, the case demonstrates
as well the inadequacy of the strict compliance rule in that, applying the rule, we
find ourselves unable to agree with the judgment of the Orphan's Court Division
... that the will was not signed at the end. Where reasonable minds thus disagree
on this issue, the rule itself presents obvious difficulties of application.
Id. In a subsequent case, the court stated that "Proley is the product of an evenly divided
court and is of no precedential value." In re Estate of Hopkins, 391 Pa. Super. 211, 218, 570
A.2d 1058, 1061 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
309. E.g., Fenton v. Davis, 187 Va. 463, 47 S.E.2d 372 (1948).
310. For a discussion of self-proving wills, see infra notes 644-58, 720-26 and accompanying
text. The Texas cases arose under self-proving wills statutes contemplating what Mann calls a
"two-step" procedure in which first the testator, then the witnesses, sign the will itself after
the attestation clause, then all sign the appended affidavit (which often simply reiterates the
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every instance the document had been signed by the testator and the
witnesses in the presence of one another and in the presence of a
notary.
In Wich v. Fleming,311 the defect in wills act compliance occurred
because instead of signing the attestation clause, the testator's witnesses had signed only the self-proving affidavit, which was located on
the same page as the attestation clause and phrased in almost identical
language.3 12 The Texas Supreme Court treated the will and the attached affidavits as two entirely separate documents, each requiring
separate execution in order to be effective.13 The will in the Wich
case was not executed under this standard and thus, according to the
Wich court, was not properly witnessed.314 The Wich court, therefore,
3
held the will invalid. 15

language of the attestation clause in the past tense as a fait accompli). For discussion of this
two-step procedure, see also Effland, Self-Proved Wills, 16 ARIz. B.J. 31 (Feb. 1981); Schneider,
Self-Proved Wills - A Trap for the Unwary, 8 N. KY. L. REV. 539 (1981); Note, Wich v.
Fleming: The Dilemma of a Harmless Defect in a Will, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 904 (1983).
Although the procedure for making wills self-proving is fairly uncomplicated, serious problems
can occur at the time for probate if, as in these cases, it turns out that the witnesses and the
testator have failed to execute the will itself. Under the "two-step" provisions which make
execution of the will and the affidavit separate acts, attempts by testators and their attorneys
to achieve "simultaneous execution" of both will and affidavit by executing only one document
has sometimes led to unenforceability. Mann, supra note 32, at 41-42; Schneider, supra, at
34243. Failure to execute the will may occur if the will itself contains no attestation clause but
instead goes directly to the affidavit or if the eye of the officiating notary or attorney is
insufficiently "watchful." It may also occur if the witnesses and testator are misled by the
attorney or notary as to the proper procedure for achieving due execution. Mann observes that
witnesses are likely to defer to the apparent authority of the person in charge of the execution
ceremony, and to assume that one set of signatures is legally sufficient. Mann, supra note 32,
at 4142.
311. 652 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1983).
312. Id. at 354.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 354-55 (following Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966), holding that the
existence of a will is a "condition precedent" to the use of a self-proving provision and distinguishing between the intent of a witness to attest a will and the intent of a witness to execute an
affidavit affirming the will has been self-proved). See also Orrell v. Cochran, 695 S.W.2d 552
(Tex. 1985) (holding testator's signature invalid when testator, on advice of the notary, signed
only in the space for the witnesses on the self-proving affidavit). The Cochran court thus
reversed the court of appeals, which had distinguished Boren on the grounds that in Cochran, the
self-proving affidavit on the form will was never signed by the witnesses, and that testator had
placed his signature in the part of the form that could be used as an affidavit by mistake, and
not for any non-testamentary purpose. Orrell v. Cochran, 685 S.W.2d 461, 461 (Ct. App.), rev'd,
695 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1985).
315. 652 S.W.2d at 356.
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Although the Texas approach was not universally accepted,3 16 it

was followed in several other jurisdictions,31 7 and ultimately prompted

a 1975 revision to the UPC permitting one-step or simultaneous execution.3 Mann has termed the Texas approach "a triumph of formalism,"
and the result, essentially converting the provision for making the

will self-proving into "a new separate formality" requiring strict 3com19
pliance at the risk of invalidating the whole will, "unforgivable.)
(2)

Borderline compliance and the quantitative standard of substantial
compliance ("sufficient" compliance)

Despite the ubiquitousness of the strict compliance doctrine, there
is, as Langbein states, "considerable diversity and contradiction in

the cases interpreting what acts constitute compliance with what formalities." As the subsequent discussion will show, the courts sometimes have gone to great lengths to hold that borderline conduct fulfills
the requirements of the wills acts. In certain cases, the courts may

apply a quantitative principle of substantial compliance, reasoning that

316. See infra notes 734-43 and accompanying text (for discussion of cases rejecting the
Texas rule).
317. E.g., In re Estate of Sample, 175 Mont. 93, 95-96, 572 P.2d 1232, 1233-34 (1977)
(invalidating will in case in which testator signed will and self-proving affidavit but witnesses
signed only self-proving affidavit; the court held purpose of self-proving affidavit is to expedite
probate, not to cure defective wills); In re Estate of Mackaben, 126 Ariz. 559, 600-01, 617 P.2d
765, 766-67 (Ct. App. 1980) (invalidating will in case in which testator and witnesses signed at
end of will and in the self-proving affidavit because will lacked attestation clause disclosing that
testator signed or acknowledged her will in the presence of the witnesses and self-proving
affidavit did not state that this formality was met); In re Estate of Ricketts, 54 Wash. App.
221, 221-22, 773 P.2d 93, 94 (1989) (invalidating will in case in which witnesses signed only
self-proving affidavit attached to codicil; court said language in self-proving affidavit negated
any intention of the witnesses to attest and subscribe the execution of a codicil).
318. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504(a) (1975). The 1990 UPC permits a will to be "simultaneously executed, attested, and made self-proved, by acknowledgement thereof by the testator
and affidavits of the witness according to the form set out in section 2-504(a)." Section 2-504(c)
specifically provides that "[a] signature affixed to a self-proving affidavit attached to a will is
considered a signature affixed to the will, ifnecessary to prove the will's due execution." UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 2-504(c). Section (c) was added to "counteract the unfortunate judicial interpretation of similar self-proving will provisions. . . under which a signature on the self-proving
affidavit has been held not to constitute a signature on the will, resulting in invalidity in cases
where the testator or witnesses got confused and signed only on the self-proving affidavit." Id.
§ 2-504 comment (quoting Mann, supra note 32).
319. Mann, supra note 32, at 47. The strict construction of these statutes in some jurisdictions indicates that self-proving wills, while eminently useful as a concept, may indeed prove
to be a trap for the unwary in those jurisdictions that still retain the two-step procedure. See
Schneider, supra note 310, at 542-48.
320. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 489.
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marginal conduct is sufficient to meet the requirements of the wills
acts. 21 The courts in these cases sometimes give effect to wills despite
less than literal compliance with the statutory requirements on the
theory that the testator has achieved compliance with the wills act
formalities. This means that in the court's view, the testator's conduct
has achieved a sufficiently high level of conformity with the requirements as interpreted by the court to be in compliance with the wills
act. In effect, courts in these cases must determine that there was
no defect or omission in the testator's execution of the will.
(a) Attested and holographic wills
(i) Defects in attestation
Court interpretations as to what circumstances meet the publication
and presence requirements may vary widely. In In re Estate of
Burke,32 the court considered whether the testator had met 0klahoma's presence and publication requirements. The testator signed
her will while sitting in a pickup truck and then handed the will out
the window to the witness, who signed the will after placing it on the
hood of the truck. 3- Although the testator never said anything about
the will directly to the witnesses, both were requested to act as witnesses to the testator's will by a third party who was also present at
the execution.22 The witnesses had heard the third party read the
document aloud to the testator and discuss some of the provisions
with her immediately before the execution of the will.3- The Oklahoma
court found that the witnesses "knew why they were there and what
they were doing. 3 26 The court held that the testator had sufficiently
complied with the statute requiring that the testator subscribe the
will in the presence of attesting witnesses, that the testator acknowledge that the instrument was her will, and that the witnesses sign
the will at the testator's request and in the testator's presence.3

321. Langbein specifically distinguishes the substantial compliance principle that courts
apply when "borderline conduct is close enough to the prototype to be deemed in compliance"
from a harmless error principle permitting "concededly defective conduct" to be deemed in
compliance with the wills act on the ground that the defect is harmless error. Id. at 526 n. 127.
322. 613 P.2d 481 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
323. Id. at 484.
324. Id. at 483.
325. Id. at 483-84.
326. Id.
327. Id. For decisions applying a liberal construction to the presence requirements, see,
e.g., Glenn v. Mann, 234 Ga. 194, 214 S.E.2d 911 (1975) (In Mann, the court upheld the will
although testator did not acknowledge his signature to witness, witness did not see testator
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In In re Estate of Perkins,m the Kansas Supreme Court applied
the principle of substantial compliance with the wills act in affirming
a lower court decision upholding a will,3 despite the testimony of one
witness that she did not actually see the testator sign the will or hear
the testator acknowledge the will. ° Although the witness was "seated
across the room with her back to the wall," both witnesses and the
testator were in the same room at the time of the execution of the
will; both witnesses had seen each other sign the document; and both
witnesses knew that they were witnessing the testator's wi.3 1 Therefore, the supreme court held that the presence requirement was met
because the testator and both witnesses "were all within the presence,
sight, and hearing of each other."
In some states, courts apply a "conscious presence" rule to validate
wills if the testator has not actually seen the witnesses sign, but "(1)
sign within the testator's hearing, (2) the testator
the witnesses ..
...
know[s] what is being done, and (3) the signing by the witnesses
constitute one continuous transaction." In In
and the testator
re Demarris' Estate,m the Oregon court was "convinced that any of
the senses that a testator possesses, which enable him to know whether
another is near at hand and what he is doing, may be employed by
him in determining whether the attesters are in his presence as they
sign his will." Therefore, the DeMarriscourt would not require that
the witnesses attest the will within the testator's "range of vision" or
even within the same room.3 6 "If they are so near at hand that they

sign, and witness was seated 13 feet from testator in a position from which he could not see
her sign. Acknowledgement of signature was deemed sufficient since third party told witness
in testator's range of hearing that the document was testator's will and asked her to sign it.
The requirement that witness sign in testator's presence was deemed met because circumstances
were such that testator, in his actual position, might have seen her sign.); In re Lane's Estate,
265 Mich. 539, 251 N.W. 590 (1933) (In Lane's Estate, the court upheld the will although
witnesses signed at a table 30 feet from where the testator was lying and out of his sight. The
court applied a "liberal" construction of the presence requirement based on the inference that
the testator understood why the witnesses left the room and what they were doing - the
witnesses were 'in his call. .. ").
328. 210 Kan. 619, 504 P.2d 564 (1972).
329. Id. at 624, 504 P.2d at 568 (citing Kitchell v. Bridgeman, 126 Kan. 145, 267 P. 26 (1928)).
330. Id. at 622, 504 P.2d at 568.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. In re Tracy's Estate, 80 Cal. App. 2d 782, 783-84, 182 P.2d 336, 337 (1947).
334. 166 Or. 36, 110 P.2d 571 (1941).
335. Id. at 71, 110 P.2d at 585.
336. Id.
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are within range of any of his senses, so that he knows what is going
'' 7
on, the requirement has been met. 3
Historically, courts that have applied a substantial compliance
standard have drawn ultra-fine distinctions between conduct that is
sufficient to satisfy that standard and conduct that is not. In a recent
decision, the Virginia Supreme Court described its approach somewhat
differently - as one of "rigid insistence" upon "substantial compliance."- In Robinson v. Ward,- the Virginia court held a will valid
and its execution in substantial compliance with witness subscription
requirements even though the witness, who was also the beneficiary,
wrote her name on the document while acting as scribe to the testator
without any intention of acting as a witness.340 In the view of the
Robinson court, the statutory safeguards were not designed "to make
the execution of wills a mere trap and pitfall, and their probate a
mere game."31 Hence, although the court stated that the statute must
be strictly followed, it determined that the provisions must "not be
construed in a manner which would 'increase the difficulty of the
transaction to such an extent as to practically destroy' the right of
the uninformed lay person to dispose of property by will."2 Applying
its "rigid insistence upon substantial compliance" standard,' 3 the
Robinson court held that the witness had sufficiently subscribed the
4
will within the meaning of the statute.(ii) Defective signature
Occasionally a testator's signature will appear in the body of the
will or somewhere other than at the end of the dispositive provisions.
This circumstance may raise questions of whether the writing of the

337. Id.; see also Lane's Estate, 265 Mich. at 539, 251 N.W. at 590; Glenn, 234 Ga. at 194,
214 S.E.2d at 911.
338. Robinson v. Ward, 239 Va. 36, 387 S.E.2d 735 (1990).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 39-40, 387 S.E.2d at 737. The Virginia Supreme Court stated that the purpose
of the statute in requiring subscription of the will by competent witnesses in the presence of
the testator is to prevent "fraud, deception, mistake, and the substitution of a surreptitious
document .. " Id. at 41, 387 S.E.2d at 738 (quoting Ferguson v. Ferguson, 187 Va. 581, 591,
47 S.E.2d 346, 352 (1948)). These requirements, however, "are not intended to restrain or
abridge the power of a testator to dispose of his property. They are intended to guard and
protect him in the exercise of that power." Id. at 39, 387 S.E.2d at 737 (quoting French v.
Beville, 191 Va. 842, 848, 62 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1951)) (citations omitted).
341. Id. (quoting Bell v. Timmins, 190 Va. 648, 657, 58 S.E.2d 55, 59-60 (1950)).
342. Id. (quoting Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 546, 49 S.E. 668, 669-70 (1905)).
343. Id. (quoting Bell v. Timmins, 190 Va. 648, 657, 58 S.E.2d 55, 59-60 (1950)).
344. Id. at 44, 387 S.E.2d at 740.
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testator's name by the testator was intended to function as a signature,
whether the will was regarded by the testator to be in final form,
and whether there were subsequent additions to the document. As
the subsequent discussion will show, unless the wills act specifically
requires that the will be signed at the end or subscribed by the testator, courts usually will not read into the wills act the additional
requirement that the testator sign the will at the end. Usually the
courts will hold that the signature may appear anywhere in the document and is effective if the testator signed the document with the
intent to authenticate and adopt it as the testator's will.
For example, in Estate of MacLeod,35 a California case, the testator's will was found on her bedside table after she had suffered a
stroke. 46 The will was undated, written in several colors of ink, and
marred by interlineations, corrections, and writing in the margin.m7
The testator's name appeared only on the top of the first page, where
she had written in a superscription added to the will by means of'' a8
caret mark, "Being of sound mind, I, Margaret MacLeod Horwitz. 3
Although no signature appeared at the end of the document,4 9 the
MacLeod court held that the inserted superscription met the signature
requirement.w
Other jurisdictions have permitted signatures in places other than
at the logical or sequential end of the will, despite statutory language
requiring the will to be signed at the end. For example, in Scritchfield
v. Loyd,3 1 the testator's signature appeared in the attestation clause
of the will. The Arkansas Supreme Court stated that although
[t]here is a distinct conflict among the authorities as to
whether a signature in the attestation clause qualifies as a
[W]e believe the better rule to
signature "at the end." .

345.
346.

206 Cal. App. 3d 1235, 254 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1988).
Id. at 1238, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 157.

347. Id.
348.

Id. at 1239, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 157.

349. Id.
350. Id. at 1243, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 160. The court noted:
While not the most presentable of documents, and while not dated or subscribed,

the instrument here did contain a statement by Margaret that it was her will.
Margaret signed it, albeit at the beginning, and the document can reasonably be
interpreted as a complete device for the disposition of her property.
Id. at 1243, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 159. But see In re Estate of Proley, 492 Pa. 57, 422 A.2d 136
(1980) (invalidating a will written on a printed will form which was signed only in the endorsement

section of the form).
351.

267 Ark. 24, 589 S.W.2d 557 (1979).
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be that where the testator places his signature in the attestation clause because he believes that it belongs there and
with the requisite testamentary intent, it constitutes a sufthe statute requiring the signature
ficient compliance 3with
52
to be "at the end.
An Oklahoma court of appeals reached the same conclusion on similar
facts in In re Estate of Burke.
In Kajut Will,3M the 'Pennsylvania Orphan's Court, a court of first
instance, considered whether the execution of a will by a blind testator
substantially complied with a statutory requirement that the name of
a testator who signs by mark be subscribed to will in the testator's
presence. 5 5 In Kajut, the testator's name had been typed on each of
the three pages of the will outside the testator's presence.3 Although
the attorney, who also acted as a witness, 7 called the testator's attention to the typed signature immediately before the testator made his
mark, the will was not actually subscribed in the testator's presence.35
The court pointed out that "whatever authority is inherent in having
the testator 'see' his signature subscribed in his presence has no meaning in this case because of the testator's blindness."3 9 The court concluded that "under the particular circumstances of this case, . . .the
requirements of [the Pennsylvania Wills Act] were met.'' -

352. Id. at 25, 589 S.W.2d at 559; see also In re Morey's Estate, 75 Cal. App. 2d 628, 171
P.2d 131 (1946) (upholding will although testator signed form will in a blank space following the
attestation clause rather than at the end of the will; court said testator affixed signature with
intention of executing the will); In re Schiele's Estate, 51 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1951) (stating that
signature appearing in attestation clause rather than at end of the dispositive provisions sufficiently complies with requirement that will be signed at end if placed there with intention of
executing the will; not error to require trial court to hear testimony as to whether signature
placed on will with testamentary intent). For discussion of the conflict among authorities as to
whether a signature in the attestation clause qualifies as a signature "at the end," see Annotation,
Wills: When is Will Signed at "End"or "Foot"as Required by Statute?, 44 A.L.R.3d 701 (1990).

353. 613 P.2d 481 (Old. App. 1980).
354. 2 Pa. Fiduc. 2d 197, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 123 (Orphans' Ct. 1981).
355. Id. at 202, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d at 129.
356. Id. at 201, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d at 135.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 203, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d at 131.
359. Id. The court's reasoning in Kajut indicated that the court considered the execution
of the will under the circumstances to be quantitatively sufficient to meet the wills act standard.
Id. at 202-04, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d at 131-36. For further discussion of the Kajut court's application
of the "substantial compliance" principle, see infra notes 729-33 and accompanying text.
360. Id. at 202, 222 Pa. D. & C.3d at 131.
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(iii) Defective compliance with the handwriting requirement
The development and application of the intent and surplusage
theories in jurisdictions that require holographic wills to be entirely
handwritten exemplifies statutory interpretation that is intended to
permit marginal conduct to satisfy strict statutory requirements. s61As
previously discussed, holographic will provisions have produced a large
volume of cases that have been decided on ultra-fine factual distinctions. Although holographic will provisions typically are not strictly
construed, differing court interpretations of their requirements have
produced a largely arbitrary case law.
An essentially quantitative standard usually is applied to determine
whether the handwriting requirement is met when the instrument
contains nonholographic matter. The issue is the sufficiency of the
testator's compliance; the objective is to set a standard for determining
what conduct is sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute.
The result in a particular case may depend upon whether the intent
or surplusage theory is applicable. The cumulative result is a body of
case law turning on such factors as the testator's choice of will form
or stationery, placement of date, or method of filling in blanks on a
printed will form. Even under the more liberal surplusage theory, the
amount and nature of printed matter contained in a will often determines its validity.36
The Arizona Supreme Court no longer applies a sufficiency standard
to determine compliance with the handwriting requirement. In Muder
v. Muder, the court interpreted the Arizona "material provisions"
or "surplusage" statute to permit the printed portions of a will form
to be "incorporated" into the handwritten portion of the holographic
will as long as the decedent's testamentary intent was clear and the

361. For discussion of the application of the Intent" and "surplusage" theories in jurisdictions requiring that holographic wills be entirely handwritten, see supra notes 212-40 and

accompanying text.
362.

See, e.g., Estate of Johnson, 129 Ariz. 307, 630 P.2d 1039 (Ct. App. 1981) (invalidating

holographic will executed on printed form; court said that only the printed portions of the will,
which may not be considered under Arizona's version of the UPC holographic wills statute,
contained language from which testamentary intent could be inferred.). For discussion of decisions under a "surplusage" approach, see supra notes 249-63 and accompanying text. For discussion of the "surplusage" theory and decisions under the UPC's surplusage-type holographic will

provision, see infra notes 226-40 and accompanying text (surplusage rule applied to wills that
are entirely handwritten) and infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text (UPC holographic wills

provisions).
363.

159 Ariz. 173, 765 P.2d 997 (1988).
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protection afforded by requiring the material provisions to be handwritten is achieved.- The Muder court stated:
We see no need to ignore the preprinted words when the
testator clearly did not, and the statute does not require us
to do so. . . . If testators are to be encouraged by a statute
like ours to draw their own wills, the courts should not adopt
upon purely technical reasoning a construction which would
result in invalidating such wills.3 6
In reaching this result, Muder rejects a quantitative or sufficiency
standard of validity in favor of a "functional" or "purposive" analysis
similar to the qualitative substantial compliance concept proposed by

Langbein.366
(b) Self-proving wills
In contrast to the Texas line of cases in which self-proving wills
have been invalidated because the testator or the witnesses signed
the affidavit but not the will itself,3 6 7 the courts of Oklahoma, 36 Kan364. Id. at 176, 765 P.2d at 1000. The court pointed out that the purposes and policies ot
the wills statute are "[t]o discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution
of his property." Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1102(B)(2) (1988)). In this case, the
court was certain of the testator's intent and therefore held "that a testator who uses a preprinted
form, and in his own handwriting fills in the blanks by designating his beneficiaries and apportioning his estate among them and signs it, has created a valid holographic will." Id. (emphasis
in original). But see Estate of Johnson, 129 Ariz. at 311, 630 P.2d at 1043 (stating that Arizona
has "stringent requirements for finding that a document which might appear in a thousand
different forms, is a valid and authentic holographic will").
365. Id. The dissenting judge wrote:
The majority reads into the statute a provision that printed portions of a form
may be "incorporated" into the handwritten provisions so as to meet the statutory
requirements. I am unable to discern such expansiveness in the statute ....
I am
sympathetic to the majority's desire to give effect to a decedent's perceived testamentary intent. However, the legislature has chosen to require that testamentary
intent be expressed in certain deliberate ways before a document is entitled to be
probated as a will. Whether the holographic will statute should be amended to
take into account the era of do-it-yourself legal forms is a subject within the
legislative domain. I suspect the ad hoc amendment engrafted on the statute in
this case will prove to be more mischievous than helpful. Because I believe there
has been no compliance with the statute on holographic wills, I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 178, 765 P.2d at 1002 (Moeller, J., dissenting).
366. For discussion of Langbein's concept of "substantial compliance," see infra notes 695748 and accompanying text.
367. For discussion of the Texas cases, see supra notes 310-19.
368. See, e.g., Dillow v. Campbell, 453 P.2d 710 (Okla. 1969) (witnesses signed only self-proving affidavit, not codicil; the court held that under these circumstances, signature of affidavit
was sufficient to meet requisites of formality in execution); Estate of Cutsinger, 445 P.2d 778
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sas,3 9 and FloridaFo have held that the attestation requirement is met
even if only the self-proving affidavit is signed, leaving the will itself
technically unexecutedA7 In In re Estate of Petty,37 the Kansas Supreme Court stated that
[t]he mere fact that the attestation, in form, resembled an
affidavit, does not destroy its validity. Here the sworn statement was on the same page of paper as the last article of
the will and may be said to have been incorporated into the
will by words of reference therein. The evidence is undisputed that the will was signed by the testator

. . .

in the

presence of each of the subscribing witnesses and that they
signed the will, as subscribing witnesses, at his request and
in his presence and in the presence of each other... It has
been the policy of this court to uphold wills if the form of
the will substantially complies with the requirements of the
statute.5 7
In In re Estate of Chary,374 a Florida appellate court reached a
similar conclusion. The court stated that "the better view is that
attestation clauses and self-proof affidavits are not necessary or essential parts of a will but when incorporated into a will they are not
improper parts of it. The Texas view places form above substance
''75
and we decline to follow it.

(Okla. 1968) (witnesses failed to sign attestation clause but signed self-proving affidavit; the
court held that since the statute requires no particular form of attestation and the affidavit was
treated as an attestation clause, witnesses substantially complied with the Oklahoma statute).
369. See, e.g., In re Estate of Petty, 227 Kan. 697, 608 P.2d 987 (1980) (the testator signed
the will, but the witnesses signed only the self-proving affidavit; the court held that "no particular
form of attestation is required in Kansas" and the mere fact that the attestation resembled a
self-proving affidavit in form does not destroy its validity).
370. See, e.g., In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978) (witnesses
signed the self-proving affidavit, but failed to sign the codicil; the court held that witnesses'
signatures performed the function of attestation and therefore, the will was valid).
371. The decisions upholding improperly executed self-proving wills reach their results by
determining that the signature in the affidavit is sufficient to achieve compliance with the
attestation requirements. These courts therefore are applying what is in effect a quantitative
standard in holding that marginal compliance is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
wills acts. But see Hopkins v. Hopkins, 708 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App. 1986) (signature of witnesses
to self-proving affidavit cannot validate unattested will). See infra notes 720-28 and accompanying
text (comparing the rationale applied in these cases to the "substantial compliance" harmless
error rationale).
372. 227 Kan. 697, 608 P.2d 987 (1980).
373. Id. at 702-03, 608 P.2d at 992-93.
374. 359 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978).
375. Id. at 545. The Chary court noted that
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The Louisiana Statutory Will

Louisiana courts apply the principle of sufficient compliance to
execution of Louisiana statutory wills. 37 6 The statutory will is a modification of the rigidly formal Louisiana wills act requirements which
were derived from civil law. 77 The innovative statutory will was
adopted from the common law in order to avoid those requirements,3 78
though the Louisiana statutory will is significantly more formal than
an ordinary attested will and is comparable to a self-proving will. The
statute requires that the testator sign the will in the presence of a
notary public and two witnesses, publish the will, and sign it on every
3 79
page.
The legislative history of the Louisiana statutory will indicates that
it was intended to provide the testator with a "simplified means...
to express his testamentary intent and to assure, through his signification and his signing in the presence of a notary and two witnesses,
that the instrument was intended to be his last will. '" The courts
have therefore required what they call a liberal construction and application of the statutory will requirements, and have held that a will's
validity is to be maintained "if at all possible, as long as it is in
substantial compliance with the statute."' , In determining whether
a testator has substantially complied with statutory requirements, the
courts have indicated that they will look to the purpose of the statutory
requirements - "to guard against fraud. '" This focus on the purpose
[t]here is no requirement [in the Florida Statute] that the witnesses sign at any
particular place or with any particular mental intent. To require that a witness
have any specific mental intent when he subscribes a will would make the validity
of every will subject to the testimony of any witness that he did not have the
requisite intent when he signed. We decline to add this dangerous concept to the
requirements of the statute.
Id.

376. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2442 (1964).
377. Parker, supra note 204, at 23-24.
378. Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366, 368 (La. 1987); Succession of Porche v.
Mouch, 288 So. 2d 27, 28 (La. 1973); see generally Note, Donations - Imperfect Compliance
with the FormalRequirements of the Statutory Will, 15 Loy. L. REV. 362 (1968-69) [hereinafter
Statutory Will]; Note, Louisiana Statutory Will: the Role of Formal Requirements, 32 LA. L.
REV. 452 (1972).
379. Compare LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2442 (1964) with CAL. PROB. CODE § 56-6240 (providing
a less formal procedure which involves a form for the testator to fill in, sign, and have attested
by two witnesses in accordance with the printed instructions). See generally Note, supra note
210 (discussing the California statutory will provision).
380. Porche, 288 So. 2d at 30.
381. Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368 (emphasis added).
382. Id. One commentator has stated that
[w]here the departure from form has nothing whatsoever to do with fraud, ordinary
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of the requirements suggests that Louisiana courts will validate wills

containing technical defects if there is no evidence that the defect
raised any issue of fraud, a functional or purposive notion of substantial
compliance rather than a quantitative sufficient compliance standard.
To the extent that the Louisiana courts' substantial compliance principle permits courts to enforce concededly defective wills, 4 the principle is more akin to a harmless error rule than to the typical notion
of substantial compliance in the United States; that is, substantial
compliance as a rationalization for holding that borderline conduct in
fact meets the wills act requirements.3 In application, however, court
decisions show that substantial compliance in Louisiana is a narrow
quantitative standard, under which courts will enforce wills only if
the degree of deviation from the wills act requirements is marginal.6
common sense dictates that such departure should not produce nullity. It was the
intent of the legislature to reduce form to the minimum necessary to prevent fraud.
It is submitted that in keeping uith this intent, slight departuresfrom form should
be viewed in the light of theirprobable cause. If they indicate an increased likelihood
that fraud may have been perpetrated they would be considered substantial and
thus a cause to nullify the will. If not, they should be disregarded. Thus testators
and estate planners will have the security that the legislature intended to give
them.
Note, Statutory Will, supra note 378, at 371 (emphasis added).
383. For discussion of Langbein's concept of "functional" substantial compliance, see infra
notes 695-748 and accompanying text.
384. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 126 n.7.
385. Id.
386. See id. at 526 n.127 (distinguishing "substantial compliance" as typically applied in the
courts from substantial compliance as a harmless error rule to save concededly defective wills).
See, e.g., Succession of Porche v. Mouch, 288 So. 2d 27 (La. 1973); Succession of Guezuraga,
512 So. 2d 366 (La. 1911); Succession of Marcello, 532 So. 2d 230 (La. App. 1988).
In Marcello, the notary mistakenly signed the will at the end of the dispositive provisions,
where the testator ordinarily signs. Marcello, 523 So. 2d at 231. The testator's signature appeared
at the bottom of the first page of the will and after the attestation clause, where the signatures
of the notary and witnesses also appeared. Id. The appeals court held that the will met the
requirements of the statute. Id. at 233. Although the statute requires the will to be signed "at
the end," the court pointed out that the statute does not state that the signature must appear
before the attestation clause. Id. at 232.
In Porche, the will did not include the requisite declaration above the signature of the
testator in the attestation clause to the effect that the testator had published and signed the
will in the presence of the notary and witnesses. Porche, 288 So. 2d at 28 (This provision was
amended in 1974 to require that these facts be evidence by a declaration signed by the notary
and witnesses, making it clear that the testator need not sign at the end of the will. Guezuraga,
512 So. 2d at 369.). The will did include a statement directly above the signature of the testator
that he had published the will in the presence of the witnesses and notary and a statement in
the attestation clause that in their presence the testator had signed and published the will
(which statement was signed by the witnesses and the notary, but not the testator). Id. at
28-29. The court held that the will substantially complied with the formalities for a statutory
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Louisiana's substantial compliance concept has failed to save statutory
wills containing defects which appear under the circumstances to raise
no actual issues of fraud or testamentary intent.38

will, since the evidence as a whole (taking into account the signed statement of the testator
and the signed statement of the witnesses and notary together) showed that the formalities
were satisfied. Id. at 29. "[W]e see no reason why technical variations in the attestation clause
- which is designed merely to evidence compliance with the formalities - should defeat the
dispositive provisions of an otherwise valid will." Id. (emphasis in original). The court noted that
under the common law on which the statutory will provision is (purportedly) based, "the statutes
on the subject of the execution of a will should not be construed technically or rigidly if the
testator has attempted, in good faith to make a will." Id. at 30 (quoting 2 W. BOWE & D.
PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 19.4 (1960)).
In Guezuraga, application of a substantial compliance principle again saved a statutory will.
In this instance, the violation was the testator's failure to sign the will at the end and on each
separate page, as required by LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2442-:2449 (West 1990) (the current version
of these sections is identical to the version analyzed in Guezuraga)of the statutory will provision.
Id. at 366. The testator had signed the first page of the will, which contained all of the dispositive
provisions and the beginning of the attestation clause, but did not sign the page containing the
conclusion of the attestation clause. Id. The court held that the will was executed in substantial
compliance with the requirements for a statutory will, since the Louisiana statutory will provision
does not require the testator to sign following the attestation clause. Id. at 369. The court
remarked that in most common law jurisdictions, the testator may sign either before or after
the attestation clause, since it is not regarded as a part of a will. Id. The court also remarked
in a footnote that although the statutory will "is derived from the common law," Louisiana is
the only state requiring a signature on each separate page of the document. Id. at 366 n.2.
387. See, e.g., Succession of English, 508 So. 2d 631 (La. App. 1987); Succession of Malone,
509 So. 2d 659 (La. App. 1987); Succession of Holloway, 511 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 1987).
In English, the will was defective due to the omission of the attestation clause. 508 So. 2d
at 631-32. The will did not include the requisite language respecting compliance with the formalities. See id. However, at the ime of probate, the notary and witnesses who had participated
in the execution of the will signed an affidavit before another notary and two witnesses. In the
affidavit, the notary and witnesses who had executed the will declared that the formalities were
duly observed at the time of execution. Id. at 632. The trial court held that the document was
a valid statutory will. Id. The appellate court reversed on the ground that there is no substantial
compliance when the attestation clause required by the statute is completely omitted and the
dispositive provisions do not prove that the statutory formalities had been complied with or the
date of execution. Id. at 633. The court held that the affidavit could not "cure" the omission of
the attestation clause. Id. "To hold the probate affidavit can supply a complete lack of an
attestation clause, or for a complete failure of the dispositive provisions of the testament to
supply the requirements necessary to substantially comply with the statute, would be to judicially
rewrite the statute and carve out an exception which its language does not support." Id.
In Malone, the court invalidated the statutory will of an illiterate testator who had signed
by mark. 509 So. 2d at 663. In that case, the testator's attorney did not know at the time that
he drafted the will that the testator was illiterate, id. at 659, and the attestation clause did not
recite that the will had been read aloud in the presence of the testator or that the testator had
declared that he could not sign his name and the reason for his inability, as required by LA.
REV. STAT. § 9:2443 (West 1990) (provision for execution of a statutory will by an illiterate or
sight-impaired testator; the current version of § 9:2442 and § 9:2443 is identical to that analyzed
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(3) Consequences of the quantitative standard of
substantial ("sufficient") compliance
In general, courts validate wills which could not be admitted to
probate under a strict construction of the wills act on the rationale
that the conduct has been close enough to that required by the wills
The substantial comact statute to be considered in compliance.
pliance rule, as applied in United States courts, is not a harmless
error rule permitting defective wills to be deemed in compliance with

the wills act when the defect does not raise any issues of authenticity
or intent,m but is a yardstick measure of sufficiency. 3 9 Under a quantitative or sufficiency principle of substantial compliance, courts may
refuse to validate a will even if unequivocal indicia of testamentary

intent and authenticity exist unless the testator has attempted to

in Malone). English, 509 So. 2d at 660-61. The facts indicated that the attorney's secretary, a
notary, proceeded to execute the will in compliance with LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2442 (West 1990),
which requires a literate testator. English, 509 So. 2d at 659. When it came time for the testator
to sign, the notary discovered that the testator was illiterate, stopped the proceeding, and
informed the attorney. Id. The attorney took over, reading the will aloud in the presence of
the testator and three witnesses. Id. at 660. The testator published the will and signed his
mark in the presence of the notary and the attorney and the witnesses signed under the
attestation clause. Id. The court held that the will was not in substantial compliance with the
applicable statute, since the document failed to show on its face (in the provisions or attestation
clause) that it had been executed in compliance with the statute. Id. at 662. Moreover, the
record showed that the three witnesses had not actually followed the notary's reading of the
testament on copies of the will and that in fact the witnesses did not have copies of the Will as
the statute required. Id. This omission was held to be 'Tatal" to the validity of the will, despite
the fact that the will had been read aloud in the presence of the testator and witnesses. Id.
The court said that the procedure for execution of statutory wills for illiterate testators gives
the testator "reasonable assurance that his desires are in fact reflected in the document." Id.
Failure of the witnesses to follow the reading on copies frustrates that purpose. Id.
In Holloway, the sole defect in the statutory will was the omission of the date from the
attestation clause. 511 So. 2d at 1275. The court noted that the statute states that the attestation
clause shall be dated as provided in the statutory form and that the word "shall" is mandatory.
Id. at 1276. The dispositive language of the document did not reveal the date of execution. Id.
at 1277. The court held that "substantial compliance with the statutory scheme has never been
interpreted to authorize the total absence of a mandatory requirement.... Rather, substantial
compliance has been found when there is some technical variation in the mandated formalities
but the instrument as a whole shows that the relevant formalities have been reasonably satisfied."
Id. at 1276.
388. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 526 n.127.
389. See, e.g., Malone, 505 So. 2d at 659; Kajut Will, 2 Pa. Fiduc. 2d 197, 203, 22 Pa. D.
& C.3d 123, 135 (Orphans' Ct. 1981).
390. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 526 n.127; see also Rudd's
Estate, 140 Mont. 170, 177, 369 P.2d 526, 530 (1962) ('This court has previously stated in effect
that substantial compliance means only that a court should determine whether the statute has
been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which it was adopted.").
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comply with every formality of the wills act and the court concludes
that any conduct challenged as problematic can be considered to meet
the wills act requirements.
An examination of the legal contortions that courts have employed
in order to save improperly executed wills from invalidation reveals
that courts hesitate to assume dispensing powers in order to excuse
noncompliance with the wills act,3 91 yet at the same time are reluctant
to invalidate the testamentary plans of decedents when no doubt exists
as to authenticity or intent. Whether the courts are hobbled by respect

for the "dead man policy, '3 9? a perceived need to limit the factfinding
authority of probate courts, 3 93 superstitious reverence for the wills
act, garden-variety judicial inertia produced by the force of precedent,
or some combination of these factors, application of the strict compliance doctrine produces many hard cases turning on imperceptible
factual differences and, therefore, much bad law. Because testators
frequently bungle the formalities of will-making, the result is an "undignified spectacle of the courts indulging in schizophrenia, sometimes
bending backwards to save a will despite formal defects, and sometimes standing firm on trivial and highly technical defects. . . . Such
judicial acrobatics may be entertaining, but hardly make for certainty
or clarity in the law. '' 9 The inflexible presumption against the validity
of a defectively executed will and the attempts of well-intentioned
judges to avoid harsh consequences in particular cases, produces a
law of wills characterized by a lack of uniformity.

391. See, e.g., In re Estate of Fernandez, 173 N.J. Super. 240, 413 A.2d 998 (1980). In
Fernandez, the testator did not publish the will, although the wills were signed and attested.
Id. at 241-43, 413 A.2d at 999-1000. The court refused to find substantial compliance with the
wills act, on the grounds that to do so would be to break new ground - "a role more appropriate
to appellate courts." Id. at 245, 413 A.2d 1001 (citing "Langhelm's" [sic] article, Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 489 and other authorities). The court held the will valid
on the ground that the new statute diminishing the requirements for will execution and eliminating the publication requirement was controlling. Id. at 245-48, 413 A.2d at 1001-02.
Langbein discusses this case in Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 7. Langbein
felt that the judge was "obviously sympathetic to the substantial compliance doctrine," id.,
although it is not clear from the opinion that the trial court distinguished substantial compliance
as applied to save defective wills from the quantitative substantial compliance principle as
typically applied in the courts, as distinguished by Langbein in the 1975 article, Langbein,
Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 526 n.127.
392. For discussion of the "dead man policy," see Langbein, Substantial Compliance,supra
note 32; infra notes 405-24 and accompanying text.
393. For discussion of the inferior status of probate courts, see infra notes 449-67 and
accompanying text.
394. A. MELLOWS, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION 46 (3d ed. 1977).
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b. Policies Perpetuating Underlying Wills Act Formalism

In 1975, Langbein published an article premised on the notion that
'' 5
the law of wills is "notorious for its harsh and relentless formalism. 3
Although the case law suggests that the "relentlessness" of the courts
in applying the strict compliance rule may vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, and from case to case, the policy of requiring strict com-

pliance clearly is responsible for an unacceptably high level of arbitrariness, distortion and disharmony in the law of wills specifically, and

the law of donative dispositions generally. This distortion and disharmony is due to the machinations of courts straining to avoid "harsh"
and '"relentless" consequences in particular cases. It is inevitable that

many property owners will attempt to make gratuitous 3dispositions
96
without attending to the applicable standard of formality.

395. Langbein, SubstantialCompliance, supranote 32, at 489. Mann explains the purpose
and limitations of formalism.
Formalism is not, of course, necessarily evil. The statutory requirements for formal
wills ease the transfer of property at death by taking the vast array of testamentary
things and channeling them into a form that is easily recognizable as a will. The
requirements for writing, signature, and attestation impose a standard form on
testamentary instruments that permits probate courts to identify documents as
wills solely on the basis of readily ascertainable formal criteria. The formalities
thus routinize probate in the large majority of cases. The problem lies not with
the formalities but with judicial insistence on literal compliance with them. The
only legitimacy of the formalities is that they signify that functions deemed essential
to the process have been fulfilled. Whether or not the functions have been served
is, or at least should be, a separate question from whether the formalities have
been met. The latter is only evidence, albeit presumptive evidence, of the former.
Since the presumption is not conclusive, it seems a rather shaky foundation upon
which to rest a judicial requirement of strict compliance with the formalities.
Courts, however, routinely invalidate wills on formal grounds, despite ample evidence that the document offered for probate accurately represents the testator's
intent.
F. MANN, supra note 32, at 59-60.
396. See Palk, Informal Wills: From Soldiers to Citizens, 5 ADEL. L. REV. 382 (1975).
Palk explains that
[s]uch cases have occurred because, although the statutory requirements on the
formal validity of wills and codicils are relatively clear and precise, testators have
proved singularly incapable of obeying these simple instructions . . . . Testators
have restlessly wandered their houses while witnesses have signed. Witnesses have
come and gone like the ebb and flow of the tide. Attestation clauses have travelled
north, south, east and west across the page. Weird and mysterious scratchings
have appeared in the place of signatures. Codes have been employed, no doubt for
fear the will may fall into enemy hands. Egg-shells have proved almost more
popular than paper.
Doubtless not all the errors made can be laid at the door of human folly. People
are struck down with sudden illnesses and, with no will made, istakes occur in
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From a policy standpoint, the insistence on literal compliance with
the requirements of the wills act as the threshold test for enforcing
a will is difficult to justify. Although the act of testation is considered
a privilege granted to property owners by the state rather than a
concomitant of the right to private property protected by the Constitution, 397 the principle of free testation is deeply rooted in both United
States property law and in the common law from which such property
law is predominantly derived. 398 What is the rationale underlying judicial formalism which perseveres even in instances in which the defect
in the document or its execution does not raise even a single issue
that compliance with statutory formalities would have resolved?
(1) Historical precedent
The history of the English Statute of Wills indicates that its drafters were well aware of the function of formality not only as a means
of preventing fraud, but also as a means of establishing testamentary
intent and authenticity. Formal compliance with the Statute of Wills
thus substituted for proof of intent and authenticity. The 1837 Act
amending the Statute of Wills seems to have been in part a response
to the practice of the ecclesiastical courts in enforcing wills that did
not formally comply with the statute in instances in which the courts
nevertheless were satisfied as to testamentary intent and authenticity. 399 It is clear, therefore, that the doctrine of strict compliance has
not always been applied to wills.
Lindgren points out that the wills act formalities for attested wills
and many related principles and corollaries have survived centuries
longer than the conditions that were responsible for bringing them

the urgency to make one. Pieces of paper have conspired to be just the wrong size
for what the testator wanted to say. Moreover the printed will-form has ironically
not made life easy for the Do-It-Yourself testator. But whatever the cause, and
whether they have had professional legal advice or not, people have made errors
or committed irregularities in endeavoring to satisfy the formal requirements for
a valid will.
Id. at 382-83.
397. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942). The Day court held the
[r]ights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy,
are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance.
Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit,
condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property
within its jurisdictions.
Id. at 562. See supra note 39 (for discussion of the privilege of free testation).
398. For discussion of the privilege of free testation, see supra note 39.
399. Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 340-44.
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into being.4 0 One such change is the reversal of the common law
presumption against testacy in dispositions of real property. 401 The old
common law presumption produced the maxim that the courts should

not construe wills to disinherit heirs or to "thwart the dispose which
the law makes of the land." 4° It could be argued that the rule of strict
compliance is consistent with a system which favors the state's forced

succession scheme,'4 3 rather than a system which favors the "individualistic institution" of private property4°4 and the principle of free

testation.
(2) The "Dead Man" policy
One explanation for the doctrine of strict compliance is that courts
have "a deep and abiding anxiety about attempting to divine the intent
of people now dead." 40 5 Presently, all existing wills acts seem to be
based on an assumption that formal compliance with the requirements
replaces the need for extrinsic evidence to prove intent and authenticity. 406 Langbein analogizes the irrebuttable presumption that improperly executed wills are invalid to the "dead man" statutes that disqualify witnesses from testifying concerning transactions with a decedent,
when the decedent's estate is a party to the suit.407 The presumption
that improperly executed wills are invalid and the rule forbidding
reformation 408 of mistake or defects in the will, operate in combination

to prevent courts or survivors from varying or interpreting the expres49
sions of a decedent who is permanently absent from the jurisdiction.
400.

0

Lindgren, supra note 58, at 550-56.

401. Id. at 552-54.
402. Id. at 553 (quoting Gardner v. Sheldon, 124 Eng. Rep. 1064, 1066 (1671)).
403. For discussion of the relationship between strict compliance and the family protection
system promoted by the intestate succession statutes, see infra notes 425-48 and accompanying
text.
404. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 2.
405. Mann, supra note 32, at 61.
406. For discussion of the functions of the wills act formalities, see infranotes 470-522 and
accompanying text.
407. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 501-02. For discussion of the
Dead Man Statutes, see C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65, at 159-61 (3d ed. 1984); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 575-80 (Chadbourn Rev. 1979); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1576, at
323-27 (2d ed. 1923) [hereinafter 3 J. WIGMORE 1923].
408. For an excellent discussion of the recent developments respecting the rule forbidding
reformation and recent developments in the law, see Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of
Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Directionin American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
521 (1982); Note, Mistakenly Signed Reciprocal Wills: A Change in TraditionAfter In re Snide,
67 IowA L. REV. 205 (1981).
409. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 373-74; Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra
note 32. For Friedman quote, see supra note 31.
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Similarly, the dead man statutes are premised upon the notion that
decedents' intentions with respect to their lifetime transactions are
peculiarly unsusceptible to reliable proof, because decedents cannot
speak for themselves and the testimony of witnesses is likely to be
colored by self-interest.410 Although wills are not "transactions" to
which the dead man statutes apply, Langbein suggests that a similar
policy is implicit in the requirement of strict compliance.41 Just as the
dead man statutes prevent oral proof of a decedent's intentions, the
wills requirements force decedents to set out their testamentary
wishes in a permanent and reliable form to avoid the problems created
by permitting proof of oral wills. One of the rationales for requiring
strict compliance with the formalities is to avoid the hardship and
fraud that doubtless would be a consequence of permitting surviving
parties or interested persons to testify as to intent and authenticity.412
This rationale is sometimes also cited as justification for the dead man
statutes.
Langbein criticizes the "dead man" policy that is implicit in the
strict compliance rule, and argues that
[i]f the conduct and intention of a dead man are matters
thought to be impossible of fair proof, then the judicial insistence on due execution may be welcomed as serving for the
probate of wills the function which the dead man statutes
serve elsewhere. It becomes important to notice, therefore,
that the dead man statutes are 41 3widely condemned among
commentators and practitioners.
In his treatise, McCormick characterizes the policy underlying traditional "dead man" statutes as "a seductive argument. ' 41 4 However,
McCormick along with most commentators, 4 5 practitioners,416 and
courts,'4 17 rejects the reasoning behind the rule.418

410. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 407, at 159; 3 J. WIGMORE 1923, supra note 407, at
324-25.
411. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 501-02. See Gulliver & Tilson,
supra note 41, at 6. Gulliver and Tilson likewise state that oral testimony may be particularly
unreliable in the case of a will or other donative disposition when the issue of intent is raised
after the death of the transferor. Id. Not only is the main actor dead, but there may have been
an extended lapse of time between the time of execution and the time of probate. Id.
412. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 501.
413. Id. at 502.
414. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 407, at 159.
415. Id. at 160. McCormick and most commentators agree that
the expedient of refusing to listen to the survivor is, in the words of Bentham,
a "blind and brainless" technique. In seeking to avoid injustice to one side, the
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Courts will address the issue of testator intent in probate proceedings if a purported holographic will appears to be ambiguous on its
face, if an apparently valid formal will is challenged as a sham, or if
wills are ambiguous and provisions require construction. Such instances require an inquiry into the testator's intent. In conducting
this inquiry, courts have clearly demonstrated that they are capable
of dealing with extrinsic evidence and of making the factual determi-

statute-makers ignored the equal possibility of creating injustice to the other. The
temptation to the survivor to fabricate a claim or defense is obvious enough, so
obvious indeed that any jury will realize that his story must be cautiously heard.
A searching cross-examination will usually, in case of fraud, reveal discrepancies
inherent in the "tangled web" of deception. In any event, the survivor's disqualification is more likely to balk the honest than the dishonest survivor. One who would
not balk at perjury will hardly hesitate at suborning a third person, who would
not be disqualified, to swear to the false story.
Id.
See also 3 WIGMORE 1923, supra note 407, at 325 ('The policy of disqualifying the survivor
... [is] unenlightened and unpractical, and is ... thoroughly to be condemned."). For further
discussion of the dead man rules, see Ladd, The Dead Man Statute, 26 IOwA L. REV. 207
(1941); Ray, Dead Man's Statutes, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1963).
416. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supranote 32, at 502 (stating that the American Bar Association recommended as early as 1938 to abrogate the rule excluding testimony
of the decedent); see also C. MCCoRMUCK, supra note 407, § 65, at 160 n.7 (discussing 1938
ABA recommendation to abrogate rule excluding testimony of a decedent); 2 WIGMORE 1979,
supra note 407, § 578 (discussing 1938 ABA recommendation and 1922 Commonwealth Fund in
Connecticut, a comnnittee of judges, practitioners, and professors, concluding that rule does not
protect against false claims, but obstructs "thorough investigation of truth").
417. The concern of courts with excluding testimony of survivors in these cases goes back
many years. Extracts from several nineteenth century cases are quoted in 7 WIGMORE 1923,
supra note 407, at 324.
I have not the least hesitation in saying that I think it would be a highly desirable
improvement in the law if the rule was that all statements, made by persons who
are dead, respecting matters of which they had a personal knowledge, and made
"ante litem mortem," should be admitted. There is no doubt that by rejecting such
evidence we do reject a most valuable source of evidence.
Id. (quoting Sugden v. St. Leonards, L. R. 1 P. D. 154 (1876) (Mellish, L.J.)). "I regret that
according to the law of England any statement made by the deceased should not be admissible."
Id. (quoting R. v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox. Cr. 342 (1879) (Cockburn, L.C.J.)).
No doubt there are many countries . . . where the law permits declarations of
persons who are dead to be given in evidence in all cases where they were made
under circumstances in which such evidence ought properly to have been admitted
if the person had been living, and there is much to be said for that law as compared
with our own.
Id. (quoting Woodward v. Goulstone, L.R. 11 App. Cas. 469 (1886) (Herschell, L.C.)).
418. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 407, at 160 (stating that lawmakers and courts are
starting to see "the blindness of the traditional survivor's evidence acts" and "liberalizing
changes" are being adopted).
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nations necessary to identify intent. No magic is required. The "divination is not one that requires resort to occult aids, such as tea leaves
49
or entrails.' 1
Langbein points out that courts have exhibited a higher degree of
flexibility when confronting instances of defective compliance with the
formalities required by the statute of frauds for execution of an enforceable contract. 420 As a consequence, courts have developed principles for enforcing formally defective contracts if the party wishing to
avoid application of the statute has experienced an "irreversible change
of position at the inducement of the defendant. '42' Langbein suggests
that the disinclination toward similar leniency when a testator's compliance with wills act formalities has been defective may be due partly
to the fact that a disappointed beneficiary, unlike the plaintiff in a
contract action, is a mere volunteer.42
The revised UPC provisions seem to signify an unequivocal rejection of the application of the "dead man policy" to wills. First, new
UPC section 2-503 permits evidence to show a decedent's intent that
defectively executed wills, alterations or additions to wills, revocations, or revivals be implemented. 42 Second, revised UPC section
2-502(c) expressly permits introduction of extrinsic evidence to estab424
lish testamentary intent.

419. Mann, supra note 32, at 61 n.126; see Langbein, Substantial Campliance, supra note
32, at 502.
420. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 502-03.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 502. Langbein remarks that in cases of noncompliance with the statute of frauds
the courts apply the main purpose doctrine and part performance rules to enforce agreements
that otherwise would be void under the statute. Id. at 498-99. He argues that the courts follow
a purposive or functional analysis to the Statute of Frauds formalities. Id.
The essential rationale of these rules is that when the purposes of the formal
requirements are proved to have been served, literal compliance with the formalities
themselves is no longer necessary. The courts have boasted that they do not permit
formal safeguards to be turned into instruments of injustice in cases where the
purposes of the formalities are independently satisfied.
Id. (emphasis added).
As Fuller has suggested, the requirement of consideration in contract cases is the distinguishing feature serving to evidence validity and to identify the transaction as a contract. See Fuller,
Considerationand Form, 41 COLuM. L. REV. 799 (1941). Theoretically, the reason that wills
act formalities are needed is to give substance to what would otherwise be an empty promise
respecting succession to property. See id.
423. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990) (dealing with defective execution of writings intended
as wills).
424. Id. § 2-502(c). "Intent that the document constitute the testator's will can be established
by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in
the testator's handwriting." Id.
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(3)

Family protection and the Intestate Succession Acts

Langbein identifies family protection as a further rationale underlying the predisposition of courts to insist on strict compliance with
the wills acts. Noting that the wills acts are backstopped by intestate
succession statutes, which invariably include family protection measures,? Langbein suggests that application of the doctrine of strict
compliance may be a mechanism through which "the courts implement
a policy preference for these family protection measures."' Langbein

argues that application of the strict compliance doctrine would be
"intolerable... if invalidity of the will were to result... in forfeiture
of the property," but that in actuality its effect is simply to implement the states forced succession scheme, with its emphasis on the
family. Courts use the strict compliance doctrine to invalidate wills

perceived as containing "unnatural" dispositions; that is, wills contrary
to family interests in cases in which "unnatural" wills contain formal
defects.
The UPC attempts to strike a balance between the principle of

free testation and the policy underlying provisions favoring family
protection. For example, the recent UPC revisions to the elective
share provisions4 0 have been designed in line with the modern view

425. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 499.
426. Id. at 500. See Dunham, The Method, Processand Frequency of Wealth Transmission
at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 251-63 (1963) (suggesting that testation actually serves the
"family protection" policy more effectively than the intestate succession acts because most
testators leave a larger share to a surviving spouse than would be available through intestacy,
although the same study also may indicate that many people believe that there should be greater
limits on free testation, especially where there are minor children); Gaubatz, supra note 40, at
507-09, 520-28 (discussing the conflicting policies that contribute to the tendency of courts to
invalidate marginally defective wills); see also M. SussMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE
FAILY AND INHERITANCE 83-108 (1970) (showing that most testators prefer to leave all
property to a surviving spouse, even when there are surviving lineals and if there is no surviving
spouse, to relatives who are in need or who have rendered services to testator); Ward &
Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 393, 413 (showing that
in almost 40% of cases, testators left all of their estates to the surviving spouse and that
practically all testators transfer "within the family"; authors observe that a significant number
of wills accomplish transfers substantially identical with intestate succession).
427. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 499.
428. See generally Gaubatz, supra note 40, at 517-47, 548 (discussing (1) the failure of
present intestate succession schemes to achieve the goal of family protection; and (2) the irrelevance, to the policy of family protection, of application of strict compliance doctrine to invalidate
wills for technical defects).
429. Id. at 516-20 (discussing impact of strict compliance doctrine on family protection
policy).
430. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to -207 (1990).
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of marriage as an economic partnership431 and with increased recogni43 2
tion of the surviving spouse's need for support.
Revised section 2-201(a) implements the "partnership theory" by
increasing the survivor's, entitlement to a portion of the assets in the
augmented estate if the marital assets were disproportionately titled
in the decedent's name and is decreasing or eliminating the entitlement
if the marital assets were evenly titled or disproportionately titled in
the survivor's name. 4- The new provision also takes into account the
length of the marriage in determining the entitlement of the surviving
spouse, increasing the entitlement of the survivor of a long-term marriage and decreasing or eliminating the entitlement of the survivor of
a short-term marriage431 (on the theory that the survivor of a shortterm marriage is unlikely to have contributed significantly to the ac435
quisition of the decedent's wealth).
A further family protection policy implemented by the revised elective share provisions is predicated on the notion that the deceased
spouse's lifetime duty of support "should be continued in some form
after death in favor of the survivor, as a claim on the decedent's
estate. 43 6 The revised elective share provisions provide for a "supplemental" elective share amount in section 2-201(b) based on the needs
of the survivor. 437 Section 2-201(b) now permits the survivor to receive
up to $50,000 in addition to the portion of the decedent's estate that
he or she is entitled to under section 2-201(a) if the surviving spouse's
"assets and other entitlements are below this [$50,000] figure. '"
The surviving spouse is further protected from the consequences
of lifetime transfers that have the effect of reducing the probate estate
by a redesign of the UPC's "augmented estate" concept. 439 The concept
of the augmented estate requires assets in addition to those nominally
titled in the decedent's name to be taken into account in determining
the amount to which the surviving spouse is entitled.- ° This result is

431. Id. at general comment to part 2.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. § 2-201(a).
435. Id. at general comment to part 2. "[T]he effect is to deny a windfall to the survivor
who contributed little to the decedent's wealth and ultimately to deny a windfall to the survivor's
children by a prior marriage at the expense of the decedent's children by a prior marriage." Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.; see id. § 2-201(b). "Inimplementing a support rationale, the length of the marriage
is quite irrelevant." Id. at general comment to part 2.
438. Id. § 2-201(b), § 2-201(b) comment.
439. Id. § 2-202.
440. Id. at general comment. to part 2; see id. § 202(b).
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accomplished by adding to the value of the decedent's net probate
estate the value of the decedent's "reclaimable estate."41 The decedent's "reclaimable estate" includes so-called "will substitute" inter
vivos transfers"" made by the decedent during the marriage to people
other than the surviving spouse, 44 and property subject to a general
power of appointment that is presently exercisable by the decedent." 4
The concept of the "augmented estate" has thus been strengthened
by the closing of several loopholes previously left open," 5 including
that of purchasing life insurance naming someone other than the sur6
viving spouse as beneficiary."
In refining the provisions relating to rights of survivors 447 while
implementing a "harmless error" principle intended to prevent invalidation of testamentary plans for formal defects in execution," 8 the
revised UPC attempts to ensure the problem of ensuring the protection
of the family by some other means than invalidation of well-intentioned
wills on technical grounds.
(4) Inferior status of the probate courts
Mann suggests another explanation for the inflexibility of courts
in interpreting the wills acts: wills can be implemented only through
the medium of a court of traditionally inferior ministerial status." 9
441. Id. § 2-202(b).
442. For discussion of the will substitutes, see supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
443. UNIF. PROB. CODE general comment to part 2 (1990); see id. §§ 2-201(b)(2); 2-201(b)
comment.
444. Id. § 2-202(b)(2)(i).
445. See id. at general comment to part 2.
446. Id. § 2-202 comment.
447. For discussion of the ways in which current elective share provisions fail to provide
an effective solution to the problem of protecting the family, see Gaubatz, supra note 40;
Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 18.
448. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990).
449. Id. (discussing the inferior status and limited, largely ministerial functions of probate
courts). For discussion of the origins of the probate courts, see Atkinson, supra note 64. The
"inferiority" of probate courts in the United States may derive from the suspicion and hostility
with which the English ecclesiastical courts, where wills of personalty were proved and the
probate process originated, were regarded by the common law courts. See id. at 107 (finding
the roots of United States probate courts in the ecclesiastical courts); 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 304-05, 476 (5th ed. 1942) (hostility of common law courts to
ecclesiastical courts); E. JENKS, supra note 149, at 269 (criticizing ecclesiastical courts for
"scandalous laxity" in wills matters).
The English ecclesiastical courts were abolished in 1857. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 77 (1857). After
Parliament abolished the ecclesiastical courts, it created a new Court of Probate with power to
grant probate, letters of probate and letters of administration, effective as to real and personal
property for wills disposing of both land and chattels. Atkinson, supra note 64, at 124; see 3
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 135, at 689.
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"The requirement of strict compliance with the wills act formalities
limits discretionary interpretation of the formalities by discouraging
anything other than mechanical, literal application of them. '' 4 ' Considered thus, the strict compliance doctrine is an effective means of
controlling inferior courts which are not equipped to engage in detailed
factfinding or to adjudicate extrinsic evidence.451
In determining whether an instrument is a will as defined by the
wills act, courts use a "fundamentally different mode of analysis" from
that used to determine whether an instrument is a will based on
evidence of testamentary capacity, intent, and absence of mistakes,
fraud, or imposition; 452 that is, analysis requiring "discretionary adjudication. ' ' 45 Mann argues that the strict compliance doctrine relegates
the probate courts, at least in those jurisdictions that do not recognize
holographic wills, to the essentially ministerial function of "rubber
stamping" duly executed wills and refusing to enforce wills that are
defectively executed, without regard to circumstances indicating tes4
tamentary intent. 5
[T]he administrative decision of what constitutes a will is
guided solely by whether or not the document meets the
stipulated requirements of form. Those requirements - the
wills act formalities - are a set of formally rational criteria
for determining what constitutes5 a will. The rationality of
the rules is formal, not logical.4
The strict compliance requirement permits the fundamental issue of
intent to be treated as a purely formal matter by probate courts.
Thus, formal compliance with the wills act establishes testamentary

450. Mann, supra note 32, at 64; see 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 135, at 689.
451. Mann, supra note 32, at 64-65. The strict compliance doctrine and the related presumptions "prevent probate courts of limited jurisdiction from hearing contested matters fully, either
by removing such matters to a court of general jurisdiction or by empowering the superior
court to try the case again on the merits rather than limit its review to the questions appealed."

Id.
In 1943 Atkinson wrote that the Probate Division of the High Court of Justice in Britain
"has no business regarding succession except to grant, contest, or revoke probate and administration." Atkinson, supra note 64, at 125.
452. Mann, supra note 32, at 64-65.
453. Id. Application of the strict compliance doctrine converts wills act formalities into a
set of mechanical criteria for determining, without reference to "the legally relevant characteristics of the facts of execution through logical analysis of their meaning," whether or not the
document is a will. Id. at 65.
454. See id. at 64-65.
455. Id. at 65.
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intent. If a contestant disputes that the decedent intended the document as a will notwithstanding formal compliance with the wills act,
the contest should take place in a different forum to preserve the
routine of probate, since the vast majority of wills are not contested. 4 -

Mann remarked that one anomalous consequence of the strict compliance doctrine is that appellate courts apply the same mechanical
standard applied by probate courts in the initial administrative decision
of whether to deny admission to probate due to formal defects in the
will. 45 7 In construing the wills acts, appellate courts substitute the

strict compliance standard for "techniques of judicial reasoning and
statutory interpretation." 45 To the extent that they do not typically

apply "discretionary adjudication" in wills cases, 459 the appellate courts

cannot effectively ensure doctrinal consistency in the probate courts
or prevent abuse of discretion by "a class of judges who are not trained
to exercise it or whom the supervisory courts perceive as not qualified
to exercise it. '' 460 Mann suggests that upgrading the probate courts to

enable them to deal with the factual issues raised by defective execution might be one step toward eliminating formalism. 4 61 However,
Mann's theory does not account for the ubiquity of the strict compliance
doctrine (which, as Langbein observes, persists even in jurisdictions
in which the probate courts have not been historically debased)46 and
Mann does not deal with the administrative difficulties involved in
increasing the powers of the probate courts.
Since the advent of the UPC, many states have upgraded the
status and functions of their probate courts. 463 Since its inception, the
4

UPC has endowed probate courts with subject-matter jurisdiction. 6
The UPC consolidates the probate court as a division of the state's
trial court of general jurisdiction, with power to adjudicate issues of
fact. 465 Under the UPC, probate courts are expressly empowered to
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 67.
461. Id. at 67-68. Mann concedes, however, that 'the probate process will not lose its
stigma of inferiority merely by judicial fiat." Id.
462. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 503. Mann's response to that
argument is that "formalism became embedded in wills adjudication when the traditional structure of probate was all but universal. Reforms in probate jurisdictions, particularly reforms
that are so recent, would not necessarily root out formalism unless they removed the stigma
of inferiority from the probate process itself, which they have not." Mann, supranote 32, at 63.
463. L. AVERILL, supra note 189, at 8-9.
464. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-302(a) (1990).
465. Id. §§ 1-301 to -304.
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take "all necessary and proper" action with respect to matters before
them. 4 - As Mann remarks, however, the UPC changes "are relatively
recent, and they have not always applied to all probate districts within
a state. Probate courts and judges in many states still follow the
traditional model of limited jurisdiction and inferior status to at least
'467
some degree.
III.

FORM, FORMALITY, FORMALISM, AND THE IDENTIFICATION
OF INTENTION: THE FUNCTIONAL COUNTER-ANALYSIS OF THE

WILLS ACTS

A.

Strict Compliance and the Presumption of Intention

The implementation of a harmless error rule presupposes that compliance with wills act formalities is not the only conduct by which a
testator may evidence testamentary intent. Revised UPC section 2-503
sets out a harmless error rule which, in combination with new UPC
section 2-502, permits wills that do not comply with execution formalities to be admitted to probate if the proponent can carry the
burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the writing to constitute a will. 4 Introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove testamentary intent is specifically authorized by
469
new UPC section 2-502(c).
The new UPC harmless error rule, or any similar provision permitting the proponent of a defective will to prove that the decedent
executed it with testamentary intent, necessarily assumes that the
most significant function of formal compliance with the wills act is to
produce a document evidencing intent and authenticity, and that a
defect in the document may be cured by presentation of evidence on
those issues. Implementation of a harmless error rule depends upon
acceptance by legislatures and courts of two basic principles: first,
that the wills acts formalities are not magical rites indispensable to
the process of testation; and second, that the formalities are not indispensable safeguards against fraud and overreaching. Indeed, adoption
of a harmless error rule implicitly requires the conclusion that wills
act formalities are useful only to the extent that the testator's com-

466. Id. § 1-302(b).
467. Mann, supra note 32, at 63. Mann reports that when several years ago he called on
the judge of a small probate district in Connecticut, he was informed that "[t]he probate judge,
Joe, was performing surgery on a Volkswagen." Id. at 62 n.129.
468. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)-(b) (setting out formal requirements for attested and
holographic wills, respectively); § 2-503 (1990) (setting out new harmless error rule).

469.

Id. § 2-502(a). For quote from this section, see supra note 292.
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pliance obviates the need for extrinsic evidence to prove intent and
authenticity. In default of strict compliance with the wills act requirements, such rules permit the court to look beyond the document to
determine the meaning of the testator's conduct.
B. FunctionalAnalysis of the Wills Act Formalities
1. Evolution of the "Functional Approach"
Courts routinely accept the formal limitation on the enforceability
of wills without delving into the issue of whether the requirements,
"each particular aspect [of which] can be traced to some antecedent
stage where formality served a more palpable function, 470 continue
to have any utility. Even in instances in which the courts have upheld
wills in cases in which there has been less than literal adherence to
the strict letter of the wills act, the courts usually have done so on
the theory that the testator in fact sufficiently complied with the
specific requirement alleged to have been violated, not on the theory
that the deviation from the requirement was harmless.471 Commen-

tators who have considered the issue generally maintain that the formal requirements of wills acts, as well as other formalities of transfer,
such as the delivery requirement and the statute of frauds, still serve
certain palpable functions. During the latter half of this century, commentators began to consider the formalities of transfer pragmatically.
For example, advocates of the so-called "functional school 472 identify
several purposes or policies served by the requirement that property
owners observe a prescribed standard of formality in executing wills
and in otherwise directing the disposition of property to their successors.
The major premise underlying this functional analysis of formality
is that the formalities of transfer endure because they effectively serve
at least two important purposes or policies: 47 (1) ensuring some means
470. Friedman, supra note 23, at 366.
471. For discussion of the courts' treatment of borderline conduct and the quantitative
principle of substantial compliance, see supra notes 321-94.
472. See Rohan, supra note 23, at 4-7.
473. See infra text accompanying notes 470-522 (for discussion of the functions of the wills
act formalities). The advocates of functional analysis reject the notion that the sole force maintaining the requirements of formalities in the law of succession is inertia; they consider that
the formalities have survived because they serve certain essential purposes in facilitating transactions between parties. See Rohan, supra note 23, at 6. Friedman remarks that since most
medieval legal institutions are "gone with the wind," it is reasonable to infer that those that
persist have "survival value." Friedman, supra note 23, at 366.
The earliest application of functional analysis was limited to the delivery requirement in the
law of gifts. See Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in
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of determining the genuineness or authenticity of claimed dispositions;
and (2) requiring some objective manifestation of the transferor's intent
so that a court need not rely entirely on the statements of witnesses
for assurance that the transferor intended to implement the disposition. 4 74 Advocates of functional analysis argue that if the transferor's

Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, (pt. 1), 21 U. ILL. L. REV. 341, 358 (1926).
Mechem's thesis was that the continued vitality of the delivery requirement "is attribut[able]
to several desiderata which are achieved by the prerequisite of delivery, perhaps without the
courts being conscious of their Existence or of the role of delivery in securing them." Rohan,
supra note 23, at 4-5. Mechem identified three desiderata or functions that are served by "the
wrench of delivery": (1) delivery makes the significance of the gift "vivid and concrete" to the
donor; (2) it provides unequivocal evidence of the transaction to any witnesses who might be
present; and (3) it provides the donee with prima facie evidence of the gift. Mechem, supra, at
354.
In 1941, Gulliver and Tilson applied a similar "functional analysis" to the requirements of
transfer generally. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41. In considering the purposes served by the
formalities of transfer, Gulliver and Tilson treat desiderata identified by Mechem as aspects of
what they term the "ritual" and "evidentiary" functions of formality. In addition, they identify
a third "protective" function. Id. at 3-4; see Rohan, supra note 23, at 4-5.
In the same year Fuller, discussing the purposes served by formality (with special emphasis
on the role of consideration in the law of contracts), also employed a form of functional analysis.
Fuller, supra note 422. Fuller likewise identified three functions of formality: the "evidentiary"
function, the "cautionary" function (overlapping to some extent with Gulliver and Tilson's "ritual"
function) and the "channeling" function. Id. at 800-01.
In his 1975 article applying functional analysis specifically to the wills acts, Langbein identified
four purposes served by wills act formalities that synthesize and incorporate the concepts identified by previous commentators: (1) "ritual" or "cautionary" (Gulliver & Tilson, Fuller, and
Mechem); (2) "evidentiary" (Gulliver & Tilson, Fuller, and Mechem); (3) "protective" (Gulliver
& Tilson); and (4) "channeling" (Fuller). Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at
491-97. Commentators writing after Langbein have tended to adopt his analysis. See, e.g., Love,
supra note 42; Nelson & Starck, supra note 32.
474. See Rohan, supra note 23, at 3-6. Functional analysis applies to save formally defective
transfers in instances in which the facts and circumstances establish that the purposes served
by the formal requirements have been met. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41; Langbein,
Substantial Compliance, supra note 32; Love, supra note 42; Mechem, supra note 473. Functional analysis in effect treats the requirements of transfer as meaningful formal, not substantive,
requirements. Rohan, supra note 23, at 6. The advocates of functional analysis generally agree
that an important rationale for the retention of formalities is to safeguard against the enforcement
of impulsive promises and to serve as an evidentiary tool for the transferee, third party witness,
or both. Id.
For applications of functional analysis to various problems in the law of succession and
gratuitous transfers, see, e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41 (discussing ambulatory and
revocable transfers not executed in accordance with the wills acts); Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32 (discussing defectively executed wills); Love, supra note 42 (discussing
delivery in the law of gift/oral declarations of trust); Mechem, supra note 473 (discussing delivery
in the law of gift); Nelson & Starck, supra note 32 (discussing defectively executed wills); Rohan,
supra note 23 (discussing delivery requirement in the law of gift).
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conduct effectively has achieved the purposes that the formalities of
transfer were designed to serve, a court should enforce the transfer
even if the transferor's conduct falls short of the standard. In effect,
they suggest that courts should have a form of dispensing power
permitting them to enforce formally invalid transfers in cases in which
the transferor has failed to do what the law requires but in which
4 5
there are no unresolvable issues respecting intent and authenticity. The most important recent adaptation of the functional approach
is Langbein's proposed use of the substantial compliance doctrine to
save defectively executed wills. 476 In his influential 1975 article, Langbein argues that when a defect in a will is "harmless to the purposes
of the wills act" - when the bungled or omitted formality does not
raise fundamental issues of intent or authenticity - the document
should be deemed "in substantial compliance" with the wills act and
should be admitted to probate. 47 The concept of substantial compliance
as a litigation rule converting the irrebuttable presumption that a

formally defective will is unenforceable into a rebuttable presumption 471
obviously differs profoundly from the substantial compliance concept
sometimes referred to by United States courts in cases determining

475. Mechem, supra note 473, at 354. Mechem argues that the delivery requirement in the
law of gift should not be strictly applied in instances in which the purposes of the requirement
have been effectively met, because in some instances literal compliance - manual tradition is impracticable or impossible; in such instances, the gift should be upheld. Id.; see also Rohan,
supra note 23 (reexamining Mechem's arguments and reaching a similar conclusion).
In their seminal article on classification of gratuitous transfers, Gulliver and Tilson argue
that courts should uphold testamentary dispositions made by decedents who fail to comply with
the wills act if there is compliance with formalities appropriate to some inter vivos form of
gratuitous transfer. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 17. Gulliver and Tilson consider that
all of the formalities of transfer serve the same or similar functions, and that the intentions of
a decedent who uses an inappropriate mode of transfer should not be disregarded if the conduct
of the transferor raises no unresolvable issues that would have been resolvable by compliance
with the wills acts. Id. In a recent article, Langbein argues that the essentially testamentary
will substitutes (or "nonprobate transfers"), traditionally classified as inter vivos dispositions,
require "alternative formalities" that effectively fulfill the functions of the wills act requirements
and that it is this fact, rather than the spurious inter vivos classification of these transfers,
that justifies their exemption from the wills act requirements. Langbein, NonprobateRevolution,
supra note 17, at 1130-32.
Love argues for treating imperfect gifts as enforceable oral declarations of trust in instances
in which the donor dies before completing delivery and, the circumstances show that the donor
intended the gift to be given effect. See Love, supra note 42.
476. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32.
477. See id. For discussion of the substantial compliance doctrine, see infra notes 696-743
and accompanying text.
478. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 513.
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that arguably defective wills in fact comply with the wills act require479
ments allegedly violated.
Langbein's functional interpretation of wills act formalities and his
proposal that the strict compliance doctrine be replaced with a rule
permitting implementation of certain defective wills is the first sys4
tematic formulation of a harmless error rule applicable to wills. 8
Langbein's analysis, which greatly influenced the development of UPC
section 2-503 and harmless error legislation in other countries, is very
much the product of the theory that wills act requirements can be
analyzed and ranked in terms of their utility in establishing testamentary intent or preserving evidence of authenticity. Langbein's substantial compliance harmless error rule is grounded upon certain assump4s
tions about the functions of formal requirements for due execution. 1
Further, the comments to the new UPC harmless error rule indicate
that the drafters contemplated that courts would apply functional
4
analysis reasoning when addressing section 2-503. 8
2.

Four Functions of Formality
a. Attested Wills

Functional analysis is founded on the premise that the transfer
requirements represent a meaningful formal, as opposed to substantive, requirements.4- As the subsequent discussion shows, the advocates of functional analysis generally assume that it is entirely rational
to retain formal transfer requirements as a safeguard against enforcement of casual promises and unpremeditated action as well as a means
of preserving evidence of the intention to make a gratuitous transfer.4
The gravamen of the functional approach, however, is that enforce-

479. For discussion of cases holding that testator's conduct was in substantial compliance
with wills acts, see infra notes 729-42 and accompanying text.
480. Although the South Australian provision that eventually became the model for most
harmless error rules today, including UPC § 2-503, was under discussion during the period that
Langbein's article was in press, the legislative history of the South Australian statute seems
to indicate that its drafters neither anticipated nor intended the broad construction eventually
given to it by the courts. See infra notes 744-87 and accompanying text. Cf. Bates, supra note
3 (anticipating the advent of the harmless error debate, but not providing a systematic analysis
of the problem and its solution).
481. For discussion of the substantial compliance doctrine, see infra notes 696-743 and
accompanying text.
482. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990). For discussion of UPC § 2-503, see
infra notes 92549 and accompanying text.
483. Rohan, supra note 23, at 6.
484. Id.
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ability of gratuitous transfers (including transfers by will) should not
depend on exact compliance with the formalities, but on the effectiveness of the parties' conduct in establishing the transferor's intent to
implement the purported transaction.
Functional analysis is useful in addressing the problem of strict
compliance with the wills acts because it focuses attention on individual
wills act formalities and their relationship to the problems of establishing (1) whether the document is genuine; and (2) whether the maker
of the document intended it to be given effect as a will. In his 1975
article, Langbein synthesizes the analysis of the commentators who
previously addressed the problem of strict compliance and identifies
four major categories of purposes, policies, or functions that are served
by wills act compliance. Although in many significant respects the
following analysis of the categories and functions differs from Langbein's analysis, his 1975 article has been the point of departure for all
subsequent discussion by scholars, including the discussion that follows.
(1) "Intent-verifying" function
In this article, the term "intent-verifying function" refers to the
role that compliance with transfer formalities serves to produce an
objective manifestation of the transferor's intent. According to
Mechem, the first scholar to look at formality functionally, formal
standards effecting a transfer serve to make the nature of the transferor's act "vivid and clear" to any witnesses to the transfer, to a
court called upon to enforce the transfer, and to the transferor. 4 1
Mechem thus discerned two aspects of the intent-verifying function.
These aspects were later identified, although not generally clearly
differentiated, by other commentators as (1) the "ritual" aspect of
formality that produces an objective manifestation of intent on the
part of the transferor to implement the transfer, 48 and (2) the "cautionary" aspect of formality, resulting from the requirement that the transferor perform prescribed acts as a condition of an effective transfer
that impresses on transferors the seriousness of their actions and
induces deliberation. Although most commentators, including Langbein, seem to use the terms "ritual function" and "cautionary function"

485.

See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 491-97.

486. Mechem, supra note 473, at 354.
487. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 3-4.
488. Fuller, supra note 422, at 800.
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interchangeably, a careful examination of the literature reveals that
two distinct functions are actually considered to be comprehended
within the statutory requirements for due execution.4 9
(a) The ritual aspect of formality
Legal statutory requirements designed to produce an objective
manifestation of intent through the use of ritual serve the intent-verifying purpose by requiring of the transferor some form of conduct
that reliably distinguishes transactions intended to have legal effect
from casual statements or rash promises. 4 -° The wills acts ritual that
contributes most to the intent-verifying purpose is attestation, because
it induces the testator to select witnesses to the testament and otherwise to engage in deliberate, premeditated conduct that unequivocally
signifies the intent to make a will. 491 Although all of the acts required

489. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 495 n.30 (although Langbein
does not explicitly distinguish between these concepts, his analysis reveals recognition of both
aspects).
490. Gulliver and Tilson look primarily to the usefulness of formality in identifying dispositions intended to be enforced - in other words, at the objective ritual aspect of the intent-verifying function of formality.
[A] court needs to be convinced that the statements of the transferor were deliberately intended to effectuate a transfer. People are often careless in conversation
and in informal writings. Even if the witnesses are entirely truthful and accurate,
what is the court to conclude from testimony showing only that a father once stated
that he wanted to give certain bonds to his son, John? Does this remark indicate
finality of intention to transfer, or rambling meditation about some possible future
disposition? . . . Possibly the remark was inadvertent, or made in jest. . . . The
court is far removed from the context of the statements, and the situation is so
charged with uncertainty, that even a judgment of probabilities is hazardous. Casual
language, whether oral or written, is not intended to be legally operative, however
appropriate its purely verbal content may be for that purpose. Dispositive effect
should not be given to statements which were not intended to have that effect.
The formalities of transfer therefore generally require the performance of some
ceremonial for the purpose of impressing the transferor with the significance of
his statements and thus justifying the court in reaching the conclusion, if the
ceremonial is performed, that they were deliberately intended to be operative.
This purpose of the requirements of transfer may conveniently be termed their
ritualfunction.
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 3-5 (emphasis added). Gulliver and Tilson further state
that "[c]ompliance with the total combination of requirements for the execution of formal attested
wills has marked ritual value, since the general ceremonial precludes the possibility that the
testator was acting in a casual or haphazard fashion. The ritual function is also specifically
emphasized in individual requirements." Id. at 5.
491. See id. at 5; Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 520-21.
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to execute a will serve to promote the "ritual" aspect of formality to
attestation
some extent, fulfillment of the traditional requirements for
"set[s] wills apart from the other activities of daily life. '492
(b) The cautionary aspect of formality
A secondary aspect of formality is its tendency to induce deliberation and reflection on the part of the testator. Formality thus prevents
enforcement of casual statements and unpremeditated action, and thus
493
serves a subjective cautionaryas well as an objective ritualfunction.
Virtually all of the wills act formalities serve the cautionary aspect

of the intent-verifying function. Even the bare act of reducing the
testamentary scheme or intended disposition to written form induces
deliberation and reflection. 49 The ritual and cautionary aspects of formality reinforce one another: on the one hand, ritual tends to induce
deliberation and reflection; and on the other hand, fulfillment of the
ritual function indicates premeditation and deliberation.4 95 Together,

492. Lindgren, supra note 58, at 544. Lindgren agrees that attestation does serve this
purpose, but does not consider that its ritual value justifies retention of what he considers to
be an obsolete requirement. See id. at 569-73.
493. Fuller focuses on the effect of compliance with formality on the transferor's subjective
intentions:
A formality may . . . perform a cautionary or deterrent function by acting as a
check against inconsiderate action. The seal ... fulfilled this purpose remarkably
well. . . . [It] was an excellent device for inducing the circumspective frame of
mind appropriate in one pledging his future. To a less extent any requirement of
a writing, of course, serves the same purpose, as do requirements of attestation,
notarization, etc.
Fuller, supra note 422, at 800.
494. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 14; Nelson & Starck, supranote 32, at 349.
495. As Langbein comments:
A will is said to be revocable and ambulatory, meaning that it becomes operative
only on death. Because the testator does not part with the least incident of ownership.., the danger exists that he may make seeming testamentary dispositions
inconsiderately, without adequate reflection and finality of intention. . . . One
purpose of many of the forms is to impress the testator with the seriousness of
the testament, and thereby to assure the court "that the statements of the transferor were deliberately intended to effectuate a transfer." They caution the testator
[cautionary function], and they show the court that he was cautioned [ritual function].
Langbein, SubstantialCompliance,supranote 32, at 494-95 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
"The execution of the will is made into a ceremony impressing the participants with its solemnity
and legal significance. . . .It is difficult to complete the ceremony and remain ignorant that
one is making a will." Id. at 495.
Formalities which caution the transferor of the significance and finality of his act
are desirable since they force upon him the opportunity to reflect on its significance;
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the ritual and cautionary aspects of formality contribute to produce
the inference that the testator or transferor followed the statutory
requirements to signify an intention that the disposition be given effect.
Generally speaking, formalities that serve only the cautionary function will not produce a strong inference of intent because Without a
ritual or implementing act signifying the finality of the transferor's
intention, the issue of whether the disposition should be implemented
remains in doubt. Of the wills act formalities, only attestation unequivocally signifies that the will is complete and intended to be en4 96
forced.

they also indicate to the court that the action was taken with deliberation. By
limiting judicial recognition to transfers which comply with such formalities, the
courts reduce the chance of giving legal import to words carelessly spoken or to
idle ruminations about actions to be taken in the future.
Love, supra note 42, at 339-40.
Nelson and Starck suggest that the goals of the wills act formalities include providing the
court with the following assurances:
(1) . . . the testator has thought seriously about the nature and value of his
property, those who have natural claims upon the testator for support, and how
those claims can be satisfied; [and] (2) . . . the testator reached a final decision on
the disposition of the assets. Although it is not necessary that the testator make
complete disposition, it is desirable that the testator's state of mind be final on
the disposition made in the will.
Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 348. Although Nelson and Starck refer only to the "ritual"
function, their discussion focuses mainly on the subjective cautionary aspect of what is here
referred to as the intent-verifying function.
It is perhaps true that facing the reality of death and its attendant consequences
is one of the most difficult responsibilities in life. While the consequences of death
are inherently the focus of the execution of a will, a will is normally executed at
a time when death is not imminent. Coupled with the fact that normally the testator
does not part with the least incident of ownership upon execution of the will, such
execution may not achieve the goal of careful consideration of property and obligations. The process of ritual or ceremony is thought to assure that the testator is
aware of the solemnity of the act and its attendant consequences ....
It is believed
that the sum and substance of ... formalities is that few persons could realistically
avoid the conclusion that this is a solemn act which will have significant consequences.
Id. at 348-51.
496. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 5. An attested will on its face provides strong
evidence of testamentary intent and finality. "Compliance with the total combination of requirements for the execution of formal attested wills has a marked ritual value, since the general
ceremonial precludes the possibility that the testator was acting in a casual or haphazard fashion."
Id. Gulliver and Tilson appear to regard attestation as primarily serving the evidentiary function,
which may be open to question. See id. at 4.
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The signature4 9 and writing4 9s formalities serve the intent-verifying

function to some extent, but standing alone, are not sufficiently final
Langbein recognizes the importance of the attestation formalities to the intent-verifying
function as means of enforcing awareness of the import of the testator's acts and as a manifestation of intention.
The execution of a will is made into a ceremony impressing the participants with
its solemnity and legal significance. Compliance with the Wills Act formalities for
a witnessed will is meant to conclude the question of testamentary intent. It is
difficult to complete the ceremony and remain ignorant that one is making a will.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 495.
When the Wills Act requires attestation, it directs that persons additional to the
testator participate in the execution of the will. Their participation is the major
factor in ceremonializing the execution, and those who survive the testator will be
able to testify to due execution. The increment which attestation adds to the
cautionary . . . function[ ] seems unlikely to be achieved by other means ...

Attestation, unlike the ceremonies associated with it [presence and publication]
has been nearly as fundamental in the statutory scheme as signature and writing.
Id. at 521.
But see Langbein, HarmlessErrorRules, supra note 5, at 52 (attestation serves a modest
protective fiction, but it is usually not necessary because "there is usually strong evidence
that want of attestation did not result in imposition"); Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra
note 32, at 498 ("Only where the protective policy is still valued is it fair to characterize
attestation as indispensable to the policies of the Wills Act."); Lindgren, supra note 58, at
544-46 (arguing that while attestation contributes to the "ritual" function, it is nevertheless
dispensable).
497. Gulliverand Tilson discuss the signature requirement and the ritual function:
[The ritual function] furnishes one justification for the provision that the will be
signed by the testator himself or for him by some other person. Under the English
Statute of Wills of 1540, specifying a will "in writing," no signature was expressly
required. In construing this statute, the courts gave effect to various informal
writings of the testator, even though the circumstances furnished no assurance
that the testator intended them to be finally operative. These decisions are said
to have been influential in the enactment of the provision of the Statute of Frauds,
which were the first to require a signature. The signature tends to show that the
instrument was finally adopted by the testator as his will and to militate against
the inference that the writing was merely a preliminary draft, an incomplete disposition, or haphazard scribbling. The requirement existing in some states that
the signature of the testator be at the end of the will has also been justified in
terms of this function; since it is the ordinary human practice to sign documents
at the end, a will not so signed does not give the impression of being finally
executed.
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 5-6. The requirement that a will be signed at its end has
also been said to serve a similar function. Id.
According to Langbein, signature is the primary intent-verifying formality. "More important
than the requirement of written terms is that of written signature." Langbein, Substantial
Compliance, supra note 32, at 495. "Of the many formalities found in the different Wills Acts,
two are universal. A will must contain written terms and the testator must sign it.... Writing
and signature are the minimum requirements which assure the finality, accuracy, and authenticity
of purported testamentary expression." Id. at 498. Langbein points out that "[m]ost people
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and unequivocal to establish the testator's intent to adopt the will.
An unsigned writing evidences deliberateness, but the lack of an unambiguous implementing act leaves open the issue of finality of intention. 49 9 Further, a signature alone may not unequivocally establish
finality. Signed writings produced for probate in jurisdictions that
permit unattested holographic wills often leave in doubt whether the
testator intended the writing to be a will or whether it was merely
a draft, a letter, or some other informal or incomplete writing.- ° Even
would not lightly sign anything captioned 'Last Will and Testament.' . . . Signature separates
the preliminary draft from the decided 'last will."' Id. at 518. "If you leave your will unsigned,
you raise a grievous doubt about the finality and genuineness of the instrument." Langbein,
Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 52. "Signature is the formality that distinguishes
between drafts and wills." Id. at 23. "Evidentiary and cautionary formalities such as signature
and writing are all but indispensable ..
" Langbein, Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians
Point the Way, 65 A.B.A. J. 1189, 1194 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act].
With respect to the indispensability of signature to the policies of the wills acts, see Langbein,
Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 518-19.
498. Gulliver and Tilson state that an unsigned writing does not indicate finality. Gulliver
& Tilson, supra note 41, at 5. Nelson and Starck, however, consider that the act of writing
has cautionary value to the extent that it induces deliberation.
Writing has always been regarded as the most solemn form of expression and is
far less susceptible to a claim that it was tentative instead of final. The requirement
of writing cannot, of course, assure the desired degree of solemnity. Holographic
wills, though required to be in writing, are often cast in very conversational tones
which have the reader wondering whether the expression was nothing more than
a segment of the writer's "stream of consciousness" instead of a finalized act.
Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 349.
The better view is that the act of reducing one's testamentary plans to writing indicates
deliberation but that the intent to have the disposition enforced cannot be said to be final absent
some implementing act such as signature or attestation. See Fuller, supra note 422, at 803-04.
499. See Fuller, supra note 422, at 803-04.
500. See infra notes 523-615 and accompanying text (for discussion of holographic wills and
the problem of "overinclusiveness").
One formal requirement found only in a few jurisdictions that has some bearing upon the
meaning of the testator's signature for the testator and for the probate court is the requirement
that the will be signed at the foot or end. A number of cases have arisen because the testator
placed the signature somewhere other than at the end of the document; and courts in those
instances have had to struggle with the question of whether the apparent signature was actually
affixed with the intention to signify adoption of the terms of the will. Most commentators do
not treat placement of the signature as fundamental to the wills act purposes. See Langbein,
Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 498 (stating that the "requirement that the will be
signed is vastly more purposive than the requirement that the signature be 'at the end.').
Mechem, supra note 182, at 504 (stating that the requirement that signature be at the end of
the document is dispensable and approving its elimination from the Model Probate Code).
But see Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 349-50 (emphasizing the ritual value of the
requirement that the will be signed at the foot; failure to require the signature at the end of
the will raises two problems: (1) whether its placement elsewhere was an adoption of the will
by the testator; and (2) whether the document is final).
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will substitutes, which need not include attestation to be effective,
generally are only effective if some objective act on the part of the
transferor (such as formation of a contract with a financial institution
or insurance company) finalizes and implements the document.
Langbein observes that the increasing use of the signature in unimportant transactions has diminished its cautionary value °1To some
extent, the fact that signature is the implementing act for many transactions reduces the degree of reflection and deliberation which is induced by the wills act signature requirement. Perhaps people who
routinely sign their names are less likely to be impressed by the
significance of signing their will. However, it could be argued that
the routine use of signature as an implementing act in ordinary business transactions may enhance its "ritual" impact, because the omission
of a signature from a document produces an inference of a lack of
finality of intention. The formalities that contribute to the ceremoniousness of attestation - presence 6 2 and publication5 - contribute to
some extent to both the ritual and cautionary aspects of the intent-verifying function.r

501. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 518.
502. Most commentators consider that the presence requirements (requirements that testator sign in the presence of the witnesses, that the witnesses sign or acknowledge the will in
the presence of the testator, or that the witnesses sign in the presence of each other) contribute
little to the intent validating or authenticating functions of the wills act. To the extent that
they increase the ceremoniousness of the process of will-making, presence requirements may
enhance the cautionary or ritual functions, but their primary purpose seems to be prevention
of fraud. See infra notes 520-21 and accompanying text.
503. "The occasional provisions that the testator publish the will or that he request the
witnesses to sign [the will] . . . seem chiefly attributable to this purpose, since such actions
indicate finality of intention." See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 6. Langbein considers
that publication increments the intent-validating function by contributing to the ceremoniousness
of will-making by "warning the testator of its seriousness," and 'Tlx[ing] the execution in the
memory of those who may testify to it." Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at
521. However, Langbein regards publication as one of the minor formalities and as therefore
dispensable under a substantial compliance rule. See id. at 521.
Nelson and Starck consider that publication plays an important role in serving the ritual and
cautionary functions: "[tihe completion of the act in the presence of witnesses definitely adds
formality to the ceremony and prevents the testator from regarding the act as whimsical or
capricious." Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 350-51.
The UPC of 1969 eliminated the publication requirement. See supra notes 183-203 and accompanying text.
504. See Lindgren, supra note 58, at 544 (stating that virtually all the formalities that one
could imagine, including a password or a secret handshake, would serve the ritual function
"because they would set wills apart from the other activities of daily life").
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"Authenticating" function

The wills act formalities also serve to create reliable evidence of
the authenticity of the purported will and of the specific disposition
of property intended by the testator. 50 5 For attested wills, this function

505. Gulliver and Tilson note:
The requirements of transfer may increase the reliability of the proof presented
to the court. The extent to which the quantity and effect of available evidence
should be restricted by qualitative standards is, of course, a controversial matter.
Perhaps any and all evidence should be freely admitted in reliance on such
safeguards as cross-examination, the oath, the proficiency of handwriting experts,
and the discriminating judgment of courts and juries. On the other hand, the
inaccuracies of oral testimony owing to lapse of memory, misinterpretation of the
statements of others, and the more or less unconscious coloring of recollection in
the light of the personal interest of the witness or of those with whom he is friendly
are very prevalent; and the possibilities of perjury and forgery cannot be disregarded. These difficulties are entitled to especially serious consideration in prescribing requirements for gratuitous transfers, because the issue of validity of the
transfer is almost always raised after the alleged transferor is dead, and therefore
the main actor is usually unavailable to testify, or to clarify or contradict other
evidence concerning his all-important intention. At any rate, whatever the ideal
solution may be, it seems quite clear that the existing requirements of transfer
emphasize the purpose of supplying satisfactory evidence to the court.
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 4. Obviously, in the case of a will, the transferor will
always be unable to clarify intent.
[T]he testator will inevitably be dead and therefore unable to testify when the
issue [of the validity of the will] is tried. . . . [A]n extended lapse of time, during
which the recollection of witnesses may fade considerably, may occur between a
statement of testamentary intent and the probate proceedings. Both factors tend
to make oral testimony even less trustworthy than it is in cases where there is
some likelihood of the adverse party being an available witness and where the
statute of limitations compels relative promptness in litigation. The statute of wills
may therefore reasonably incorporate unusual probative safeguards requiring evidence of testamentary intent to be cast in reliable and permanent form.
Id. at 6.
Fuller refers to the authenticating or "evidentiary" function as "[tihe most obvious function
of a legal formality." Fuller, supra note 422, at 800. It is likewise emphasized by Mechem (with
respect to the delivery requirement specifically); that formalities of transfer may make the
transfer "unequivocal" to witnesses and may serve to preserve evidence of the intent to have
the transfer take effect. See Mechem, supra note 473, at 354.
Langbein states that "[t]he primary purpose of the Wills Act has always been to provide
the court with reliable evidence of testamentary intent and the terms of the will; virtually all
the formalities serve as 'probative safeguards."' Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note
32, at 492.
Nelson and Starck appear to agree with Langbein in identifying the authenticating function
of wills as primary.
All wills acts have as a primary function the providing of evidence from which the
court can, with certainty, ascertain the testator's wishes. . . . It cannot be said
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is served by the attestation" and signature 5°0 requirements. For un-

with certainty that [the] goal will be achieved by [the] formalities. Interpolation
of a signed and witnessed will is not impossible since there is no requirement that
the testator sign every page and there is certainly no requirement that the witnesses
know what is in the instrument. The fact that they promote achievement of the
goals is, however, sufficient to warrant their inclusion in the statute.
Nelson & Starck, supranote 32, at 351. Nelson and Starck point out that the wills act formalities
help to ensure "[that there be a record of the scheme of disposition which is free from alteration
or substitution by others." Id. at 348.
506. To probate a witnessed will, the proponent is usually required to offer the testimony
of at least one of the attesting witnesses, if either is available. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42,
at 496. Mann states:
[The witnesses'] testimony, whether in person or by deposition, simply recapitulates
the assertions of the standard attestation clause - that the testator signed the
will freely in their presence or acknowledged his or her signature to them, . . .
and that the testator appeared to be of the requisite age and of sound mind. If,
as often happens, the witnesses are themselves dead or otherwise unavailable,
there are statutory provisions for proving the will without their testimony.
Mann, supra note 32, at 40. Although the procedure varies, the general pattern is consistent
with the above description. Id. at n.4. Attestation serves to authenticate the will by providing
a procedure for having witnesses testify that the document offered for probate originated with
the testator and was not the product of forgery. Many states today have procedures for making
a will "self-proving" so that the proponent need not call the witnesses and the will is presumptively valid on its face. See infra notes 644-58 and accompanying text.
The important requirement that . . . [the] will be attested obviously has great
evidentiary significance. It affords some opportunity to secure proof of the facts
of execution, which may have occurred long before probate, as contrasted with the
difficulties that might arise if an unattested paper purporting to be the will executed, according to its date, thirty or forty years before, were found among the
papers of the testator after his death. Of course, this purpose is not accomplished
in every case, since all of the attesting witnesses may become unavailable to testify
because of death or some other reason, and their unavailability will not defeat
probate of a will. The high evidentiary value placed by the courts and legislatures
on the testimony of those chosen by the testator as attesting witnesses is shown
by the requirement, unusual under the philosophy of the general rules of evidence,
which leave the calling of witnesses to the initiative of the parties, but regularly
accepted for wills, that one or more of the attesting witnesses must be produced
at probate if available. The provision existing in some states that the will be signed
or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of the attesting witnesses may
be justified as having some evidentiary purpose in requiring a definitive act of the
testator to be done before the witnesses, thus enabling them to testify with greater
assurance that the will was intended to be operative.
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 8-9; see also Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra
note 32, at 493 ("It]he attestation requirement, the distinguishing feature of the so-called formal
will, assures that the actual signing is witnessed and sworn to by disinterested bystanders").
But see Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 351-52 (placing less emphasis on attestation as a
formality serving the evidentiary or authenticating policy).
507. The requirement that the testator sign the document often has evidentiary value in
that it helps identify the author of the document.
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attested holographic wills, the handwriting requirement provides evidence of genuineness. 50
Although many commentators consider attestation to be the major
evidentiary formality, its utility in that respect is problematic. Given
the passage of time that may occur between will attestation and probate, and given the mobility of contemporary testators, the attestation
formality may be of little or even no value as evidence of authenticity.
By the time a will reaches probate, witnesses may be dead or outside
the court's jurisdiction. Further, because of the time lapse between
attestation and probate, witnesses may have forgotten the actual event
and may give testimony that calls into question formal compliance
with execution requirements. 5 9 Only adoption of mandatory self-provThe requirement of the testator's signature... has evidentiary value in identifying,
in most cases, the maker of the document. While the typical statutory authorization
of a signature made by another for the testator, and the generally recognized rule
that the testator's signature need not be his correct name, both indicate lack of
complete adherence to this purpose, such cases are probably quite rare in view of
the usual custom in a literate era of signing documents with a complete name. The
possibility of a forged signature must be controlled by the abilities of handwriting
experts. There is judicial support for the theory that the requirement that the will
be signed at the end has an evidentiary purpose of preventing unauthenticated or
fraudulent additions to the will made after its execution by either the testator or
other parties.
Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 7. This is true even though generally the testator does not
have to sign the correct name and may in fact be authorized by statute to have another sign
in proxy. Id. The requirement that the will be signed at the end also has the evidentiary purpose
of preventing fraudulent additions to the will. Id.
Langbein places great importance on the evidentiary value of the testator's signature. See
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 495. Signature, according to Langbein,
has "major evidentiary significance." Id. "The signature authenticates the document as being
that of the testator. The requirement that the signature be at the end with subsequent attestation
assures completeness, prevents interpolation and infers [sic] finality.
Nelson & Starck,
supra note 32, at 351.
508. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 498. For discussion of the policies
served by the handwriting requirement and holographic formality generally, see infra notes
523-615 and accompanying text.
509. In discussing attestation formality, Lindgren states:
Under current law, the attesting witnesses are part of the substantive law of
wills, part of the formal requirements for a valid will. No matter how many witnesses were actually present at execution, at least two must have signed the will. If
they do not sign, the will isn't valid. It's not essential that the witnesses ever give
testimony in court. If when probate is began the attesting witnesses are absent
or unavailable, the will may be proved by other testimony. Furthermore, the
competency or credibility of the attesting witnesses is measured at the time the
will is executed, not at the time it is to be admitted to probate. Accordingly,
witnesses to a will are not necessarily witnesses in court, and witnesses in court
are not necessarily witnesses to a will.
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ing procedures will restore the attestation requirement to the role it
served in the days when wills were often executed on testators' death-

beds 510 of ensuring reliable evidence of authenticity.51
(3) Channeling function
The wills act formalities collectively interact to create a format for
a disposition by will that probate courts can readily identify. The
formalities also provide procedures that an individual can rely upon
to create an effective will.1- Fuller identifies two aspects of the so-

called channeling function of formalities: (1) to facilitate court enforcement of transactions by creating a standardized or characteristic format that unequivocally identifies a conforming document; and (2) to
facilitate transactions between parties by creating a consistent and

reliable procedure for giving effect to intent. 51

To the extent that the wills acts promote standardization, they
4
serve the channeling function of formality by routinizing probate.1

Lindgren, supra note 58, at 569-70 (citations omitted).
See also Bates, supra note 3, at 381 ('There is no difference in the effect of a will, the
witnesses to which have disappeared, from one which never had any witnesses in the first place.
Again, proof of the testator's identity is no longer necessary in a society which is enslaved by
vigourous documentation procedure.").
510. See Lindgren, supra note 58, at 570. The UPC provides a procedure to make a will
self-proving by means of a heightened execution ceremony in the presence of a notary. UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 2-504 (1990). For discussion of the UPC provision, see infra notes 656-58 and
accompanying text. In addition, some non-UPC states have provisions for self-proving wills.
For citations, see infra notes 646-47. Lindgren explains:
The easiest way to prove a will in probate is to offer an affidavit of the attesting
witnesses, swearing that they witnessed the execution of the will and that the
testator was of sound mind and free from undue influence. In most jurisdictions,
this affidavit may be executed at the same time the will is executed and made
part of the will itself. This procedure is called a self-proved or self-proving will.
It contains not only the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses
needed for formal validity, but also the sworn, notarized testimony of the testator
and the witnesses used to prove the will in court. Self-proving wills are optional.
The affidavit isn't necessary for formal validity. It simply makes the will easier to
prove after death.
Lindgren, supra note 58, at 570.
For discussion of self-proving wills, see infra notes 644-58 and accompanying text. For
discussion of problems arising from application of the strict compliance rules to self-proving
wills, see supra notes 310-19 and accompanying text.
511. See Lindgren, supra note 58, at 570.
512. See Fuller, supra note 422, at 801-02.
513.

Id.

514.

Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 493-94.
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This aspect of the channeling function is particularly important for
dispositions by will because a probate court must implement the disposition and the testator's compliance with the formalities allows the
probate court to avoid examining issues of authenticity and intent in
every case. 515 Standardizing the form for wills eliminates the need for
judicial diagnosis of the nature of the transaction.516

515. Friedman notes:
In general, formalities of execution, rule, and administration in the law of succession
standardize and guide the process of transmitting billions of dollars of assets from
generation to generation; they help make the process smooth, uniform, and efficient.
Uniformity and efficiency are otherwise difficult to achieve under the principle of
free testation. The substance of wills (what they actually say) cannot be standardized. It may be all the more important that the documents be standardized in form.
• . . Formalities must be capable and fit for the job of handling millions of estates
and billions of dollars in assets.
Friedman, supra note 23, at 368. [emphasis in original].
Compliance with the Wills Act formalities for executing witnessed wills results in
considerable uniformity in the organization, language, and content of most wills.
Courts are seldom left to puzzle whether the document was meant to be a will.
Standardization of wills is a matter of unusual importance, because unlike contracts
or conveyances, wills inevitably contemplate judicial implementation, although normally in nonadversarial litigation resembling adjudication less than ordinary governmental administration. Citizen compliance with the usual forms has, therefore,
the same order of channeling importance for the probate courts that it has, for
example, for the Internal Revenue Service. . . . The lowered costs of routinized
judicial administration benefit the estate and its ultimate distributees.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 493-94.
"Human behavior which utilizes the proper legal form for achieving a desired end is 'channeled
behavior.' The desirability of encouraging behavior thus channeled has two aspects. It signals
to those who administer the law that a legally effective transaction was intended and what sort
of legal transaction was intended ....
Love, supra note 42, at 340-41.
The advantage of channeling the act of testation into the formalities of the wills
act is limited largely to the ease of judicial administration which is thereby made
possible. Since wills by their very nature contemplate judicial administration, the
volume of cases that probate courts must handle requires as much standardization
in form as possible.
Id. at 341.
Nelson and Starck identify ensuring "[tihat the testator's choices be expressed in language
and form which enables the implementation of those choices on a routine basis" as one of the
purposes of the wills act formalities. Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 348. They state further:
[I]t is important to put wills into recognizable forms in order to minimize the time
and effort required to ascertain their purpose. Presumably, the more an instrument
looks like a will and speaks like a will, the less likely it is that litigation will result
with consequent depletion of the estate and prolonged or delayed distribution. To
the extent that formalities force a will into a set form, they have served the
function of effecting a routine transmission of wealth. However, the critical factor
is not whether the testator created something which looked like a will, but whether
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In addition to this social and objective aspect, the channeling function of formality has an individual and subjective aspect. The channeling function sets the standard of conduct for testation and thus provides testators with reliable guidelines for executing their wills.517
(4) Protective function

As previously discussed, the wills act formalities originated as
measures intended to limit the opportunities for fraud and imposition.
Most scholars agree that the wills act formalities are unlikely to be
particularly effective in preventing fraud in the execution of a will

the language of the transmission was adequate to express the testator's intent.
Formalities, as they are presently structured, do not prescribe language of transmission, but only the requirements surrounding execution.
Id. at 353.
516. Fuller compares the formalities of transfer and their aspect of aiding judicial diagnosis
to the stamp on a coin. Fuller, supra note 422, at 801-02.
Just as the stamp on a coin relieves us from the necessity of testing the metallic
content and weight - in short, the value of the coin (a test which we could not
avoid if the uncoined metal were offered to us in payment), in the same way legal
formalities relieve the judge of an inquiry whether a legal transaction was intended,
and - in case different forms are fixed for different legal transactions - which
was intended.
Id. (quoting R. IHERING, II GEIST DES ROMISCHEN REICHTS 494 (8th ed. 1923)) (emphasis
in original).
517. Guidelines are needed to bridge the gap between the conceptual outline of the will
and the limited mechanisms for creating a will. As Fuller points out,
[o]ne who wishes to communicate his thought to others must force the raw material
of meaning into defined and recognizable channels; he must reduce the fleeting
entities of wordless thought to the patterns of conventional speech. One planning
to enter a legal transaction faces a similar problem. His mind first conceives an
economic or sentimental objective, or, more usually a set of overlapping objectives.
He must then ...

cast about for the legal transaction ...

which will most nearly

accomplish these objectives.
Fuller, supra note 422, at 802.
The [will's] channeling function has both social and individual aspects....
The standardization of testation achieved under the Wills Act also benefits the
testator. He does not have to devise for himself a mode of communicating his
testamentary wishes to the court and to worry whether it will be effective. Instead,
he has every inducement to comply with the Wills Act formalities. The court can
process his estate routinely because his testament is conventionally and unnistakably expressed and evidenced.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 494. See also Love, supra note 42, at
340-41 ("Form is a means of communicating to other participants the legal significance which
one wants a transaction to have. It is just as important to have generally accepted forms for
this expression as it is to have a common language for communicating thoughts.").
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and that they are totally ineffective against subtler forms of fraud,
undue influence, and duress. 5 11 Two of the most influential advocates
518. Gulliver and Tilson first identified the protective function of formality. Gulliver &
Tilson, supra note 41, at 4, 9. "Some of the requirements of the statutes of wills have the stated
prophylactic purpose of safeguarding the testator at the time of the execution of the will, against
undue influence or other forms of imposition." Id. at 4-5. Gulliver and Tilson suggested that
"the value of this objective and ihe extent of its accomplishment are both doubtful." Id.
In spite of the benevolent paternalism expressed in some of the decisions interpreting these requirements, the makers of wills are not a feeble or oppressed group
of people needing unusual protection as a class; on the contrary, as the owners of
property, earned or inherited, they are likely to be among the more capable and
dominant members of our society. . . . The protective provisions first appeared in
the Statute of Frauds, from which they have been copied, perhaps sometimes
blindly, by American legislatures. While there is little direct evidence, it is a
reasonable assumption that in the period prior to the Statute of Frauds, wills were
usually executed on the death bed. A testator in this unfortunate situation may
well need special protection against imposition. His powers of normal judgment
and of resistance to improper influences may be seriously affected by a decrepit
physical condition, a weakened mentality, or a morbid or unbalanced state of mind.
Furthermore, in view of the propinquity of death, he would not have as much time
or opportunity as would the usual inter vivos transferor to escape from the consequences of undue influence or other forms of imposition. Under modern conditions,
however, wills are probably executed by most testators in the prime of life and
in the presence of attorneys. If this assumption is correct, the basis for [the
protective formalities] disappears ....
While the provisions of the statutes of wills
seeking to fulfill the protective function must be reckoned with doctrinally as part
of our enacted law, this function is not sufficiently important in the present era
to justify any more emphasis than these provisions require ...
Id.
"The protective policy is probably best explained as an historical anachronism. In the seventeenth century when the first Wills Act was written, most wealth was conveyed in the form of
realty, and passed either by intestacy or conveyance. Will making could thus be left to the end
and the danger of imposition was greater ..
" Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note
32, at 496-97.
In the early years after the first enactment of a Wills Act in England, there may
have been a justifiable concern that testators were old, weak, and susceptible
victims for greedy and unscrupulous persons. However, this is probably not an
accurate stereotype of the testator today. The legitimacy of the protective functions,
questioned by Gulliver and Tilson, is not universally accepted.
Love, supra note 42, at 342.
[With respect to the protective function] . . . the formalities requirements may
have failed to live up to their purposes. While fraud may be practiced at the time
of the execution of the will, undue influence usually occurs over a much longer
period of time ....
[F]ailure to adhere to the formality can result in the will being
disallowed probate even where the court is satisfied that no fraud or undue influence
has occurred. The courts have recognized that these formalities are overly harsh.
. . . Fraud and undue influence are usually the results of objective acts which may
be proven at probate and which do not usually require the testator's presence.
Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 352-53.
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of functional analysis, Gulliver and Tilson, sum up the prevailing view
of the utility of protective formalities as follows:
[T]hese remedies seek to diminish the possibility of a testator
being forced or influenced to execute a will when surrounded
only by those who are interested financially in having it
executed. Any such possibility seems largely imaginary in
terms of a hale and hearty testator making his will in the
prime of life; such imposition would probably not be attempted . . . or successful if attempted, since its consequences
could easily be nullified by subsequent revocation... unless
the testator were kept in some physical or emotional durance
vile for the remainder of his days on earth. The situation
thus viewed with alarm must, therefore, presumably be that
of a failing or decrepit testator, probably bedridden, who
finds himself in the hands of a greedy group of malefactors
compelling him to sign a will in their favor, and who then
conveniently expires before he can call for help. But, while
this may conceivably occur, is it not also rather fanciful in
terms of general experience? Is there not a greater likelihood
of the presence of a doctor, nurses, some members of the
family who are normally devoted and, in any event, would
probably be disinherited by such a will, or loyal friends?
Must we adopt such a pessimistic view of human nature to
assume that many people are so lonely and friendless in
dying? The supposed danger really seems fictional in terms
of general probabilities. 519
Because the protective function generally is considered to be only
marginally served by wills act compliance, most commentators suggest
that the presence requirements serve no critical function. 520 Accord-

519.
520.

Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 12.
See id. at 10 (stating that the original purpose of the presence rules was 'to prevent

the witnesses substituting some other paper for the will actually executed by the testator");
Mechem, supra note 182, at 504-05.

[T]he best the cases have been able to suggest is that it [the presence requirement]
is intended to "prevent fraud" by keeping the witnesses from taking the will out
of T[estator]'s presence and substituting a spurious one. However often this may
be repeated, and by however reputable courts, it is still preposterous. It assumes

a group of witnesses (and possibly an attorney as well) who have carefully prepared
in advance an elaborate scheme of forgery and deception. It assumes a testator
who is too unconscious or too indifferent to identify his own will when it is brought
back to him; it assumes that he either dies at once or never bothers to look at his
will after its execution. And finally, it involves the super-absurdity of assuming
that a group of expert criminals who are capable of executing such a scheme and
have located a suitably incompetent victim, could be frustrated in their fell designs
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ingly, new UPC section 2-502(a) eliminates any requirement that an
attested will be either signed or acknowledged in the presence of the
witnesses, or that the witnesses sign in the presence of the testator
or each other.521
The primary protective formality is the writing requirement. The
Statute of Frauds of 1677 substantially decreased the number of
fraudulent wills because it required testators to reduce testamentary
dispositions to writing. 5- The writing requirement not only preserves
evidence of the terms of the disposition, but also serves as evidence
that the testator actually intended such a disposition.
b. Holographic Formality, Extrinsic Evidence of Intent, and the Problem of
Over-Inclusiveness
(1) "Intent-verifying" and channeling functions
It is axiomatic that courts rarely consider direct statements of
intent by the testator on the issue of testamentary intent if the document under consideration is a properly executed and attested will.Of course, evidence to prove lack of mental capacity or the existence
of undue influence and some species of fraud and mistake is relevant

by the existence of a statutory provision requiring the will to be attested in the
presence of the testator!
Id., at 505. "It has often been remarked that the likelihood of crooks attempting that trick
[substitution of the will] is remote. By forbidding the proponents to prove that no substitution
of the will in fact occurred, the law is made to presume irrebuttably that this farfetched plot
transpired." Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 517. Note that presence
defects are unlikely to be discovered if the will appears valid on its face (for example, is signed
by the testator and two witnesses) because of the "presumption of due execution that arises
from a seemingly regular attestation clause [and generally] forecloses inquiry into the actual
circumstances of execution." Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 17 n.66.
"Functionally, the presence of multiple parties acts as a check against imposition by third
parties and by parties present at the signing of the will. It is here, however, that the formalities
requirements may have failed to live up to their purpose." Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at
352.
521. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) comment (1990). Langbein considers the presence requirements dispensable even in jurisdictions that still require them. "[Omitted protective formalities, like the simultaneous presence of attesting witnesses, are easily shown to have been
needless in the particular case." Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 17, at 1194.
522. For discussion of Statute of Frauds, see supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
The statute required even nuncupative wills to be reduced to writing by the witnesses within
six months of the disposition. T. ATKINSON, supra note 42, at 19-20.
523. In re Cook, 44 N.J. 1, 6, 206 A.2d 865, 867-68 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1965) ("Though direct
statements by the testator as to his intentions are still being excluded by most courts, other
utterances by him which may bear on the construction of his will are sensibly being received
more and more freely by the courts.").
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to the issue of testamentary intent and will be considered; however,
a duly signed and attested will produces a powerful inference of validity
by creating a presumption that the recitals in the signature and attestation clauses are true. 52 As the following case shows, by reason of
this presumption (sometimes in combination with elements of the parol
evidence rule), courts often will not permit contestants to present
evidence that a decedent who executed a document in testamentary
language and attested form did not intend it as a will.
The exceptional cases in which extrinsic evidence typically is admitted to controvert the validity of a properly executed and attested will
are those in which a document is challenged as a sham or specimen
will. 5

In In re Sharp's Estate,62 6 for example, the Florida Supreme

Court held that the probate court erred in refusing to admit extrinsic
evidence in a contest regarding a purported will executed by the
decedent as part of a ceremony required to obtain a "degree in
Masonry." 5 The court said that the record showed ample evidence
that the execution of the "wills" by the twenty novitiates was "a mere
ceremonial 528 and that initiation into the Masons was the "dominating
and controlling purpose of the evening." 529 The court stated that "it
was essential that all the evidence which could have any bearing whatsoever upon the true nature of the transaction should have been received by the court."
Although there is nothing in the Sharp opinion to suggest that the
purported will was not executed in compliance with statutory formalities, the court observed that the purported will did not contain
testimonium or attestation clauses and therefore did not "carry the
indicia of a regularly executed will." ,31 The court observed that even
a duly executed document should not be enforced if the "dominating
purpose" of execution was not the "calm, solemn, and momentous
purpose of disposing of the estate"' 2 but was merely a ritual designed

524. See, e.g., Jones v. Whitely, 533 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Estate of Thomas,
6 Ill. App. 3d 70, 284 N.E.2d 513 (1972); In re Estate of Campbell, 47 Wash. 2d 610, 288 P.2d
852 (1955).
525. See, e.g., Fleming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120, 72 N.E. 499 (1904) (holding properly

executed will invalid based on evidence that testator had said that the will was a fake, executed
in order to induce the beneficiary to sleep with him).
526.
527.

133 Fla. 802, 183 So. 470 (1938).
Id. at 805, 183 So. at 471.

528. Id.
529.

Id.

530. Id.
531.
532.

Id. at 808, 183 So. at 472 (emphasis added).
Id. at 803, 183 So. at 470.
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for some other purpose. 3 Other courts have reached similar conclusions.i In most instances, however, the existence of a duly executed
and attested will effectively resolves the issue of a testamentary intent.
Compliance with the formal requirements for unattested holographic wills, in contrast, does not produce an equal presumption of
testamentary intent. The holographic will requirements are less effective in discharging the channeling function primarily because the holographic will statutes do not require specific conduct or "ritual" that
unequivocally manifests an intention to make a will, as distinguished
from an intention to execute some other document.- 5 The formalities
required for attested wills demand a virtually unmistakable testamentary act, whereas the formalities required for holographic wills closely
resemble patterns of common communication.-6

533. Id. at 803-04, 183 So. at 470.
534. E.g., Vickery v. Vickery, 126 Fla. 294, 170 So. 745 (1936) (stating that a duly executed
will should be presumed to be executed with testamentary intent, even if executed pursuant
to initiation into the Masons; in this instance, however, the will was properly denied admission
to probate since the will was improperly signed "Vickey" rather than "Vickery" and "uncertainty
and doubt were shown to have surrounded the making of the will"); Shiels v. Shiels, 109 S.W.2d
1112 (1937) (stating that facts and circumstances should be considered in determining testamentary intent in the case in which decedent executed a will under protest pursuant to initiation
into Masonic Order; testamentary intent is necessary "to constitute an instrument a will, regardless of its correctness in form," but mere fact that it was executed pursuant to initiation rite
does not establish lack of testamentary intent); Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21, 113 S.E. 873 (1922)
(admitting to probate a will and a codicil which were executed pursuant to initiation into Masons
after considering purported codicil to will showing continued testamentary intent); In re Watkin's
Estate, 116 Wash. 190, 198 P. 721 (1921) (stating that a will executed pursuant to initiation
into Masons was executed with testamentary intent based on testimony of a surviving witness,
despite "somewhat meager evidence" of intent; a will may be executed pursuant to initiation
into Masons); but see Succession of Torlage, 202 La. 693, 12 So. 2d 683 (1943) (Louisiana court
denying probate to a holographic will written as part of initiation into Masons without considering
extrinsic circumstances because the will was undated, the language of the document did not
reflect present intent to make a will, and because the testator executed it in compliance with
a ritual rather than with intention to make a will).
535. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 494. See Fuller, supra note 422,
at 803-04.
[S]ome minimum satisfaction of the desideratum of channeling is necessary before
measures designed to prevent inconsiderateness can be effective ....
The necessity
of reducing the testator's intention to his own handwriting would seem superficially
to offer, not only evidentiary safeguards, but excellent protection against inconsiderateness as well. Where the holographic will fails, however, is as a device separating the legal wheat from the legally irrelevant chaff. The courts are frequently
faced with the difficulty of determining whether a particular document - it may
be an informal family letter which happens to be entirely in the handwriting of
the sender - reveals the requisite "testamentary intention." This difficulty can
be eliminated by a formality which performs adequately the channeling function,
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Compliance with the attestation requirement produces a "virtually
unmistakable testamentary act '' 5 7 and a standardized format readily
identifying a writing as a will. Compliance with the requirements for
a holographic will often fails to distinguish the writing intended to be
given effect as a will from the signed and dated letter, memorandum,
or draft containing statements about the disposition of the decedent's
property.- Since a holographic will "need not assume any particular
form or be couched in language technically appropriate to its testamen-

tary character,"'

9

and may deal with extraneous matters unrelated

to its testamentary purpose,540 courts sometimes do enforce letters
and other informal writings as holographic wills.-, The test is whether

some external mark which will signalize the testament and distinguish it from
non-testamentary expressions of intention. It is obvious that by a kind of reflex
action the deficiency of the holographic will from the standpoint of channeling
operates to impair its efficacy as a device for inducing deliberation.
Id. at 803-04.
536. Bird, supranote 204, at 632; Langbein, SubstantialCompliance,supranote 32, at 494.
If a document has been executed with the usual testamentary formalities [attestation and signature], a court can be reasonably certain that it was actually executed
by the decedent; that it was seriously intended as a will; what its contents are;
and that the testator was free from at least immediate duress at the time of its
execution. Only the first of these functions is served by the holographic statute,
and even that not very effectively. Because the holographic form does not serve
these other essential purposes it leaves these matters open to doubt and hence to
litigation.
Bird, supra note 204, at 631-32.
537. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 494.
538. See id. at 493-94; Friedman, supra note 23, at 368.
539. In re Estate of Logan, 489 Pa. 29, 35, 413 A.2d 681, 683 (1980); see also In re Spencer's
Estate, 87 Cal. App. 2d 591, 197 P.2d 351 (1948) (holding that a writing is not inoperative as
a will merely because it discusses matters unrelated to testamentary purpose, though inclusion
of extraneous matter may be considered in determining intent); In re Hughes' Estate, 140 Cal.
App. 97, 35 P.2d 204 (1934) (holding that there are no definite forms or fixed terms that
invariably determine testamentary character of an instrument); In re Button's Estate, 209 Cal.
325, 287 P. 264 (1930) (holding that no particular words are necessary to show testamentary
intent if it appears that the writing is intended to dispose of property after death).
540. E.g., In re Spencer's Estate, 87 Cal. App. 2d 591, 594, 197 P.2d 351, 352 (1948); In
re Button's Estate, 309 Cal. 325, 287 P. 964 (1930) (holding that testamentary language included
in suicide note otherwise appealing to husband to care for children, expressing regret for actions,
and affirming affection for husband was testamentary); In re Kimmel's Estate, 287 Pa. 435, 123
A. 405 (1924) (holding that language included in letter to sons otherwise dealing with the
testator's views about the weather and pickling pork was testamentary).
541. Mann remarks:
Holographs are, by definition, unattested. As statutory creations, they represent
a legislative judgment, albeit a tacit one, that attestation is a dispensable requirement, at least when the document meets other requirements. Those other requirements ... are sufficiently minimal that the cases on holographs are often ludicrous.
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the testator intended to make an ambulatory and revocable disposition
of property, not whether the testator subjectively understood that
the disposition was a will;M2 the testator's failure to recognize the
disposition as a will and characterize it as such within the writing, or
otherwise to use "appropriate" language and form does not determine
the nature of the document.
Courts in jurisdictions that permit holographic wills often end up
having to address the issue of whether a signed and handwritten
writing should be enforced as a will because of the lack of any objective
ritual or implementing act comparable to testation. Signature alone
clearly does not achieve the intent-verifying and channeling purposes
in those cases in which the testator uses unconventional language or
format; people often write their names on draft documents and
memoranda that have no legal significance, and most people who write
letters routinely sign them. Despite the high value that Langbein and
other commentators place on the intent-verifying function of the signature requirement,-3 the large number of cases in which signed holographic writings produce controversy up to the appellate level on the
issue of testamentary intent strongly suggests that signature alone
does not effectively serve this purpose.
Nor does the handwriting requirement effectively fulfill the intentverifying and channeling functions of attestation. While it could be
argued that requiring testators to handwrite testamentary dispositions
fulfills the cautionary aspect of the intent-verifying function to the
extent that it forces deliberation,- 4 the lack of an unambiguous testamentary ritual leaves open the issue of whether the decedent reached

Alongside the perfectly serious, well-considered holographic wills, courts have accepted suicide notes, chili recipes, and inscribed tractor fenders. . . . The key
inquiry in virtually all holograph litigation is whether the testator wrote the document with testamentary intent. If the court finds that the testator did, and if the
holograph satisfies the statutory requirements, then the instrument is a will, however bizarre its form.
Mann, supra note 32, at 50 (citations omitted). For examples of "ludicrous" and "bizarre"
holographic wills, see Gerhart, Two Cheers for the Jolly Testator, 111 TR. & EST. 127 (Feb.
1972); Gest, Some Jolly Testators, 8 TEMPLE L.Q. 297 (1934); Million, Wills: Witty, Witless,
and Wicked, 7 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 336 (1960).
542. For quote setting forth definition of "will," see supra note 24, at 283-84; see also
Browder, supra note 41, at 849-50 (providing definition of "will"); see generally Ritchie, supra
note 41 (discussing characteristics distinguishing wills from other types of gratuitous transfers).
543. For discussion of the intent-verifying function of the signature requirement, see supra
note 497.
544. See Fuller, supra note 422, at 803-04; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 3-4.
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a final decision to implement the dispositions. 5 Langbein considers
the sole value of the handwriting requirement to be in the "superior
evidence" it provides of the authenticity 4of7 the disposition;4 6 he considers it an odd substitute for attestation.
Several commentators have argued that legislative recognition of

holographic wills is logically inconsistent with judicial insistence on
strict compliance with the attestation requirement; s the result is that
testators are punished for unsuccessful attempts to meet the higher
standard required for execution of an attested will even when there
is no question about the testator's intentions, while formally adequate
but substantively problematic holographic documents are often enforced, even though the writing itself or the circumstances surrounding

its execution may be ambiguous.

9 Equally

illogical is the strict insis-

tence on compliance with the handwriting requirement to invalidate
unequivocally testamentary holographic dispositions because of the
inclusion of printed matter.5 Application of the strict compliance doc-

545. "While there is a certain ritual value in writing out the document, casual offhand
statements are frequently made in letters." Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 14.
People are often careless in conversation and in informal writings .... [Sluppose
that the evidence shows, without more, that a writing containing dispositive language was found among the papers of the deceased at the time of his death? Does
this demonstrate a deliberate transfer, or was it merely a tentative draft of some
contemplated instrument, or perhaps random scribbling?
Id. at 3.
546. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 498; see also Nelson & Starck,
supra note 32, at 351-52 (stating that even if handwriting is the best form of evidence, the
premise that establishing authenticity of handwriting is justification for the holographic form is
"highly suspect").
547. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 498.
548. Id.; Lindgren, supra note 58, at 495-96; Mann, supra note 32, at 49-50.
[S]lavish attention to form on matters of attestation is anomalous in a jurisdiction
that accepts . . . holographic wills ....

Although courts have drawn the line at

[holographic] wills written on eggshells, one nonetheless must question the "logic"
of accepting such informal "wills" while rejecting on formal grounds the wills of
testators who tried to follow the directives of the wills act but whose lawyers
botched the job.
Mann, supra note 32, at 49-50. "Requiring attestation for formal wills is difficult to reconcile
with the increasing acceptance of holographic wills." Lindgren, supra note 58, at 558. Lindgren
and Langbein agree that the existence of holographic wills undercuts the policies served by
attestation in those jurisdictions that recognize witnessed wills as well. Id.; Langbein, Substantial
Compliance, supra note 32, at 495-98.
549. See Mann, supra note 32, at 50.
550. For discussion of the application of the strict compliance doctrine to the handwriting
requirement, see supra notes 204-40 and accompanying text.
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trine to the formalities for attested and holographic wills produces
under-inclusiveness in defeating many obviously well-intentioned wills,
while the inadequacy of holographic formality to distinguish intended
wills from other documents raises the question of over-inclusive enforcement of writings never intended to be given legal effect.
(a) Determination of testamentary intent in holographic wills cases
A writing, however informal, will be enforced as a holographic will
if it meets the requirements for a holographic will and is unambiguously

testamentary on its face; that is, if it shows that the testator intended
to make an ambulatory and revocable disposition of property. 1' If the
court determines that the writing is unambiguously testamentary,
extrinsic evidence of circumstances showing that the testator lacked
testamentary intent is not admissible .- 2 On the other hand, if a writing
that meets the requirements for a holographic will is unambiguously
nontestamentary, the courts will not admit extrinsic evidence of circumstances showing testamentary intent. If the allegedly testamentary language is sufficiently ambiguous that the court cannot tell by
reference to the writing alone whether it was prepared with testamentary intent the court may admit extrinsic evidence to resolve this
issue.- It is well established that in such a case a court may consider
the conditions under which the instrument was written to determine
what was in the mind of the party when it was written.

551. See, e.g., In re Button's Estate, 209 Cal. 325, 287 P. 964 (1930); In re Estate of Nelson,
250 N.W.2d 286 (S.D. 1977); In re Estate of Blake, 120 Ariz. 552, 587 P.2d 271 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978); In re Estate of Brown, 507 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
552. See, e.g., In re Holmes Estate, 191 Cal. App. 2d 285, 12 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1961); In re
Estate of Hogan, 146 N.W.2d 257 (Iowa 1966); In re Estate of Logan, 489 Pa. 29, 413 A.2d
681 (1980).
553. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hogan, 146 N.W.2d 257 (Iowa 1966); Maxey v. Queen, 206
S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1947). Cf. In re Will of Smith, 108 N.J. 257, 528 A.2d 918 (1987) (stating
that no presumption of testamentary intent arises with respect to a holographic will and burden
of proof is on proponent to prove intent by a preponderance of the evidence; court further
stated that this rule is "consistent with the general rule in other states").
554. See, e.g., David Terrell Faith Prophet Ministries v. Varnum, 284 Ark. 108, 681 S.W.2d
310 (1984); In re Estate of Spencer, 87 Cal. 2d 951, 97 P.2d 351 (1948); In re Estate of Laurin,
492 Pa. 477, 424 A.2d 1290 (1980); In re Estate of Nelson, 250 N.W.2d 286 (S.D. 1977); Guaranty
Nat'l Bank v. Morris, 342 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1986); In re Estate of Beebee, 118 Cal. App.
851, 258 P.2d 1101 (1953); In re Hughes' Estate, 140 Cal. App. 97, 35 P.2d 204 (Cal. Ct. App.
1934); In re Estate of Brown, 507 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Maxey v. Queen, 206
S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). Cf. In re Will of Smith, 108 N.J. 257, 528 A.2d 918 (1987)
(stating that no presumption of testamentary intent arises with respect to a holographic will
and burden is on proponent to establish that the writing was prepared with testamentary intent).
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The considerations that determine the nature of the writing offered
for probate vary from case-to-case.- "There are no definite forms or
fixed terms which will invariably determine the testamentary character of an instrument. The same expressions may lead the court to
determine one instrument as testamentary in character which, under
different circumstances, would lead the same court to determine
another instrument to be not testamentary in character." '
In Maxey v. Queen,57 for example, the writing in question was a
letter written by an uneducated decedent, in which she had written,
"I am sick in the horse pittle. I have been sice for some times have
been able to get down to the corthouse I wont my deads male to my
sister. Ola May Maxey. '" After considering the decedent's choice of
words, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the language
was unambiguously nontestamentary;5 9 the writing could not be enforced as a will.
In In re Estate of Laurin,5 on the other hand, the dated and
signed writing in issue stated: "I, Frances L. Laurin, give all properties and personal belongings to my daughter Beatrice L. Sprowls
Denk." 561 The contestants argued that the language selected by the
decedent was not consistent with an intention to make a disposition
by will, but that it was either an attempted lifetime disposition that
was never perfected or a memorandum intended to instruct the decedent's attorney respecting testamentary plans that were never executed.5 2 The Laurin court said that although the document contained
no testamentary language and was not testamentary on its face, the
word "give" was sufficiently ambiguous to justify the lower court's
admission of extrinsic evidence to determine intent.56 The court concluded that the evidence in the record was sufficient to establish that
the writing was in fact intended by the decedent to be her will.'3

555. For discussion of factors sometimes considered by courts, see infra notes 557-68 and
accompanying text.
556. Inre Hughes' Estate, 140 Cal. App. 97, 100, 35 P.2d 204,205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934).
557. 206 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1947).
558. Id. at 116.
559. Id. at 119. The court pointed out that an executor of the estate could not execute a
deed in the decedent's name and that for the executor to carry out her instruction, that is, to
mail the deeds to her sister, would not be effective in passing title. Id. at 118.
560. 492 Pa. 477, 424 A.2d 1290 (1981).
561. Id. at 480, 424 A.2d at 1292.
562. Id. at 481, 424 A.2d at 1292.
563. Id. at 482-83, 424 A.2d at 1293.
564. Id. at 483, 424 A.2d at 1294.
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The rule limiting admissibility of extrinsic evidence to determine
whether a decedent intended a writing meeting the criteria for a
holographic will to be treated as such is a reasonable means of preventing courts from having to determine the validity of every random
scribbling of a decedent that happens to comply with requirements
for a holographic will and that arguably bears a relation to the disposition of property at death. In Straw v. Owens,- the holographic
"will" offered for probate consisted of "words and figures scrawled
across the back of what appears to be a page of three adjoining deposit
slips torn from the back of a checkbook"' 66 that was "arguably" written
in the decedent's handwriting and signed by him. 567 The court held
that the writing was nontestamentary on its face and that in any case,
no amount of extrinsic evidence could have justified admitting such a
writing to probate.5
(b) Probate of holographic document ambiguous on its face
Once courts determine that a writing offered for probate as a
holographic will is ambiguous on its face, they may admit extrinsic
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the document to establish the intentions of the decedent.- 9 In determining
whether an ambiguous writing was intended to operate as a will,
courts may consider a number of factors, including the intelligence,
education, and character of the testator, 70 the testator's knowledge
of the formalities involved in executing a will,571 the circumstances

565. 746 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App. 1988).
566. Id.at 346.
567.

Id.

568. Id.
569. For citations to cases setting forth this principle, see supra note 7. For discussion of
issues relating to the admission of extrinsic evidence in wills cases, see Note, Ascertaining the
Testator's Intent: Liberal Admission of Extrinsic Evidence, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1349 (1971);
Note, Extrinsic Evidence and the Construction of Wills in California,50 CALIF. L. REV. 283
(1962); Comment, A Letter as a Will or Codicil: Testamentary Intent in California, 2 U.S.F.
L. REV. 367 (1968).

570. Comment, supra note 569, at 370-71. See, e.g., In re Will of Smith, 108 N.J. 257, 528
A.2d 918 (1987) (court considered intelligence, business sense, and meticulousness of testator
in concluding that writing torn from a note book was not intended to be a holographic will).
But see In re Estate of MacLeod, 206 Cal. App. 1235, 254 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1988) (contestant
unsuccessfully argued that decedent was "a well-educated, formal, and punctilious woman" who
would not have intended an unsubscribed, scribbled, and interlineated document to be her will).
571. Comment, supra note 569, at 371. See, e.g., In re Will of Smith, 108 N.J. 257, 528
A.2d 918 (1987) (court considered decedent's knowledge of wills formalities in concluding that

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss2/1

116

Miller: Will Formailty, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Ex
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE "HARMLESS ERROR" RULE

under which the decedent prepared the writing, 572 the relationship
between the decedent and those who would benefit by having the
writing enforced as a will, 573 the existence and details of any prior
testamentary dispositions, 574 and where the writing was found after

the decedent's death. 576

(c) Determination of intent when informal writing offered
In some instances, courts have had to determine whether cryptically worded but formally adequate notes or memoranda should be

unattested paper was intended as a draft or as instructions to attorney and not as a will). But
see In re Estate of MacLeod, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1235, 254 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1988) (contestant
unsuccessfully argued that decedent was aware of formality for making a will and would not
have intended unsubscribed, scribbled, interlineated document to be her will).
572. See Comment, supra note 569, at 371. See, e.g., In re Button's Estate, 209 Cal. 325,
287 P. 964 (1930) (holding that lengthy letter containing testamentary language written to
decedent's husband on day she committed suicide, written in contemplation of suicide, was
intended to serve as will); In re Estate of Laurin, 492 Pa. 477, 424 A.2d 1290 (1981) (court
considered fact that writing prepared by testator while she was ill, one month before her death,
and just after she had been discharged from the hospital in determining that writing was
prepared with testamentary intent); In re Estate of Nelson, 250 N.W.2d 286 (S.D. 1977) (holding
that writing was prepared with testamentary intent in case in which decedent who was afraid
of flying said she would not get on airplane without making her will and prepared writing before
doing so). But see In re Estate of Spencer, 87 Cal. 2d 591, 197 P.2d 351 (1948) (holding that
mere references to death in letter with no sign of real apprehension and five years before
testator died were not sufficient to show testamentary intent).
573. See Comment, supra note 569, at 371. E.g., In re Estate of MacLeod, 206 Cal. App.
1235, 254 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1988) (decedent had "strong personal feelings" for the farm she left
to her nephew and wanted it to remain in the family); In re Button's Estate, 287 P. 209, 964
Cal. 325 (1930) (letter will left everything to decedent's husband, who was the custodial parent
of her sons, and for whom she expressed abiding affection); In re Estate of Laurin, 492 Pa.
477, 424 A.2d 1290 (1981) (writing left all property to the daughter who lived with her and
cared for her several months prior to her death).
574. See Comment, supra note 569, at 371. E.g., In re Estate of Hicks, 3 Cal. App. 3d
312, 83 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1970) (court considered fact that writing was integrated into will by
detailed references to page and line numbers of the will, followed by words such as "add,"
"out," and "remain," in determining that it was valid codicil); In re Estate of Hughes, 140 Cal.
App. 97, 35 P.2d 204 (1934) (court contrasted informality of letter offered as codicil with "care
and circumstance" with which will was drawn in holding that letter was not executed with
testamentary intent).
575. E.g., In re Estate of MacLeod, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1235, 254 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1988)
(writing found on decedent's bedside table following her death); In re Estate of Hicks, 3 Cal.
App. 3d 312, 83 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1970) (writing found in envelope labeled 'VILL" inside a metal
box that had been delivered to decedent's attorney); In re Estate of Button, 964 Cal. 325, 287
P. 209 (1930) (letter found in same room with decedent's body after her suicide); Guaranty Nat'l
Bank v. Morris, 342 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1986) (writing found in decedent's bedroom in the place
where she kept her important papers); In re Estate of Brown, 507 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974) (writing found with decedent's private papers after her death).
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admitted to probate as wills or codicils.576 Occasionally a court will
hold that it is appropriate to resort to extrinsic evidence to determine
the significance of such a writing. For example, in In re Estate of
Brown,577 the writing offered as a codicil was "a cryptic note written
on an envelope":578 "This certafice [sic] from Ada B. Brown - Goes
to Josephine May Benton. ' 579 Inside the envelope was a certificate of
deposit payable to Ada B. Brown 5 0 The court concluded that extrinsic
evidence was properly admitted to clarify the meaning of "from" and
"goes to" as used by the testator in order to establish whether she
intended to make an ambulatory and revocable disposition of the certificate of deposit, as opposed to an unperfected inter vivos gift. s'
The evidence showed that the decedent had said that she wanted the
beneficiary of the transfer to have the money "if anything happens to
me and I don't need it" and that she had not delivered the certificate
of deposit to the beneficiary, but had kept it in her private papers
until she died, thus indicating that she intended to make an ambulatory
and revocable disposition of the certificate of deposit.5
Similarly, in Matter of Estate of Nelson,- the South Dakota Supreme Court held that it was appropriate to admit extrinsic evidence
respecting the circumstances leading up to the preparation of the
allegedly testamentary writing that merely said "To you - Cornie
and Richard Ostercamp [sic] my all and my all to you." The court
considered the fact that the writing was prepared immediately before
the decedent, who was afraid of flying, boarded a plane, and that she
had taken the further step of having two witnesses sign the will.
In Matter of Will of Smith,- 6 the writing offered for probate was
a note addressed to decedent's attorney, written on a five by seven

576. According to a famous article on homemade wills, the Pennsylvania court once gave
effect to dispositive language appended to a recipe for chili sauce. Gest, supra note 541, at 301.
The writing admitted to probate read as follows: "4 quarts of ripe tomatoes, 4 small onions, 4
green peppers, 2 teacups of sugar, 2 quarts of cider vinegar, 2 ounces ground allspice, 2 ounces
cloves, 2 ounces cinnamon, 12 teaspoonfuls salt. Chop tomatoes, onions, and peppers fine, add
the rest mixed together and bottle cold. Measure tomatoes when peeled. In case I die before
my husband I leave everything to him." - (signed) Maggie Nothe." Id.
577. 507 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
578. Id. at 802.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. Id. at 805.
582. Id.
583. 250 N.W.2d 286 (S.D. 1977).
584. Id. at 287.
585. Id. at 288. The opinion does not explain why the document was not a valid attested will.
586. 108 N.J. 257, 528 A.2d 918 (1987).
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piece of paper that the decedent had torn from a notebook: "My entire
estate is to be left jointly to my step daughter."' Evidence was
admitted to show that the testator was an intelligent, businesslike
woman who was knowledgeable about the formal requirements of a
will. The court concluded that the writing was intended as a draft,
and not as a final will.A
In other cases, courts have simply concluded that the note or
memorandum offered for probate was unambiguously testamentary or
nontestamentary and have refused to allow evidence to show otherwise. In In re Moore's Estate,59 the writing offered for probate was
a piece of tissue paper that the decedent's mother had found in the
pocket of one of decedent's coats wrapped around one of her rings.591
On the tissue paper the decedent had written "July 4, 1948 Mother
Here is my ring. I leave you this and all that is mine. Mike is provided
for. Dont grieve for me. I love you. I'll leave a Will. ''592 The California
court held that the words "I'll leave a Will" rendered the writing
unambiguously nontestamentary, since it was clear that even if decedent had intended to leave her property to her mother, the words
"I'll leave a Will" unequivocally showed that she had not prepared
that particular writing with testamentary intent. 59
(d) Determination of intent when letter offered for probate
In a number of instances courts have considered whether to permit
probate of a letter or letters written by the decedent. These letters
often deal with matters other than the decedent's testamentary plans.
For example, in Estate of Blake5 9 the relevant language was contained in the postscript to a letter written by the decedent to his
niece, thanking her and her husband for their hospitality during a
recent visit. 595 The postscript stated simply: "P.S. You can have my
entire estate. s/Harry J. Blake (SAVE THIS). ' '65 The Arizona court
concluded that the writing was prepared with testamentary intent,

587.
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.

Id. at 259, 528 A.2d at 918-19.
Id. at 260, 528 A.2d at 919-20.
Id.
102 Cal. App. 2d 672, 228 P.2d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951).
Id. at 672-73, 228 P.2d at 66-67.
Id. at 673, 228 P.2d at 66-67.
Id. at 673-75, 228 P.2d at 67-68.
120 Ariz. 552, 587 P.2d 271 (Ariz. App. 1978).
Id. at 553, 587 P.2d at 272.
Id.
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based on such factors as the decedent's use of the word "estate," the
definiteness of the dispositive language, the fact that the beneficiaries
were instructed to "SAVE THIS," and the fact that while the letter
itself was signed "your uncle Harry," the dispositive language in the
597
postscript was formally signed with the decedent's name.
In Estate of Meade,598 the writing offered for probate was a letter
written by Euthanasia Meade to her undertaker, informing him of her
wish to be cremated because of her "most absolute abhorrence of being
put in the ground to decay and rot" and otherwise generally discussing
her philosophy respecting "money thrown away in useless parade of
the dead." 599 The testator's brother argued that the last sentence of
the letter referring to him as the administrator of her estate, was
written with testamentary intent.600 The California court concluded
that the letter was not intended by the decedent as a will, stating
"[i]t is plain that the main question in the deceased's mind was the
disposition of her body ... it is hardly conceivable that [the deceased]
should have so indistinctly and inappropriately expressed her wishes,
[regarding her brother] if the making of a will was in her mind."-,
One of the most famous "letter wills" is the one upheld by the
Pennsylvania court in In re Kimmel's Estate, °2 in which the testamentary language was embedded in a letter dealing with the testator's
expectation of a hard winter as well as his views on the proper method
of pickling pork. - 3 In addition to these extraneous matters, the letter
stated "if I come I have some very valuable papers I want you to
keep fore me so if enny thing hapens all the scock money in the 3
Bank liberty lones Post office stamps and my home on Homer St.
goes to George Darl & Irvin.' ° 4 The court took note of the fact that
the letter advised the sons to "Kepp this letter lock it up it may help
you out ' ' °5 in concluding that the dispositive portion of the letter was
6
prepared with testamentary intent.60

597. Id. at 554, 587 P.2d at 273.
598. 118 Cal. 428, 50 P. 541 (1897).
599. Id. at 429, 50 P. at 541.
600. "My brother ... will take charge of my estate, and be the sole administrator ...
trade, sell, or occupy, as may seem to him fit." Id. at 430, 50 P. at 542.
601. Id. at 431, 50 P. at 542.
602. 278 Pa. 435, 123 A.2d 405 (1924).
603. Id. at 437, 123 A. at 405.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id. at 439, 123 A. at 406.
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(2) "Authenticating" function
Most commentators agree that the holographic form materially
serves only the authenticating (or evidentiary) function of establishing
the genuineness of the transfer.0 7 The effectiveness of holographic
wills to accomplish this result depends, however, on the ability of
courts to verify testators' handwriting. Generally, identifying the
handwriting is not much of a problem, despite the fact that holographic
wills (unlike most will substitutes and all attested wills), may be executed unilaterally so that the only evidence of authenticity is the
testator's handwriting. 6°8
Assuming that forgery of another's hand is indeed difficult to accomplish, a holographic will clearly provides more security from
forgery than an attested will bearing only the testator's handwritten
signature (especially if someone else signed the will on the testator's
behalf, as the wills acts generally permit). Holographic formality may
be a more reliable method of establishing the authenticity of a writing
than attestation, since attestation depends upon the availability and
memory of witnesses at the time the will is offered for probate.
(3) Protective function
Some commentators assert that holographic formality does not
serve the protective function, because "[a] holographic will is obtainable by compulsion as easily as a ransom note." One advantage of
holographic wills, however, is that such wills can be executed as a
private, unilateral act. In a jurisdiction that recognizes holographic
wills, testators who are strong enough to put pen to paper have an
advantage over testators in a jurisdiction requiring witnessed wills:
if victimized by unscrupulous relatives or otherwise imposed upon or
subjected to duress, testators can secretly execute a will revoking any
prior wills procured through improper means.

607. See, e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 13.
608. See Estate of Dreyfus, 175 Cal. 417, 165 P. 841 (1917). The court stated:
From time immemorial, . . . it has been a well-known fact that each individual
who writes . . . acquires a style of forming, placing, and spacing the letters and

words which is peculiar to himself and which, in most cases, renders his writing
The provision that a [holographic)
easily distinguishable from that of others ....
will should be valid.., is the ancient rule on the subject. There can be no doubt

that it owes its origin to the fact that a successful counterfeit of another's handwriting is exceedingly difficult, and that, therefore, the requirement that it should be

in the testator's handwriting would afford protection against a forgery of this
character.
Id. at 419, 165 P. at 941.
609. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 14.
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[A] dying person who wishes to dispose of his property, may
find it impossible to resort to . . . witnesses in order to
make it in authentic form. Moreover, to refuse to a sick
person the faculty of making a testament in the holographic
form is to encourage all those interested in seeing that he
to prevent him from doing
does not make any dispositions,
610
so illegally, as it were.
The option of executing a holographic will ensures that testators
will have the opportunity to reflect on their testamentary plans and
the flexibility to modify or redraft their wills at their leisure. It may
be argued that far from representing an abandonment of the protective
policy,611 holographic will provisions may actually prevent fraudulent
dispositions in a limited number of cases. 612 Holographic wills serve
the protective function to the extent that they ensure a property
owner's ability to execute a will free from outside interference or
pressure.
(4) Holographic will as alternative to common law will
Assuming that respect for the wishes of private property owners
to select the successors to their property is a more fundamental policy
61 3
objective than the efficient functioning of the implementing courts,
holographic wills are a useful alternative to the common law attested
wills.64 The most troubling aspect of holographic wills provisions is
their tendency, in combination with the strict compliance doctrine, to
be simultaneously over-inclusive and under-inclusive in practice. The
problem of over-inclusiveness raised by the enforcement of informal
documents as holographic wills may be less of a matter for concern
than the problem of under-inclusiveness raised by the strict enforcement of the handwriting and date requirements. Application of the
strict compliance doctrine to holographic wills is troubling to the extent

610. C. AUBREY & C. RAU, DROIT Civ. FRANCAIS, 3 Civ. L. Trans. 135 n.1 (C. Lazarus
Trans. 1969), reprinted in Bird, supra note 204, at 609 n.22.
611. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 519, 520-22.
612. See Bird, supra note 204, at 609.
613. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 2.
614. The drafters of the UPC clearly thought so since the UPC has always permitted
holographic wills. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1969) (original UPC holographic will section);
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(b) comment (1990) (revised holographic wills provision). For discussion of the UPC holographic wills provision, see Lindgren, supra note 58, at 558-60 (suggesting
trend is to embrace holographic wills even though handwriting affords little protection to the
integrity of the testamentary writing); Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at
511-12 (discussing UPC's liberal provision for formalism in wills).
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that writings which unambiguously demonstrate testamentary intent
may be rejected for probate because they contain nonhandwritten
material, even though the handwritten portions sufficiently establish
the document's authenticity.615 The courts' consideration of extrinsic
evidence in the case of 'letter wills" and other informal documents
seems unreasonable only in light of their refusal to give equal consideration to documents that bear all of the indicia of testamentary intent.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF FORMALISM

IV.

A.

Reformulating the Formalities
1. Minimizing formality

a. The Uniform Probate Code Provisions for Attested and Holographic Wills
In his critique of the 1946 Model Probate Code, 616 Mechem states
that wills act formalities should comprise "only such requirements as
seem so unmistakably essential to a safe will-making process as to
justify running the known, risk of defeating meritorious wills through
' ' 61
failure of testators to know or comply with the requirements. 7
Mechem points out that testators whose wills are most likely to be
overthrown by execution defects
are precisely those persons who do not have the job supervised by a high-powered law firm, but who instead have the
matter looked after by some very bad lawyer or by the local
J.P. or the local banker or the local real estate man or on
the advice of those who happen to be gathered at some lonely
deathbed.... [T]he governing philosophy should be to design
a wills act that as far as is consistent with safety adapts
itself to the knowledge (or ignorance), psychology, and habits
of such people so as to create the minimum risk that their
testamentary attempts will be frustrated by failure to have
the witnesses attest in the presence of the testator, or the

like. 618
The 1969 UPC abandoned "the big law office philosophy" deplored by
Mechem. 1 9 The intended effect of the 1969 UPC provisions was to
615. See Langbein, SubstantialCompliance, supra note 32, at 519-20 (discussing the problem of determining when there is "sufficient" handwriting).
616.

L. SIMES & P. BASYE, supra note 180.

617. Mechem, supra note 182, at 503.
618. Id.
619. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1969) (dealing with attested wills); § 2-503 (dealing
with holographic wills). For discussion of the history of the UPC, see supra notes 183-203 and
accompanying text.
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make it as difficult as possible for the testator who attempted to
execute either an attested will or an unattested holographic will to fail.
To that end, the 1969 UPC wills provisions eliminated most of the
minor formalities associated with attestation. Furthermore, it
liberalized the requirements for holographic wills by codifying the
liberal "surplusage" approach applied under traditional statutes.62 0 The
revisions to the UPC wills execution provisions continue to reflect the
original policy favoring minimal formality.-1 The minimalist approach
of the 1969 UPC provisions eliminated some, but not all, of the issues
that arise under traditional statutes. It is not inevitable that courts
in UPC states take a less stringent approach to the UPC formalities
than courts interpreting more complex provisions.6- The comment to
the new article II provisions states that "the purpose of validating
wills whenever possible has been strengthened by the addition of...
section 2-503, which allows a will to be upheld despite a harmless
'
error in its execution. 63
b. Abolition of Attestation as a Substantive Requirement
In a recent article, Lindgren proposes abolishing the attestation
requirement as part of the substantive law of wills.624 Lindgren believes
that the value of attestation in the modern property system is substantially outweighed by the problems created for testators who fail to
comply with the attestation requirements. 62 Like Mechem, he argues
that the standard of conduct required for due execution should include
only those formalities necessary to show the intent to make a disposition of property.626 Like Langbein, Lindgren argues that the recognition of holographic wills in a majority of the states and the increased
use of will substitutes indicate that the formality of a signed writing
62 7
alone is sufficient for this purpose.
Lindgren thus contends that even the minimal formalities required
for a witnessed will under the UPC are not essential and that such

620. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1969).
621. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(b) (1969), for text of this section, see supra text accompanying note 254.
622. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
623. UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 5, general comment (1990).
624. Lindgren, supra note 58, at 569.
625. Id. at 572.
626. Id. at 545-46.
627. Id. at 556-60. See also Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 17. at 1109-15;
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 503-09 (discussing "the decline of the wills
act" due to increasing popularity of will substitutes).
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requirements should be abolished.m He recommends a principle of
"parsimony" in setting the standard of formality required for dispositions by will,m observing that:
[T]he problem with looking at just the advantages of formalities is that it can lull us into thinking that more formalities are better, into thinking that proliferation is good.
Nearly any formality that one could imagine would to some
extent serve at least one of the accepted purposes.... We
shouldn't ask whether this or that formality serves the ritual
function? Practically any would. Thus, determining the wisdom of a particular formality such as attestation isn't as
simple as asking whether it serves any of the purposes of
formalities. It does. The question instead is whether the
formality promotes the primary goal of our system of testation - effectuating the intent of the testator at an acceptable
administrative cost.6 0
Lindgren concludes that attestation is an obsolete requirement that
fails to achieve this primary goal of the modern property system.0 1
Although the title of Lindgren's article suggests that he proposes
to abolish altogether the attestation requirement for wills, and a large
part of the article addresses the dispensability of attestation, Lindgren
recognizes that unattested wills may raise unresolvable issues of intent
and authenticity.6 2 He suggests various possibilities for a "two tiered"
approach that would preserve attestation as a means of establishing
the validity of a will, while at the same time eliminating the conclusive
presumption that an improperly attested or unattested will was executed without testamentary intent, so that unattested wills could still
be admitted to probate.m

628. Lindgren, supra note 58, at 561. He points out that the attestation requirement provides little protection to the testator if the witnesses can take under the will and that in having
"scrapped" the requirement that witnesses be disinterested, the UPC requirements have diluted
any of the protective value of attestation, as contemplated by the original Statute of Frauds.
Id. at 560-61. 'The best explanation for the Uniform Probate Codes approach is that testators
seldom need protection - and if they do, the attestation requirement doesn't provide enough
protection to offset the damage done to freedom of testation." Id. at 561.
629. Id. at 545-46.
630. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
631. Id. at 573.
632. Id. passim. For discussion of the function of attestation, see supra notes 497, 506,
509-11 and accompanying text.
633. Lindgren, supra note 58, at 546-47, 569-71. Lindgren proposes that: (1) courts and
legislatures encourage optional procedures for making a will seif-proving as a way of facilitating
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Maximizing Formality

Notarial Wills and Self-Proving Wills

In some civil law jurisdictions, witnessed wills executed in the
presence of an expert trained in legal paperwork, the notary, produce
a powerful presumption of testamentary intent.- In European jurisdictions that recognize the notarial will, the notary is "a fully qualified
lawyer and sworn officer of the state" and an "expert in legal paperwork."65 The notarial will is "virtually immune from attack on asserted
...Wills Act noncompliance" because the notary supervises the execuof validity arises from the highly
tion and a powerful presumption
6
formalized execution ritual.
A committee that considered the problems arising from home
drafted wills in Britain suggested that requiring notarial wills would

proof of the will; (2) legislatures draft statutes requiring attestation without making it essential
to the validity of the will; (3) legislatures draft statutes making attestation a duty of "the
scrivener," so that the lawyer or professional who drafts the will without supervising attestation
would be liable for a fine or for the costs of litigation resulting from proof of the will in probate;
(4) courts or legislatures to require "special proof' to establish unwitnessed wills; (5) courts or
legislatures to vary the standard of proof for a will depending upon whether the will is unattested
or attested. Id. at 569-71. Most of Lindgren's proposals appear to raise difficult problems of
enforcement. His proposals that proponents of unattested wills be forced to overcome a presumption that the will was not genuine or that the standard of proof be raised for an unattested will
to a clear and convincing standard, id. at 571, would produce results similar to the substantial
compliance doctrine or a dispensing power. (For discussion of these harmless error rules, see
infra notes 744-849 and accompanying text.) But see Lindgren, supra, at 568 (stating that
dropping the attestation requirement would automatically eliminate most of the defects that
substantial compliance and dispensing power doctrines are designed to cure).
634. Langbein, Living Probate: The ConservatorshipModel, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63, 69-70
(1978) [hereinafter Langbein, Living Probate];see Report of the Justice Committee on Homemade
Wills at 4-5 (1971) (hereinafter Report].
635. Langbein, Living Probate, supra note 634, at 69-70. Langbein explains:
A main function of the notary in the European legal systems is to provide for
official safekeeping of notarized documents. Notarial deposit of a will serves (in
combination with relatively strict rules for revoking such wills) to discourage the
testator from ineffective attempts at altering or revoking the will, and it prevents
accidental destruction, unauthorized tampering, or outright forgery from occurring
subsequent to the authenticated execution.
The Continental notary . . . is obliged when conducting the procedure for
authenticated testation to satisfy himself of the identity of the testator and to
oversee the testator's compliance with the formalities. European law attaches to
the authenticated will an extremely strong (although nominally rebuttable) presumption of validity, on the very reasonable supposition that this expert in legal
paperwork will have taken his statutory responsibilities seriously.
Id.
636. Id. at 70-71.
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reduce instances of defective execution by maintaining a single high

standard of formality to discourage testators from unassisted attempts
to draft their own wiIls.A 7 The Committee mused that "the relative
lack of formality required for the making of an English will is in fact
a serious disadvantage because it conceals from the ordinary testator
the difficulties inherent in disposing of his estate." However, the

Committee ultimately concluded that such a provision would be impracticable in Great Britain except as an alternative to the witnessed
will. Langbein notes that the notarial will in Europe is in fact "an
optional and relatively seldom used mode of testation."' 0 The major
drawback to the notarial will is that "the full benefits to be expected
from a notarial system will not, be achieved if it is introduced only as
an alternative to the present system."' On the other hand, as the

British committee recognized, revising the present system to require
notarial execution would probably create public confusion and increase
the number of invalid wills.6 Moreover, to implement such a system
would require fundamental changes in the probate system, since it is
the special status and training of the notary in civil law jurisdictions
3
that gives the notarial will its probative force.6

637. See Report, supra note 634, at 4.
638. Id. at 6. In the Report, the Justice Committee stated:
The principle advantage of the notarial system, in our view, is that the need to
have a will formally executed in the presence of a Commissioner for Oaths or
probate official would indirectly lead more testators to take proper legal advice
before executing their wills. In addition, the problems of formal invalidity would
be completely eliminated, and while a notary could not be expected to make any
serious investigation of the state of mind or circumstances of the testator we think
his presence would still form a more effective barrier against the more blatant
forms of undue influence than the present system provides.
Id.
For discussion of notarial wills, see Brown, The Office of the Notary in France, 2 I.C.L.Q.
65 (1953); Maxton, Execution of Wills: The Formalities Reconsidered, 1 CANT. L. REv. 393,
396 (1982); Miller, SubstantialCompliance uith the Execution of Wills, 36 INT'L & Comp.L.Q.
559, 562-63 (1987).
639. Report, supra note 634, at 6. The committee noted that making notarial execution of
wills compulsory would (1) increase the cost of will-making (though probably to a negligible
extent); (2) preclude deathbed wills in some cases; and (3) confuse the public and thus result in
an increased number of invalid wills. The Committee suggested that the notarial will be adopted
as an alternate system of testation to the ordinary witnessed will for a ten-year period. Id. at 6-8.
640. Langbein, Living Probate, supra note 634, at 71 n.31.
641. Report, supra note 634, at 6.
642. Id.
643. Miller, supra note 638, at 562; see Langbein, Living Probate, supranote 634, at 69-70.
For discussion of the role of the notary in France, see Brown, supra note 638.
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In the United States, provisions for self-proving wills permit an
alternative system of testation under which the attesting witnesses
sign an affidavit stating that they witnessed the execution of the will,
and that the testator was of sound mind and free from undue influence.- Although most self-proving wills legislation was influenced by
UPC section 2-504,6 5 Nevada has recognized self-proving wills since
1953646 and Arkansas and Texas, since 1955.647 The major purposes of
self-proving will provisions are to relieve will proponents of the neces8 and to "guard against
sity of locating the witnesses41
the lapses in
memory that can occur when witnesses try to recall a ceremony that
may have taken place years earlier.' ' 9
Self-proving wills do not prevent will contests and may not necessarily discourage them.650 "A self-proving affidavit buttresses the presumptive value of the attestation clause, but it does not make the
attestation clause conclusive evidence of due execution."', The affidavit creates sworn evidence of due execution, and in the absence
of evidence of forgery, imposition, or lack of testamentary capacity,

644.
645.
646.

See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504 (1990).
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504 (1969).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.050 (1953).
647. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-417 (1955); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (1971). Other provisions authorizing self-proving wills include, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 14-2504 (1990); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-504 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1305 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
732.503 (1990); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 560:2-504 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-504 (1990); IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.279(2) (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-606 (1990); Ky. REV. STAT. § 394.225 (Michie 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §
2-504 (1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 192, § 2(ii)
(West 1991); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-504 (1990);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-304 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2329 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 552:6-a (1979) (repealed in 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-504 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-11.6 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08-04 (Michie 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

84, § 55(5) (West 1990); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3132.1 (Purdon 1989); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 29-2.6.1 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-504 (1991); VA. CODE § 64.1-87.1
(1991); WYO. STAT. § 2-6-114 (1991).

648. Lindgren, supra note 58, at 570; Mann, supra note 32, at 41; Schneider. supra note
310, at 542.
649. Mann, supra note 32, at 41. However, because the procedure is optional, many testators
do not take advantage of it, significantly diluting its utility. Miller, supra note 638, at 562.
Lindgren considers that procedures for making wills self-proving (thus eliminating the need for
the testimony of witnesses at probate) is the best means of establishing the authenticity of a
will. See Lindgren, supra note 58, at 569. "We could keep attestation routine by retaining
witnesses for a self-proving will while eliminating the attestation requirement for the validity
of wills." Id. at 570.
650. Mann, supra note 32, at 41.
651. Id.
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raises a conclusive presumption that the signature requirements for
valid execution have been met and a rebuttable presumption that the
2
other requirements also have been met.6
The experience in Texas and other jurisdictions that apply the
strict compliance doctrine to self-proving wills make it clear that
heightened formality does not prevent defects in execution.6 The
problems created in those jurisdictions when testators or witnesses
signed only the self-proving affidavit and not the will itself led to a
1975 reform permitting a "one-step" execution of both the will and
self-proving affidavit in addition to the traditional 'two-step" separate
execution of the will and the self-proving affidavit.
Revised section 2-504(a) of the UPC provides that "[a] will may
be simultaneously executed, attested, and made self-proved" and provides a form for a self-proving will.6 5 A new subsection (c) has been
added to counteract the Texas interpretation,-6 specifically stating
that affidavit is considered affixed to the will for purposes of proving
due execution.6 The section also permits subsequent execution of a
self-proving affidavit by the testator and affidavits of a previously
executed witnessed will.m
b. Antemortem ("Living") Probate
One way to avoid a postmortem inquiry into testamentary intent
is to implement an antemortem procedure for settling the issue at the
time the will is executed. Existing antemortem probate procedures
are designed primarily to prevent will contests and separate actions
at law or in equity that are based on such grounds as lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, or other imposition, 9 but any antemor-

652. Schneider, supra note 310, at 542.
653. For discussion of Texas cases, see supra notes 310-19 and accompanying text. For
articles discussing formalism as applied to self-proving wills under the Texas rule, see Effland,
supra note 310; Mann, supra note 32; Schneider, supra note 310; Note, Wich v. Fleming: The
Dilemma of a Harmless Defect in a Will, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 906 (1983).
654. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504 (1983). Mann, supra note 32, at 42 n.11. "Will mavens
refer to the liberalized procedure as the 'one-step' version and to the more cumbersome procedure
as the 'two-step' version. The one-step procedure eliminates the difficulties . . . . It has not
swept the field, however." Id.

655. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504(a) (1990). Subsection (b) provides the procedure for making
a previously attested will self-proving. Id. § 2-504(b).
656.
657.
658.
659.
Models

Id. § 2-504(a) comment.
Id. § 2-504(c).
Id. § 2-504(a).
For general discussion of antemortem probate, see Alexander & Pearson, Alternative
of Ante-Mortem Probate and ProceduralDue Process Limitations on Succession, 78

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

129

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

tem adjudication of those issues also would resolve any issue of intent
and genuineness. Thus, any issues about due execution could be conclusively resolved while the testator is still available "to testify, or to
clarify or contradict other evidence concerning his [or her] all-important intention. "66 If, at an antemortem probate proceeding, "the technical execution of the will were found wanting, it could be corrected,
rather than having the issue arise after the testator's death6 when a
''
flaw in the execution of the will would result in its failure. 61
Although Michigan enacted legislation in 1883 authorizing antemortern probate,6 2 only a few states today permit such a procedure.One problem with the concept of an antemortem proceeding to settle
all questions respecting will enforceability is that antemortem probate
raises difficult, if not unresolvable, constitutional issues. The Michigan
antemortem provision was struck down in 1885, two years after its
enactment. In Lloyd v. Wayne CircuitJudge,6 the Michigan Supreme
Court held that the antemortem provision was unconstitutional because
it failed to provide the testator's spouse with notice and an opportunity
to be heard. 66 The concurring opinion raised the additional argument

MICH. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1979); Fink, Antemortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a
Life After Death?, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 266 (1976); Langbein, Living Probate, supranote 634.
660. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 4.
661. Fink, supra note 659, at 266. Fink explains:
The proceeding would take place while the testator is alive and able to testify, not
by deposition but in direct view of the court or jury which would determine his
capacity and his freedom from influence and which would decide if the will were
properly drawn and witnessed. These findings would be binding upon all those
validly made parties to the action or represented in the action, by operation of the
doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and virtual representation.
Id. at 267.
662. 1883 MICH. PUB. STAT. 17, reprinted in Fink, supra note 659, at 268-69.
663. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-2134 to - 2137 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§
30.1 to .04 (Michie 1991); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2107.081-.085 (Baldwin 1990). For discussion of
antemortem probate provisions and related problems, see Edwards, Antemortem Probate and
Judicial Power to Render or Refuse Declaratory Relief, 7 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 189 (1980);
Comment, The Antemortem Alte'rnative to Probate Legislation in Ohio, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 717
(1980) [hereinafter Antemortem in Ohio]; Comment, ContemporaryAnte-Mortem Statutory Formulations: Observations and Alternatives, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823 (1982) [hereinafter
Observations and Alternatives].
664. Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 56 Mich. 236, 23 N.W. 28 (1885). Lloyd's will, which
excluded one son and his wife, was refused probate. Id. at 237, 23 N.W. at 28. A circuit judge
upheld the refusal on the grounds that the statute did not provide the wife with notice and a
hearing. Id. Lloyd, seeking to enforce the statute, brought a mandamus action against the judge
which the Michigan Supreme Court denied. Id. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29. See Fink, supra note
659, at 268-74 (discussing the Lloyd case).
665. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 243, 23 N.W. at 31.
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that the case was beyond judicial competence because no justiciable
controversy existed. "The broadest definition ever given to the judicial power confines it to controversies between conflicting parties in
interest, and such can never be the condition of a living man and his
possible heirs."' 7 The concurring judge pointed out that the adjudication could only be effective
in the single case of the establishment of the will and subsequent death without revocation or alteration, and leaves
it open to the testator to make any subsequent arrangement
which he may desire, or to oust the jurisdiction by a change
of residence, or to leave the will once rejected open to probate in the usual way after death.
The court seems to have viewed the proceeding with disfavor on both
practical and policy grounds.r 9
Scholars periodically have considered the feasibility of antemortem
probate. In the 1930s, several articles proposed antemortem probate
670
as a solution to many of the problems arising under the wills acts.
In 1932, a committee of the National Conference on Uniform State
Laws drafted an antemortem probate provision, but the committee
apparently abandoned the project stating that "since there was then
no law on the subject on the books of any state, the Commissioners
would be in the position of advocating new legislation rather than

666. Id. (Campbell, J., concurring).
667. Id. (Campbell, J., concurring).
Our statutes have never undertaken, and do not in this case undertake, to give
to the heirs any interest which will even be fixed by this probate, or which may
not be cut off at any time by their own death, or by ... new will or conveyance.
It is by no means free from doubt what classes of probate proceedings under our
system are to be treated as judicial proceedings in the proper sense of that term;
and it is not important here to consider that question, because this proceeding is
not even a suit for probate.
Id. (Campbell, J., concurring).
668. Id. at 240, 23 N.W. at 29 (Campbell, J., concurring).
669. Id. at 241, 23 N.W. at 30 (Campbell, J., concurring).
It is a singular, and in my judgment, a very unfortunate spectacle to see a man
compelled to enter upon a contest with the hungry expectants of his own estate,
and litigate while living with those who have no legal claims whatever upon him,
but who may subject him to ruinous costs and delays in meeting such testimony
as is apt to be paraded in such cases.
Id. (Campbell, J., concurring).
670. See, e.g., Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate:An Essay in Preventive Law, 1 U. CHI. L.
REV. 440 (1934); Kutscher, Living Probate, 21 A.B.A. J. 427 (1935); Redfearn, Ante-Mortem
Probate, 38 CoM. L.J. 571 (1933).
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reforming existing legislation. ''671 In Mechem's 1941 critique of the
drafters for failing to
Model Probate Code, he reproved the MPC
672
probate.
antemortem
explore the option of
The first notable revisitation of antemortem probate appeared in
Fink's 1976 article.673 Fink proposed "a state statute providing for a
declaratory judgment as to the validity of a will and the capacity of
its maker, to be brought by the testator himself, against all those
who would, upon the testator's death, be able to challenge the will,"
settling issues of capacity, undue influence, and due execution. 67 4 Fink's
proposal spawned a series of articles, many written by eminent scholars, debating the constitutionality and practicality of the antemortem
proceeding and proposing a variety of models for resolving the due
process and justiciability issues raised by antemortem will adjudication. 675
A detailed discussion of antemortem probate, the constitutional
and other issues, and the various models recommended by scholars
or adopted by legislators is beyond the scope of this article. The
antemortem proceeding is directed mainly toward resolving the questions that tend to be the basis of will contests rather than resolving
the threshold question of formal validity. 676 Antemortem proceedings
are most likely to be invoked by testators realistically concerned about
postmortem challenges to the will (such as, testators intending to
make "unnatural dispositions," leaving their property away from their
heirs).6 77 It seems unlikely that a testator would go through a court
proceeding merely to obtain an adjudication as to the formal validity
of the will, particularly since, depending on the statutory model
adopted in that jurisdiction, antemortem adjudication might conceiv-

671. Fink, supra note 659, at 288-89 (citing Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 143 (1931) (statement of Mr. Imlay)).
672. Mechem, supra note 182, at 521.
673. Fink, supra note 659.
674. Id. at 266.
675. E.g., Alexander, The ConservatorshipModel: A Modification, 77 MICH. L. REV. 86
(1978); Alexander & Pearson, Alternative Models of Ante-Mortem Probate and ProceduralDue
Process Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L. REV. 89 (1979); Edwards, supra note 663;
Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1066 (1980); Langbein, Living
Probate, supra note 634; Comment, Antemortem in Ohio, supra note 663; Comment, Observations and Alternatives, supra note 486.
676. See Fink, supra note 659, at 265.
677. See id. Devices presently available to testators in many jurisdictions are the in terrorem
clause making loss of bequests the penalty for unsuccessful contests, perpetuation of testimony
by the testator during his or her lifetime, and a self-proving will in which the testator asserts
capacity and freedom from undue influence at the time of execution. Id. at 266.
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testator's freedom to alter, amend, or
ably be construed to limit the
78
revoke the adjudicated will.

Despite the proliferation of models, the constitutionality of antemortem probate remains quite problematic. No single approach
seems to be entirely satisfactory both constitutionally and practically.679
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has recently considered a model draft for an antemortem probate
proceeding.m Even if a workable model is adopted, antemortem probate is unlikely to be used by testators who are not apprehensive of
will contests and is therefore unlikely to have any meaningful impact
on the problem of formalism.
c. Videotaped Wills
A fairly recent proposed reformulation of the statute of wills would
permit courts to admit videotaped wills to probate either as duly
executed "videowills" or, in the alternative, as evidence to prove due
execution.681

678. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 659, at 118-19. Alexander and Pearson suggest that
there is indeed some basis for concern that an antemortem proceeding will limit the testator's
subsequent freedom and suggest that there is a need in framing such a statute 'to be clear
about the availability of revocation and its procedure if only to avoid the appearance of making
the will irrevocable through court approval." Id. at 118. Langbein states,
I doubt that the point would have practical importance, because most testators
who are at once sufficiently prudent and well-counseled to have used living probate
procedure and sufficiently aged or decrepit to have needed it will not lightly venture
out of the safe harbor that they will have achieved. The testator who uses living
probate procedure will almost always be making his true "last will." Further, if
the need for modification does become inevitable, he and his lawyer are likely to
understand that the circumstances that made the use of living probate advisable
in the first place are persisting, and that the procedure ought to be used again
despite the nuisance and expense.
Langbein, Living Probate, supra note 634, at 81.
679. See generally Edwards, supra note 663 (describing various living probate proposals,
pointing out the weaknesses of each, and suggesting an alternative which concentrates on
eliminating the expense and uncertainty of a mental capacity requirement for executing a valid
will; Fellows, supranote 675 (discussing the application of the "case or controversy" requirements
of Ohio's Declaratory Judgment Act to an Ohio antemortem statute).
680. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UNIFORm ANTEMORTEM PROBATE OF WILLS ACT, DRAFT B (submitted for discussion in 1980).
681. Beyer, Video Requiem: Thy Will be Done, 124 TR. & EsT. 24 (1985) [hereinafter
Beyer, Video Requiem]; Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony - PreventingFrustrationof the Testator's FinalWishes, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Beyer, Preventing Frustration];Buckley, Devising Videotaped Will Statutes: A Primer, 7 A.B.A. J. 37 (Spring
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If our legal principles are to keep pace with the progress
surrounding them, legislators and judges must eventually
decide how to incorporate society's new tools into our reservoir of legal precedents. . . . When few could write, courts
had to rely on . . . oral testimony. With increased literacy
came the admission of written evidence. Eventually, science
developed techniques that preserved information on film and
magnetic tape, and gradually photographs and audio recordings were permitted at trial. In recent years the use of
videotape in the legal arena has become more widespread.
However, there are some areas of the law, such as probate,
which have been slow to recognize the merits of this
medium.-2
At present, none of the states have expanded wills provisions to include
the videowill as a substitute for a written will.- In In re Estate of
Reed,- the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the contention that an
audio recording could serve as a will, absent explicit legislative authorization.- The Reed court declined to "enlarge, stretch, expand, or
extend the holographic will statute to include a testamentary device
not falling within the express provisions of the statute. "6
In his 1975 article, Langbein rejects the concept of an electronically
recorded will, arguing that such a recording "lack[s] the solemnity
and finality of a signed document. '' 6 7 The comments to section 2-502(c)
and section 2-503 in the draft versions of the recent revisions to the
UPC indicate that the drafters were similarly prejudiced in favor of

1986) [hereinafter Buckley, A Primer]; Buckley, Indiana's New Videotaped Wills Statute:
Launching Probate into the 21st Century, 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 83 (1985) [hereinafter Buckley,
Launching Probate]; Buckley, Videotape Wills: More than a Testators Curtain Call, TR. &
EST. 48 (Oct. 1987) [hereinafter Buckley, Testator's CurtainCall]; Buckley & Buckley, Videotaping Wills: A New Frontier in Estate Planning, 11 OHio N.U.L. REV 271 (1984); Nash, A
Videowill: Safe and Sure, 70 A.B.A. J. 87 (1984); Comment, supra note 69.
For discussion of the use of electronic media in court proceedings, see McCrystal & Maschari,
Will Electronic Technology Take the Witness Stand?, 11 TOL. L. REV. 239 (1980); Note,
Admission of Videotapes, 38 Miss. L. REV. 111 (1973); Note, Videotape as a Tool in the Florida
Legal Process, 5 NOVA L.J. 243 (1981); Note, Videotape Depositions: An Analysis of Use in
Civil Cases, 9 CUMB. L. REV. 195 (1978).
682. Buckley & Buckley, supra note 681, at 271-72 (citations omitted).
683. Buckley, A Primer, supra note 681, at 37; Comment, supra note 54, at 139. See supra
note 191 for citations to current wills provisions.
684. 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983).
685. Id. at 833.
686. Id.
687. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 518-19.
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the medieval methods of executing wills.6 The comments to the final
(1990) revision of these provisions, however, is equivocal with respect
to the status of videotaped wills; though the comment notes that "[a]
tape recorded will has been held not to be 'in writing,"' it does not
state, as does an earlier version, that a video or audio recording is
not a writing, 690 nor does the comment to section 2-503 specifically
state that the UPC harmless error rule cannot be applied to validate
such a recording if it is shown that it was prepared with testamentary
intent. 691 Certainly a case can be made that a carefully contrived vid-

eotape could be designed to serve all of the purposes of the wills act
provide superior evidence of testamenand indeed in such a way as to
6
tary intent and authenticity. 9

688. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) comment (1988 Discussion Draft). The discussion draft
states that "[tihe will must be in writing. Any reasonably permanent record is sufficient; but
a tape-recorded or video-taped will is not 'in writing."' Id. (citing Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829
(Wyo. 1983)). It is unclear whether the drafters considered that a videotaped will could be
admitted under the § 2-503 harmless error rule. See id.
689. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) comment (1990) (citing Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829
(Wyo. 1983)).
690. See id. Beyer has pointed out that there is judicial and legislative authority in other
contexts for extending the definition of a "writing" beyond the narrow meaning of words printed
or written on paper. Beyer, Preventing Frustration,supra note 681, at 52-54. Beyer points out
that the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and the California Evidence Code all have expanded the term beyond its usual
meaning. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (1987); UNIF. R. EVID. 1001(1) (1989); FED. R. EVID.
1001(1); CAL. EVID. CODE § 250 (West 1991)). The California Evidence Code specifically defines
writing as "handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, and every other
means of recording upon any tangible thing any form of communication or representation,
including letters, words, pictures, sounds, symbols, or combinations thereof." CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 250 (West 1991).
691. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment.
692. Nash describes some of the techniques that the maker of a videowill could employ to
satisfy the purposes of an attested wil:
The signature requirements can be handled in a number of ways. The testator
can simply sign his name in view of the camera, perhaps on a sheet of paper or
cardboard, and aclmowledge it to the witnesses who can do likewise. The camera
can zoom in close to show the signatures. Actually, however, if the purpose of the
signatures is to authenticate the instrument, the signing of names in view of the
camera is superfluous. The appearance of the testator himself, rather than just his
signature, certainly identifies him positively. The videowill shows his person, allows
the viewer to hear his voice and note his demeanor and his mannerisms. The same
holds true for the witnesses. Most important, the actual appearance of the testator
is unlikely to be copied as a signature might be.
Because the signing requirement is also intended to signal that the testator is
finished with the dispositive provisions and that he intends to adopt them as his

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

135

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Commentators argue that even if courts do not recognize the concept of a "videowill," a videotape of the execution of a will is eminently
well-adapted to resolve a number of issues that may arise at probate.
"A carefully prepared videotape that records both visually and audibly
the entire will execution procedure may prove indispensible [sic] should
the will subsequently be contested. This procedure ... allows a ready
determination as to whether the various . . . statutory requirements
for a valid will were satisfied."6 3 By showing the testator actually in
the process of executing the will, a videotape might provide "practically irrebuttable evidence" of testamentary intent.6 9 Indiana has recently enacted legislation permitting courts to admit videotapes of the
6 95
execution ceremony as evidence of due execution.
B.

Harmless Error Rules

1. Langbein's "Functional" Substantial Compliance Doctrine
a. Purpose of the Doctrine
Langbein is generally considered to be the first scholar to have
presented a comprehensive and detailed argument in support of the

last will, the testator might simply make a short statement declaring just that.
The witnesses also might declare that they are acting as witnesses, thus "signing"
the will. They also might, for safety's sake, subscribe their names in view of the
camera. In this manner, a videotape can be executed in full accordance with [the
purpose of] every requirement of a present-day statute of wills.
Nash, supra note 681, at 88.
693. Beyer, Preventing Frustration, supra note 681, at 5. Other purposes that Beyer
believes a videotape may serve at probate include: (1) preserving evidence of testamentary
intent; (2) recording the testator's demeanor as a means of helping to establish lack of duress,
fraud, imposition, or undue influence; and (3) providing contemporaneous statements by the
testator to assist in will interpretation and construction. Id. at 5-7.
694. Id. at 6-7.
695. IND. CODE § 29-1-5-3(c) (Burns 1990). "The amendment . . . marked the official
acceptance of videotaped wills as evidence." Comment, supra note 69, at 150. The provision
"specifically allows videotape to be admitted during probate to document that a will was executed
according to statutory mandates." Buckley, Launching Probate, supra note 681, at 83-84. 'This
precept restricts videotape to modest evidentiary tasks primarily because the legislature was
hesitant, on its maiden enactment, to authorize videotaped wills without written counterparts."
Buckley, A Primer, supra note 681, at 37. The videotape is admissible only to prove correct
execution. "The written will still speaks for itself." Buckley, Launching Probate, supra note
681, at 88.
Some courts have admitted audio recordings as evidence at the probate proceeding. See,
e.g., Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956) (admitting audio recording as evidence
of testamentary capacity and lack of undue influence); Hultquist v. Ring, 301 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957) (admitting dictaphone recording as evidence of error in transcription in order
to resolve latent ambiguity in the provisions of the will).
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judicial abandonment of the strict compliance rule in wills cases in
favor of a flexible "functional" approach to defectively executed wills.69

The thrust of Langbein's substantial compliance doctrine, as he originally envisioned it,69 seems to be that a court should deem a formal
defect in a will to be a harmless error and permit the will to be
admitted to probate if the proponent can demonstrate that the defect
does not raise unresolvable issues of authenticity or testamentary
intent.6

8

Application of the doctrine depends on the substitution of a

functional interpretation of the statutory formalities for due execution
that would consider the nature of the defect in execution in light of
extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent for the traditional strict construction of the wills formalities as legislatively mandated criteria for
validity. 69 Langbein characterizes substantial compliance as essentially
a litigation doctrine7 oo that permits the proponents of a defective will
to rebut the traditionally irrebuttable presumption of invalidity arising
from defective execution7ol by producing extrinsic evidence of the facts
and circumstances surrounding execution sufficient to prove testamentary intent by a preponderance of the evidence. 70 2 In contrast to the
696. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32. The scope of substantial compliance seems to be extended beyond its original limits in Langbein's 1987 article. See Langbein,
Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5. For detailed discussion of the substantial compliance
doctrine, see Miller, pt. 2, 43 FLA. L. REv. _
(1991).
For a proposal that courts effectuate the intentions of testators by enforcing defectively
executed wills in the absence of "suspicious circumstances" surrounding execution that preceded
Langbein's "substantial compliance" proposal, see Bates, supra note 3. Bates' article, sketching
out the parameters of a form of harmless error rule, was published while Langbein's 1975 article,
supranote 32, was already in press. Langbein, CrumblingWills Act, supranote 347, at 1194.
697. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32.
698. See id. at 513-26.
699. See id.
700. Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note 497, at 1194.
701. Id. at 1194; Langbein, HarmlessErrorRules, supra note 5, at 6-7; Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 513.
702. Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note 497, at 1194. Langbein states that "[t]he
substantial compliance doctrine would permit the proponents in cases of defective execution to
prove what they are now entitled to presume from due execution - the existence of testamentary
intent and the fulfillment of the Wills Act purposes." Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra
note 32, at 513. Miller explains:
Professor Langbein argues that the finding of a formal defect in the execution of
a will should lead not to automatic invalidity, but to a further inquiry. This further
inquiry should be concerned with whether the non-complying document expresses
the deceased's testamentary intent and whether its form sufficiently approximates
to Wills Act formality to enable the court to conclude that it serves the purposes
of the Wills Act. It is pointed out that although a presumption of testamentary
intent arises from due execution, this may be rebutted by evidence that the document was not intended to be a will. In the same way, it should be open to the
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quantitative or sufficiency notion of substantial compliance sometimes
applied in the courts, 70 3 application of the functional substantial compliance doctrine does not depend on the court's determining that the
conduct of the testator or witnesses was sufficiently close to the stat7
utory standard to be deemed in actual compliance with the wills act. 04
b.

Scope of the Doctrine

The substantial compliance doctrine as explained in Langbein's 1975
article generally would save wills containing minor technical defects
in execution and also, in some cases, wills containing more serious
errors or omissions such as partial attestation or (in jurisdictions that
permit unattested holographic wills) no attestation. 70 5 Substantial compliance would validate holographic wills containing typed or printed
matter, even in instances in which material provisions (and possibly
even substantial portions) of the will are not handwritten; for example,
wills that would be formally invalid even under the relatively liberal
"surplusage" theory. 70 It also would save defectively revoked or modified wills if the proponent could show the intention of the testator to
07 °
revoke or alter the earlier document.
Application of the substantial compliance doctrine presupposes that
courts can identify the functions served by the individual wills act
formalities and can evaluate their relative significance in resolving
questions about the testator's intent and the genuineness of the document offered for probate. 7 01 An essential premise of substantial compliance is that the failure to comply with the fundamental formalities
of writing and signature almost always will raise issues of testamentary
intent and authenticity that no amount of extrinsic evidence is likely
to resolve.09 Langbein suggests that the proponent of an unsigned

propounders of a document to show that, though there is some defect of execution,
it was, nonetheless, intended to be a will.
Miller, supra note 638, at 564-65.
703. For discussion of substantial compliance applied to borderline conduct, see infra notes
264-394 and accompanying text.
704. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 526 n.127. "The substantial
compliance doctrine is a rule neither of maximum nor of minimum formalities .... Id. at 513.
705. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 521-22. For detailed discussion
of application of substantial compliance to wills containing various execution defects, see Miller,
pt. 2, supra note 696.
706. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 519. For discussion of the
"surplusage" theory applied to holographic wills, see supra notes 226-40 and accompanying text.
707. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 522.
708. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 52.
709. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 518.
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document almost never would be able to show sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption that the document was not intended to be a
will except in the extraordinary case in which the evidence shows that
the testator died during the execution of the will.71° Moreover, the
substantial compliance doctrine "would have no practical effect on the
requirement that wills be in writing. '' 711 As a practical matter, the
testator's omission of one or more of the formalities required for willmaking (as opposed to a mere bungling of the formality, such as failing
to publish the will to the witnesses, to comply with the presence
requirement, or to sign the will at the end), 712 supports a determination

that the testator did not in fact intend to make a will. The further
the document offered for probate deviates from the standard of formality set by the wills act, the less likely it is, according to Langbein,
that extrinsic evidence will be able to supply proof of the requisite
intent.713
c. Application to the Formalities
For a court to apply Langbein's substantial compliance rule to
validate a document that does not comply with the requirements of
the wills act depends on an unconventional "functional" approach to the
statute of wills. To apply substantial compliance, the court must reject
a literal interpretation of the statute of wills as a provision setting
out the minimum criteria for an enforceable will in favor of a view of
the wills act requirements as a substitute for the need to produce
evidence of the genuineness of a purported will and of its maker's
intention that it be enforced as such. Substantial compliance is a judicial doctrine designed to place the traditional requirement of strict
compliance with the literal requirements of the wills act by redefining
the notion of "compliance" in functional terms; thus, if the proponents

710.

See id. (signature so fundamental that proponents of an unsigned will bear an "almost

impossible" burden of proof).
Langbein suggests that the proponents of an unsigned will might be able to carry the burden
of showing testamentary intent in a case in which the testator died or was killed after the

witnesses had attested the will but before the testator was able to sign bullet" scenario. Id.

the "interloper's

711. Id. at 518-19. He does observe that "conceivably" the doctrine might be applied to an
electronic will if (1) the jurisdiction permits unattested wills in holographic form or the testator

dictates the will in the presence of witnesses who "attest" on the recording; and (2) the testator
is in extremis and so unable to comply with the writing requirement. But application of substantial
compliance to validate such a "will" would be the "rare case." Id. at 519.
712. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, 516-22.
713. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 17.
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of a formally defective will can carry the burden of proving through
the introduction of extrinsic evidence that the purported testator did
in fact intend the defective document to be given effect, the purpose
of the statutory requirements is effectively served and the will is
7
deemed to be in compliance, despite the defect. 14
Substantial compliance is thus distinguishable from a statutory dispensing power authorizing a court to disregard a violation of the wills
act if the proponent of a defective will can prove that it was executed
with testamentary intent. 715 A dispensing power depends upon legislative authorization to excuse noncompliance with the statutory mandate
in cases in which the proponent can show that the defective document
was intended to be given effect.7 16 It does not require a reinterpretation
of the statute of wills to permit courts to deem that documents failing
to meet the literal requirements of the statute nevertheless "functionally" comply.
Langbein characterizes substantial compliance as a "judicial doctrine" that may be adopted by courts in place of the traditional strict
compliance rule without authorization from the legislature.7' 17 "I take
the position that the existing literal compliance rule is a judicial creation and that the courts can abandon it when experience and reflection
reveal that its harsh results are not essential to the good order of the
probate system. '7'8 Because the rationale supporting the substantial
compliance doctrine is a functional reinterpretation of the wills act
rather than a power to dispense with its requirements, substantial
compliance is the only form of harmless error rule that a court could
71 9
adopt by judicial fiat.
d.

"Functional" versus "Sufficient" Compliance

Langbein's selection of the term "substantial compliance" to describe his harmless error principle may have been an unfortunate

714. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 515-16.
715. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 6-7.
716. Id. at 45.
717. See id.
718. Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note 497, at 1195. But see Estate of Fernandez,
173 N.J. Super. 240, 413 A.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1980), in which a court of first instance cited
"Langhelm's" [sic] article but refused to adopt a standard of substantial compliance because "I
would be breaking new ground, a role more appropriate to the appellate courts." Id. at 245,
413 A.2d at 1001. For discussion of this case, see Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note
5, at 7-8.
719. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 45.
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choice, given the usual meaning of the term when applied by courts.720
"Substantial compliance" implies a quantitative or yardstick standard
of compliance which if not achieved is not "substantial. '' 1 The ambiguity of the term had unfortunate results in Queensland, Australia,
whose legislature in 1987 enacted a statutory harmless error rule
7
purportedly based on Langbein's substantial compliance doctrine.
The Queensland courts have interpreted the term so restrictively that
"[i]n the hands .of the Queensland bench, substantial compliance...
is a new formal requirement that must be established independently
of testamentary intent. And the standard for this formality is essentially quantitative: compliance cannot be substantial unless the defect
is minimal. '" An Idaho court, commenting on Langbein's substantial
compliance doctrine (but refusing to apply it), gave it a similarly restrictive interpretation.'
Since Langbein's substantial compliance doctrine is predicated on
the "compliance" of an otherwise defective execution with the functions
of the wills act formalities as the test for determining whether the
defect should be treated as harmless error,m a more descriptive and
less misleading term would be "functional compliance."
In his 1975 article, Langbein hopefully observes that "substantial
compliance . . . presently awaits its first adherents among common
law courts. ' ' 7 6 A review of existing case law reveals that courts
addressing the problem of giving effect to wills in cases in which the
testator's intent is clear but compliance is marginal often take into
consideration the purpose of the arguably bungled formality in deciding

720. For discussion of the meaning of substantial compliance in cases of borderline compliance in the courts, see supra notes 264-94 and accompanying text.
721. See Miller, supra note 638, at 586; Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 355. "The

expression 'substantial compliance' is .. . ambiguous. Although potentially wide in scope as
used by Professor Langbein, it may be interpreted restrictively or quantitatively ...." Miller,
supra note 638, at 586. Nelson and Starck have also criticized Langbein's terminology for its

ambiguity. Nelson & Starck, supra note 32, at 355.
Compare Maxton, supra note 638, at 402-03 (stating that Langbein's "narrow approach" to

substantial compliance "requires both testamentary intent and its evidence in the form of an
attempt at due execution") with Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 513

(stating that substantial compliance does not rest on either maximum or minimum formalities).
722.

For discussion of the Queensland provision, see infra notes 850-87 and accompanying

text.
723.
724.
725.
726.

Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 44 (emphasis in original).
Inre Estate of McGurrin, 113 Idaho 341, 348, 743 P.2d 994, 1001 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 513-26.
Id. at 526.
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to enforce the document.72 7 These decisions are obviously not applications of a substantial compliance rationale as defined by Langbein,
because they do not turn on a determination that the proponents of
a concededly defective will have rebutted the presumption of invalidity
arising from defective execution; 7? instead, they are predicated on a
determination that no defect in execution exists. Nevertheless, an
emphasis on function rather than form is often implicit in decisions
finding arguably defective conduct sufficient under the wills acts.
e.

Functional Analysis in the Courts

In his 1987 article, Langbein states that the only American precedent that has "squarely validated a concededly defective will on the
ground that substantial compliance satisfied the purposes of the Wills
Act"729 is the Pennsylvania decision in Kajut Will.7 30 In Kajut, a
Pennsylvania court of first instance found that a will signed by mark
was valid despite noncompliance with a requirement that the testator's
name be subscribed in the testator's presence.", In finding that the
will "substantially complied" with the requirements for execution of
a will by a testator who is unable to sign, the court emphasized that
(1) the testator's attorney, who was also one of the witnesses, told
the testator before he affixed his mark to the will that his name had
previously been typed on it; and (2) even if the name had been subscribed in the testator's presence, the testator would not have been
able to see the subscription because he was blind. 732 The court thus
applied a form of purposive analysis to validate a will that the court
conceded did not meet the requirements of the wills act because the
conduct was sufficient under the circumstances to serve the purpose
of the bungled formality.Courts upholding the validity of self-proving wills in cases in which
the witnesses sign the self-proving affidavit but fail to sign the will
itself, leaving the will technically unexecuted, 7 4 apply a form of func-

727. For discussion of the courts' application of a quantitative substantial compliance standard to borderline conduct, see infra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
728. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 526 n.127.
729. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 8.
730. Estate of Kajut, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 123 (C.P. Westmoreland County 1981). For discussion
of Kajut, see supra text accompanying notes 355-61.
731. Id. at 131.
732. Id. at 130-31.
733. Id. at 130.
734. For discussion of cases, see supra notes 310-17 and accompanying text (discussing
cases holding self-proving wills invalid for lack of due execution in cases in which the testator
or witnesses failed to sign the will but signed the affidavit instead) and notes 644-58 and
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tional analysis in reasoning that the failure to attest the will is not
fatal to validity if the signatures appear on a self-proving affidavit
executed at the same time as the will. 735 In reaching this result, the
courts essentially reject the Texas rationale that the purpose of attestation and the purpose of affirming attestation in an affidavit differ
fundamentally, requiring the court to invalidate a will that has not
been properly signed and attested even if the signatures appear on
an affidavit that was executed at the same time. 57M The courts that
uphold such wills do so based on a determination that execution of
the self-proving affidavit substantially serves the purpose of attesta7
tion.
In In re Charry, for example, a Florida appellate court specifically
declined to follow the Texas courts' strict interpretation of attestation
on the ground that to do so would exalt form over substance.73 Similarly, the Oklahoma court held in Estate of Cutsinger that in signing
the affidavit the witnesses had substantially complied with the attestation requirement. 739 Implicit in these results is-a recognition that
the defect in execution was harmless in light of the clear intention of.

accompanying text (discussing cases holding self-proving wills valid despite failure of testator
or witnesses to execute the will when the signatures appeared on a self-proving affidavit executed

at the time the will was made).
735. E.g., Estate of Cutsinger, 445 P.2d 778 (Okla. 1978). In Cutsinger,the testator signed
the will and affidavit, but the witnesses only signed the affidavit. The court held that the

Oklahoma statute "does not require the attestation clause to be in any particular form ...
[W]e hold that the attestation of the will involved here was in substantial compliance [with the
wills act]." Id. at 781.
736.
737.

For discussion of the Texas rule, see supra notes 310-17 and accompanying text.
See Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th D.C;A. 1978) (holding that witnesses'

signatures sufficiently served purpose of attestation in case in which testator signed will and
affidavit but witnesses signed only affidavit); Estate of Petty, 608 P.2d 987, 227 Kan. 697 (1980)

(holding that since Kansas requires no particular form of attestation, signatures appearing on
affidavit substantially comply with Kansas requirements in case in which testator signed will
and affidavit; witnesses signed only the affidavit); Dillow v. Campbell, 453 P.2d 710 (Okla. 1969)

(holding that no particular form of attestation is required and signatures on affidavit meet
requirements in case in which testator signed codicil and affidavit; witnesses signed only affidavit).
738. 359 So. 2d 544 (4th D.C.A. 1978).
739. Cutsinger,445 P.2d at 782. Contra Hopkins v. Hopkins, 708 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Ct. App.

1986) (rejecting the argument of proponents that the signature of the witnesses on the affidavit
substantially complied with the attestation requirement). 'The proponent suggests that substantial compliance with the Probate Code is sufficient when the testator's intent is clear and the
interested parties are in agreement. We conclude that we cannot apply a different standard in

such cases. Such a departure from Code requirements would lead to confusion and uncertainty,
which the Code seeks to avoid." Id. at 32.
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the testator to execute a will; the failure of the witnesses to sign the
will itself raised no issues of intent and authenticity that would have
been resolved by strict compliance with the attestation requirement.74°
Indicia of functional analysis appear in many instances in which
the courts have applied a principle of "substantial compliance" by
reinterpreting the wills act requirements in a less than literal fashion.
Courts have permitted wills to be admitted to probate despite unconventional signatures or signatures affixed in unexpected places in cases
in which the courts determined that the purpose of the requirement
was sufficiently served.7 41 Courts holding that presence requirements

have been met under unconventional circumstances must (implicitly
or explicitly) consider the purpose of the requirements in determining
that the conduct of the testator and witnesses satisfied the presence
requirements. 742 Many of the old cases dealing with sufficiency of pub-

740. Schneider points out that these decisions in fact violate the literal requirements of
statutes that require the affidavit and the will to be separately executed, although he approves
of the result. Schneider, supra note 310, at 549-51.
741. In holding that the name was placed on the will as a signature, the courts consider
whether it was affixed to the document for the purpose of authenticating it or adopting it as a
will. See, e.g., Estate of MacLeod, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1235, 254 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1988) (holding
that testator's name at the beginning of holographic will was placed there with intention to
authenticate the will); In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting) (holding that testator's name appearing within the body of the will as part of the
identification of certain bonds constituted a valid signature); In re Button's Estate, 209 Cal.
325, 287 P. 964 (1930) (holding that "Love from 'Muddy' written in margin of last page was
signature and was intended to serve as token of execution); In re Dodson's Estate, 119 Mich.
App. 427, 326 N.W.2d 532 (1982) (holding that testator's signature on attested will, directly
above place at the beginning of the will where his name was typed, was written there in a
manner indicating testamentary intent); In re Kimmel's Estate, 278 Pa. 435, 123 A. 405 (1924)
(holding that letter signed "Father" containing dispositive language addressed and mailed to
testator's sons was validly signed). See generally Note, Validity of Signaturefor Holographic
Wills, 28 ARK. L. REV. 521 (1975) (discussing Nelson v. Texarkana Historical Soc'y & Museum,
257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W.2d 882 (1974), and reviewing development of signature requirement in
Arkansas as applied to holographic wills). See also Robinson v. Ward, 239 Va. 36, 387 S.E.2d
735 (1990) (holding that there was a sufficient subscription of the will by a witness who, when
the testator was dictating the will to her, wrote her name in the body of the will as a beneficiary).
742. See, e.g., In re Rudd's Estate, 140 Mont. 170, 369 P.2d 526 (1962), in which the facts
showed that the testator could not see one of the witnesses or the will at the time the witness
attested it and that the testator had not signed or acknowledged the will in the presence of the
witnesses. Id. at 175, 369 P.2d at 529. Despite its conviction that the strict rule of construction
promotes justice by lessening the opportunity for fraud and that all of the formalities "stand
as of equal importance, and all must be observed," id. at 176-77, 369 P.2d at 529-30, the court
applied a form of functional analysis to hold that the will substantially complied with the requirements. "[S]ubstantial compliance means ... that a court should determine whether the statute
has been followed sufficiently ... to carry out the intent for which it was adopted." Id. at 180,
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lication have permitted less than literal compliance with the require-

ment.7

43

2. Statutory Harmless Error Rules
a. South Australia's Broad Dispensing Power
(1) Intended scope of section 12(2)
Legislatures in some common law jurisdictions in Canada and Australia have recommended or enacted harmless error rules for defective
wills. 7" While Langbein's 1975 article was still in press, 745 the state

369 P.2d at 530-31. The court concluded that there was not even a remote possibility "that John
Rudd was doing or thought he was doing anything other than executing a will" and the legislative
purpose of eliminating fraud was sufficiently served. Id.
743. E.g., In re Rudd's Estate, 140 Mont. 170, 369 P.2d 526 (1962) (holding that the will
was in substantial compliance with the publication requirement though the testator did not
declare to the witnesses that the document was his will or request them to sign as witnesses).
For a lengthy annotation dealing with the various ways that courts have interpreted the publication requirements, e_ e Annotation, Sufficiency of Publicationof Will, 60 A.L.R. 124 (1968).
For courts applying substantial compliance to the publication requirement, see id. at 136-38.
744. For articles analyzing various forms of harmless error legislation, see, e.g., de Groot,
Will Execution Formalities- What Constitutes Substantial Compliance?, 20 QUEENSLAND
LAW Soc'Y J. 93 (Apr. 1990); Lang, Formalityv. Intention - Wills in An Australian Supermarket, 15 MELBOURNE U.L. REv. 82 (1985); Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note
498; Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5; Maxton, supra note 638; Miller, supra
note 638.
A number or jurisdictions that have enacted or considered harmless error legislation have
produced recommendations. For reports recommending adoption of harmless error rules, see,
e.g., New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report on Wills - Execution and Revocation
(1986) [hereinafter New South Wales Report]; Law Reform Commission of Western Australia,
Project No. 76, pt. 1, Report on Wills: Substantial Compliance (1985) [hereinafter Western
Australia Report]; Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Project No. 76, pt. 1,
Discussion Paper on Wills: Substantial Compliance (1984) [hereinafter Western Australia Discussion Paper]; Law Reform Commission of Tasmania, Report No. 35 on Reform in the Law of
Wills (1983) [hereinafter Tasmania Report]; Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report
No. 52 on The Making and Revocation of Wills (1981) [hereinafter British Columbia Report];
Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Report on 'The Wills Act" and the Doctrine of Substantial
Compliance (1980) [hereinafter Manitoba Report]; Northern Territory Law Reform Committee,
Relating to the Attestation of Wills by Interested Witnesses and Due Execution of Wills (1979)
[hereinafter Northern Territory Report]; Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Report of
the Law Reform Commission on the Law Relating to Succession (1978) [hereinafter Queensland
Report]; Twenty-Eighth Report of the South Australia Law Reform Committee to the AttorneyGeneral, Reform of the Law of Intestacy and Wills (1974) [hereinafter South Australia Report].
But see Law Reform Committee, The Making and Revocation of Wills, 1980, 22d Report,
Comnd. No. 7904 at 4 (England) [hereinafter English Report], recommending that a dispensing
power not be adopted.
While the idea of a dispensing power has attractions, most of us were impressed
by the argument against it, namely that by maling it less certain whether or not
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of South Australia was in the process of considering legislation destined
to create, in Langbein's words, "a tranquil revolution in probate
law."746 The South Australian harmless error rule originated as part
of legislation designed to reduce intestacy. -7 The original premise was
that intestacy would be reduced if courts had the power to validate
wills despite certain technical defects in execution.748
The provision became effective in 1975. 749 The legislative history
indicates that the Commission that proposed the recommendation contemplated a limited reform. Professor Palk, an Australian scholar who
extensively analyzed the background and probable scope of the section
12(2) dispensing power shortly after its enactment, identified two principal concerns addressed by the Commission: (1) invalidation of wills
containing minor technical defects in execution;7 0 and (2) the problem
of the dying or isolated testator who is unable to procure witnesses.751
Palk pointed out that the Commission proposed distinct standards to
be applied to these two categories of execution errors. First, with
respect to technical defects in compliance with the presence and signature requirements, they recommended that courts confronted with
such documents be given a power "to declare that the will in question
is a good and valid testamentary document if. . . satisfied that the
document does in fact represent the last will and testament of the
testator.752 Second, with respect to testators who are in extremis or

an informally executed will is capable of being admitted to probate, it could lead
to litigation, expense, and delay, often in cases where it could least be afforded,
for it is the home-made wills which most often go wrong.
Id.
745. Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note 497, at 1194.
746. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 1.
747. South Australian Report, supra note 744; Lang, supra note 744, at 105; Langbein,
Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 9; Palk, supra note 396, at 384-85.
748. South Australian Report, supra note 744, at 10-11; Langbein, Harmless Error Rules,
supra note 5, at 9; Palk, supra note 396, at 384-85.
749. Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2) of 1975, § 9 amending Wills Act of 1936, § 12(2),
8 S. AUSTL. STAT. 665.
750. See Palk, supra note 396, at 384-92.
751. See id. at 392-93.
752. Id. at 385 (citing South Australia Report, supra note 744, at 10) (emphasis added).
Palk suggested that this reform was probably not an urgently needed means of limiting intestacies, because invalidation of wills on purely technical grounds was not a major problem prior
to the enactment of the dispensing power; South Australian courts were inclined to be liberal
in validating wills containing such defects. With respect to misplaced signatures, the courts
would usually expand "the concept of signatures being placed at the end of the will in the notion
of space, to the concept that the signature of the testator is placed at the end, either in time
or in the intention of the testator." Id. at 387. Thus, in most (though not all) cases, a misplaced
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isolated so that witnesses to the will are difficult or impossible to
procure, the Commission concluded that a court should have power
to declare the unattested will valid if "satisfied that for some good
and sufficient reason it was impracticable or impossible to obtain
witnesses to the will.' 75"
Palk observes that if the South Australian Legislature had picked
up the distinction between the standard to be applied to technical
defects in execution and the standard to be applied to unattested wills,
the section 12(2) dispensing power provision would indeed have intro-

duced a very narrow reform.7

Proponents of unattested wills would

signature would not invalidate the will. Id. at 389. With respect to defective compliance with
the presence requirement, "[a]s long as there has been no fundamental error in attestation, and
there has been a substantial attempt to comply with the formalities," the courts would usually
(though not invariably) validate the will. Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
Another Australian commentator also questioned the need for the § 12(2) dispensing power.
"lit seems to me that . . Australian courts have been extraordinarily generous to testators
who have executed their wills in the most quaint and eccentric ways." Ormiston, Formalities
and Wills: A Pleafor Caution, 54 AUST. L.J. 451, 452 (1980). Ormiston was highly critical of
§ 12(2), particularly because of his concern with evidentiary problems involved in proving the
intent of the decedent. Id. at 456. Ormiston states
[tlhere should not be any general dispensing power or rule of "substantial compliance," whether devised by the courts or enacted by legislation; but I see no
objection to a power of dispensation being enacted and given to the courts limited
to failure to comply with the rules as to the manner of attestation....
Id. at 457.
753. Palk, supra note 396, at 393 (citing South Australia Report, supra note 744, at 11)
(emphasis added). The South Australian Committee expressed concern that
[a] person dying of thirst in the desert or a person in the icefields of Australian
Antarctica may well scratch out what is without doubt his last will and testament
but there is no hope at all of his having or obtaining witnesses to that will and
yet there is no doubt that what is recorded is in fact his last will. The position
becomes of greater importance today as people cease to live in families and elderly
people in particular are left to fend for themselves in the cities. They too may
have no way of summoning somebody to attest their will.
Palk, supra note 396, at 393 (citing South Australia Report, supra note 744, at 11).
Palk questioned the realism of "a somewhat romantic view of the modern Australian as a
noble savage in constant battle with the forces of nature. . . . One might of course expect
intelligent persons to make wills before they disappear into arid deserts and frozen wastes."
Palk, supra note 396, at 393. He further remarked that 'itis difficult to conceive of older folk,
sane enough to have testamentary capacity and being seized of an acute desire to make a will,
who in these days of the welfare state are not in touch with somebody." Id. He pointed out
that the problem of the will left unattested by an isolated or dying testator could be simply
resolved by "a limited extension to the notion of privileged wills." Id.
754. Palk, supranote 396, at 395. In one case that arose under the provision, the Chairman
of the Law Reform Commission, Justice Howard Zelling, remarked: "I had no idea that what
is now s[ection] 12(2), which came from one of the ideas I incorporated in the report, would
produce the amount of case law that it has." Estate of Kelly, 34 S.A. St. R. 370, 380 (1983).
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have had to convince the court that it was impracticable or impossible
for the testator to obtain witnesses. 75 5 Moreover, although proponents
of wills as to which there were minor defects in execution would only
have to satisfy the court that the testator had intended the defective
document to be a will, Palk argues that the proponent would be able
to succeed only in instances in which there had been "a substantial
performance" of the formalities.756 The adoption of the broader standard for minor defects in execution was intended "to stop technical
arguments in these cases reaching the court, and the only cases to
reach the court are those where there has been a substantial performance of the formalities, so that a grant of probate could be possible.1757
(2) Actual scope of section 12(2)
The legislature that enacted section 12(2) did not incorporate the
Law Reform Commission's distinction between standards to be applied
to technical defects in execution and standards to be applied to unattested wills. Section 12(2) makes the validity of all wills, regardless
of the nature of the defect, turn on the ability of the proponent to
prove testamentary intent. Section 12(2) provides:
A document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of a deceased person shall, notwithstanding that it has
not been executed with the formalities required by [the Wills
Act], be deemed to be a will of the deceased person if the
Supreme Court, upon application for admission of the document to probate as the last will of the deceased, is satisfied
that there can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased
intended the document to constitute his will. 7 8
The power to apply section 12(2) to save defectively executed wills
was given to the supreme court, a court of general jurisdiction, though
for small estates the supreme court has delegated its discretion to the

755. Palk, supra note 396, at 394. "It can scarcely be imagined . . . that the [Commission]
would look with equanimity on a person who in civilisation does not try to obtain . . . witnesses .. " Id.
756. Id. "In speaking of 'technical failure to comply with the Wills Act,' the [Commission]
seems to imply something different from a total failure to comply with the Wills Act, and there
is no suggestion in the Report that they were seeking to promote any new modes of will-making."

Id.
757.
758.

Id.
Wills Act Amendment Act [No. 2] of 1975, § 9 amending Wills Act of 1936, § 12(2),
8 AUSTL. STAT. 665 [hereinafter South Australia Wills Act § 12(2)].
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registrar of probate through a published rule. 5976Most of the section
12(2) cases have been decided by a single judge.
The South Australian Supreme Court has given section 12(2) an
extremely broad construction.761 Initially, there was some question
whether section 12(2) required the proponent to show that the decedent had attempted to comply with the wills act in order for the
dispensing power to be applied. 7rc Such an "attempted compliance"
limitation would have significantly narrowed the potential scope of the
provision. 71 Early on, however, the court in Estate of Graham7 held
that section 12(2) does not require attempted compliance by the testator. 76
Since then, the South Australian Supreme Court has applied the
dispensing power to save even fundamentally defective wills if the
proponent can demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the testator
executed the flawed document with testamentary intent. Although the
standard of proof adopted by the legislature incorporates the criminal
"reasonable doubt" standard and despite language in some of the ear-

lier cases suggesting that certain omissions might be outside the reach

759. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 13. See Estate of Vauk, 41 S.A.
St. R. 242 (1986) (addressing application of dispensing power by registrar of probate in case in
which the will was unexecuted). According to Langbein, the supreme court judges usually sit
singly, Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 13, though very important cases
might be referred to a panel of three judges referred to as 'the Full Court." Id. at 13 n.48;
see Estate of Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. 423 (1984).
760. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 13.
761. Western Australia Discussion Paper, supra note 744, at 33 (South Australian provision
is very wide in scope); British Columbia Report, supranote 744, at 50 (South Australian provision
broad enough to apply even when no attempted compliance with wills act); Maxton, supra note
638, at 408 (South Australian provision is "the boldest step yet taken in any effort to make a
testator's intentions effective"); Miller, supra note 638, at 25 (South Australian approach is "the
widest in scope of all the remedial provisions in this area"). The scope of § 12(2) is discussed
in detail in the second part of this article.
762. See Palk, supra note 396, at 393.
763. See New South Wales Report, supra note 744, § 6.16, at 70 (a rule requiring "attempted
compliance" is "excessively narrow" because it would automatically exclude ignorant testators
unless they happen by chance to have complied with the formalities); Miller, supra note 638,
at 583 (characterizing "attempted compliance" as a "narrow approach"). For discussion of a
proposal for a dispensing power incorporating an attempted compliance standard, see Tasmania
Report, supra note 744; for discussion of this proposal, see infra notes 884-904 and accompanying
text.
764. 20 S.A. St. R. 198 (1978).
765. See id. at 205.
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of section 12(2),766 courts in South Australia have applied the statute
to save attested but unsigned documents, 767 signed but unattested
documents, 7- and completely unexecuted documents.7 69 A compulsively
quoted judicial gloss on section 12(2) is that "in most cases, the greater
the departure from the requirements of formal validity ... that is to
say, to the extent that those requirements have not been ...observed,
the harder will it be for the Court to reach the required state of
satisfaction [that the document was executed with testamentary intent]." ' 0 Nevertheless, in practice the courts do not seem to find such
satisfaction difficult to achieve, even when the deviation from the wills
act requirements is substantial.
It is unlikely that the South Australian dispensing power could be
extended further to permit proof of an oral will. Professor J.G. Miller
has observed that one requirement that is still indispensable in South
Australia is that the dispensing power be applied to a "document."'7

766. E.g., Estate of Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. 473, 474 (1983) (noting that dicta in other
cases suggest that § 12(2) generally would not apply to unsigned wills); Baumanis v. Praulin,
25 S.A. St. R. 423, 425 (1980) (unexecuted will of testator who died before he was able to sign
could not be validated); Estate of Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. 198, 205-06 (1978) (suggesting that
dispensing power would not normally apply to unattested will unless decedent unable to get
witness because in extremis).
767. E.g., Estate of Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. 423 (1984) (testator and husband asked
neighbors to witness their wills; at probate, testator's will found to be unsigned; court applied
§ 12(2) based on evidence of testamentary intent).
768. E.g., Estate of Hodge, 40 S.A. St. R. 398 (1986) (testator balked when told by his
daughter that a will had to be witnessed and refused to comply; will executed with testamentary
intent and admitted to probate under § 12(2)).
769. E.g., Estate of Richardson, 40 S.A. St. R. 594 (1986) (section 12(2) applied in uncontested case to unexecuted document found in abandoned car of testator who had committed
suicide).
770. Graham,20 S.A. St. R. at 205. Langbein has interpreted this judicial gloss as requiring
functional analysis of the formalities and a "purposive" approach in applying the dispensing
power. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 17. The comments to the new UPC
dispensing power provision incorporate this language. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment
(1990). For discussion of the interaction of a functional approach to the formalities and a broad
dispensing power, see Miller, pt. 2, supra note 696.
771. See South Australia Wills Act § 12(2), reprinted supra text accompanying note 758;
New South Wales Report, supra note 744, § 6.28, at 73 (stating that "document" is "threshold
requirement" under South Australian dispensing power and avoids "uncertainty and difficulties
of oral wills"); Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 52 (stating that writing is
the one indispensable requirement remaining in South Australia because § 12(2) requires a
"document"; oral wills not enforceable); Miller, supra note 638, at 572 (stating that writing
remains as "the one essential positive formal requirement that cannot be dispensed with in
South Australia").
Miller thought that the dispensing power would not be extended to an unexecuted will
because the judicial gloss limiting application of the dispensing power would make it "very

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss2/1

150

Miller: Will Formailty, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Ex
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE "HARMLESS ERROR" RULE

Arguably, however, the provision could be extended to give effect to
a videotaped document if the court were satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that it was executed with testamentary intent. The legislative
history of section 12(2) potentially favors a broad interpretation of
"document," since one of the concerns of the Law Reform Commission
was the plight of the "person dying of thirst in the desert or... in
the icefields of Australian Antarctica" who "scratch[es] out" a last will
and testament.77
Commentators (including law reform commissions in other jurisdictions) have been critical of the reasonable doubt standard imposed by
section 12(2) as inapposite to probate proceedings.7 Langbein argued
that a more suitable standard of proof would be a "clear and convincing
evidence" standard, and new UPC section 2-503 reflects his influence.77 The Manitoba Law Reform Commission likewise rejected the
reasonable doubt standard as an unnecessary limitation on the scope
of the dispensing power and as generally inconsistent with other areas
of probate law;7 s the Manitoba Commission recommended the preponderance of the evidence standard normally applied in probate matters.7 76 The New South Wales Law Reform Commission preferred a
"clear and convincing" standard.77
In practice, the high standard of proof required under section 12(2)
has not prevented even unexecuted wills from being validated under

unlikely the court would be satisfied that [a document unsigned by that person or by any
witness] was intended to be his will." Id. But see Western Australia Discussion Paper, supra
note 744, at 33 (South Australian dispensing power may be wide enough "to validate a document
in which none of the formalities [have] been complied with"). In fact, the South Australian
courts might admit unexecuted documents to probate under § 12(2). See Estate of Richardson,
40 S.A. St. R. 594 (1986); Estate of Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. 242 (1986).
772. South Australian Report, supranote 744, at 11. The primary concern of the Commission
was, of course, with the inability of such persons to get their wills attested. See id. But see
New South Wales Report, supra note 744, § 6.28, at 73 (emphasis added) ("To those who say
that [the document requirement] condemns the person dying of thirst in a desert or of cold in
the icefields of Antarctica to die intestate or without the opportunity of revoking an earlier
will, we answer that such is a reasonable price to pay to avoid the problems inherent in disputes
about oral wills.").
773. E.g., Manitoba Report, supranote 744, at 27-28, 29; New South Wales Report, supra
note 744, § 6.34, at 74; Lang, supra note 744, at 112; Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra
note 5, at 34-37; Maxton, supra note 688, at 408-09. But see Miller, supra note 638, at 587
(standard does not appear to have caused difficulties in South Australia).
774. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 53. The UPC harmless error rule
requires "clear and convincing evidence" of testamentary intent. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §

2-503 (1990), reprinted in text accompanying supra note 11.
775. Manitoba Report, supra note 744, at 27-28.
776. Id. at 28.
777. New South Wales Report, supra note 744, § 6.34, at 74.
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the dispensing power. 77 Langbein has identified "a quirk" in South
Australian probate law that may explain the liberal construction of
section 12(2) as well as the large number of cases applying the provision:779 South Australian probate law does not permit waiver of a
purported will by the interested parties. 780 Personal representatives
must present wills for probate, and since section 12(2) now permits
formally defective documents to be validated if executed with testamentary intent, these documents now must also be submitted even
if the interested parties would be willing to suppress them. 78 As a
result, most of the section 12(2) cases have been uncontested.7s2 In
Estate of Kolodnicky,7- the court complained of having to decide "this
'first time up' question of interpretation" after hearing "one counsel,
the muscular
putting one argument" and of having then to "rely on
'7
strength that I could gain from arguing with myself. 8
Langbein comments that the application of section 12(2) to uncontested wills has "impaired" the quality of the case law. 7 5 He suggests
that the South Australian courts would have been less likely to have

778. Estate of Richardson, 40 S.A. St. R. 594 (1986); Estate of Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. 242
(1986).
779. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 53.
780. See id. at 38-40. Langbein points out that most of the cases under § 12(2) have been
uncontested, due to South Australia's lack of a rule permitting "consensual suppression of a
purported will." Id. at 38. Even if the parties would prefer to settle, the personal representative
has to produce a "plausible" will at probate. Id. at 39. Since § 12(2) permits defective wills to
be enforced, the personal representative has to "bring forward" documents that in the past
could not have been enforced. Id. Langbein suggests that many of the cases that have been
litigated under § 12(2) would not arise under a similar provision in a United States court because
the law usually permits beneficiaries to waive their rights in a will so that the estate may pass
through intestacy or under a prior will. Id. (citing Annotation, Family Settlement of Testators
Estate, 29 A.L.R.3d 8, 102-10 (1970); Annotation, Family Settlement of Intestate Estates, 29
A.L.R.3d 174, 190, 228-29 (1970)). In many cases the persons entitled to contest a defective
will would be willing to "disregard" the defect. Id. Similarly, once it is settled that application
of the dispensing power "routinely leads to validation" of wills containing a particular type of
execution error, litigation would be unlikely because people usually do not bring "hopeless"
lawsuits. Id.
781. Id.
782. See Western Australia Report, supra note 744, at 56-57; Langbein, Harmless Error
Rules, supra note 5, at 38-39 for discussion and citations to cases. See, e.g., Estate of Richardson,
40 S.A. St. R. 594, 596 (1986), in which the fact that the will was uncontested seems to have
played a role in the court's decision to apply § 12(2) to the unexecuted will of a suicide.
783. 27 S.A. St. R. 374 (1981).
784. Id. at 376 (Legoe, J.). For discussion of this case, see Langbein, Harmless Error
Rules, supra note 5, at 40.
785. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 40.
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determined that unsigned, unattested, or unexecuted documents were
nevertheless executed with testamentary intent beyond a reasonable
doubt in vigorously contested cases.71 The expansive interpretation
of section 12(2) may therefore be to some extent a function of South
Australian procedure rather than inherent in the dispensing power
itself. This "quirk" in South Australian probate procedure may also
explain the "flood" of cases under section 12(2), as Langbein
suggests. 7
b. Examples of Proposed and Enacted Statutory Variants of Harmless Error
Rules Pre-Dating Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503
(1) Broad dispensing powers
Other jurisdictions have enacted or considered provisions based on
South Australia's broad dispensing power. Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory have enacted provisions closely modeled on South Australia's section 12(2). 7m Dispensing power provisions
in New South Wales and Manitoba represent variations on the broad
South Australian model. 789
(a) Manitoba
In recommending a broad harmless error rule, the Manitoba Law
Reform Commission reasoned that,
It is futile to try to foresee every type of mistake and every
type of formality that testators might employ in the making
of a will. The variety of human beings and their transactions
is too great. The provision instituted should be broad enough
to encompass all such possibilities. .... The only control
necessary on such a remedial provision is already provided
for in the wisdom of the courts. 7The Commission therefore concluded that South Australia's broad dispensing power represented the optimal approach.79' Significantly, the

786. Id.
787. See id.
788. See Northern Territory Wills Amendment Act of 1984, § 12(2) [hereinafter Northern
Territory Wills Act § 12(2)]; Western Australia Wills Amendment Act of 1987, § 34, Amending
Wills Act of 1970 [hereinafter Western Australia Wills Act § 34].
789. See The Wills Act, 1982-83 MAN. REV. STAT. 387, ch. 31, § 23, Cap. W150 (1983)
[hereinafter Manitoba Wills Act § 23]; de Groot, supra note 744, at 93-94 (discussing New South
Wales Wills Act § 18A).
790. Manitoba Report, supra note 744, at 25.
791. Id. at 27.
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Manitoba Commission understood the South Australian provision to
"empower[ ] a court to overcome any technical defect or absence of
formality in giving effect to the testator's intention. '' In contrast to
the South Australia Law Reform Commission, the Manitoba Law Reform Commission expressly recommended an extremely broad scope
for the dispensing power. "The introduction of limitations defeats the
' 93
purpose of the provision without serving any necessary function. 7
The Report specifically rejects any requirement of attempted compliance with the wills act as a prerequisite to application of the dispensing power to validate a document prepared with testamentary intent.7The Commission's recommendation varies from the South Australian model in several important respects. First, the Commission proposed eliminating the reasonable doubt standard of proof in favor of
a preponderance standard. 795 Second, and as a consequence of reducing
the standard of proof, the Commission recommended a further revision
to the South Australia model. The South Australia rule permits application of the dispensing power if the court is satisfied of testamentary
intention beyond a reasonable doubt. 796 The Manitoba Commission
thought that "satisfaction" "connotes subjective analysis by the
judiciary and ... not ... an objective examination of the sufficiency
of the evidence. The exact level of proof required to "satisfy" a judge
would be unclear and perhaps subject to variation. ' 797 The Commission
concluded that requiring the judge to be "satisfied" would create uncertainty and perhaps create difficulty in appealing decisions under
the dispensing power provision. 9 8 The Commission further recom792. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
793. Id. at 27.
794. See id. at 22 (discussing Queensland statutory "substantial compliance" standard).
795. Id. at 27. The Commission noted that the preponderance standard is normally applied
in Manitoba probate courts and that introduction of a different standard would create inconsistency. Id. Further, the Commission considered that the preponderance standard "serves its
function well," requiring proof showing that "a conclusion sought is the most probable view of
the facts. This does not entail just a mechanical weighing of probabilities. Rather it necessarily
involves a careful consideration of the possibilities in the context of the factors of the case."
Id. at 27-28. Moreover, any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will would
"cast[ ] an additional burden on the propounders of the will to remove the suspicion by affirmative
evidence." Id. at 28.
796. See supra text accompanying note 758 (setting out text of South Australia Wills Act
§ 12(2)).
797. Manitoba Report, supra note 744, at 28. See also Estate of Graham, 20 S.A. St. R.
198, 205 (1978), in which the court stated that the ability of the proponent to "satisfy" the court
of testamentary intent would be tied to the degree of deviation from the wills act requirements.
For discussion, see supra notes 766-72 and accompanying text.
798. Manitoba Report, supra note 744, at 28. The Commission proposed rewording the
provision to read that a will that does not comply with the statutory requirements may "be
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mended that the dispensing power provision be "very clearly worded"
to cover defective revocation and alteration, as well as defective execution.799
The provision as finally enacted incorporates the civil standard of
proof and expressly extends to defective revocation or alteration, but
retains the "satisfaction" language A°° Interestingly, the statute is entitled "Substantial Compliance in Execution of Wills," even though
the Law Reform Commission suggested that the term is ambiguous

and likely to be interpreted in its most literal sense, as requiring "a
substantial or large amount" of formal compliance. 01 It is worth noting,
however, that the Manitoba Commissioners were very evidently impressed by Langbein's functional analysis of the wills act; they applied

such an analysis to support the conclusion that the Manitoba formalities

deemed to be a will of the deceased person if it is proved upon application for admission of the
document to probate as the last will of the deceased, that the deceased intended the document
to constitute his will." Id. at 28-29. The Commission thought that this wording "creates a much
more objective standard." Id. at 29.
799. Id. at 29. In fact, the South Australian dispensing power rule has been applied to
save defectively altered and revoked wills. See, e.g., Estate of Bennett, 146 S.A. St. R. 350
(1986) (revocation); Estate of Lynch, 39 S.A. St. R. 131 (1985) (revival); Estate of Standley, 29
S.A. St. R. 490 (1982) (alteration). But see Estate of Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. 242 (1986) (altered
will not admitted to probate because evidence indicated it was intended to be a draft).
A fourth recommendation of the Commission was that "[a] further section should be enacted
to allow the probate court to save a gift to a beneficiary who has signed for the testator or as
a witness to a will, where the court is satisfied that no improper or undue influence was
employed." Manitoba Report, supra note 744, at 30.
800. Manitoba Wills Act, supra note 789, § 23. The statute provides as follows:
Where .
the court is satisfied that a document or any writing on a document
embodies
(a) the testamentary intentions of a deceased; or
(b) the intention of a deceased to revoke, alter, or revise a will of the deceased
or the testamentary intentions of the deceased embodied in a document other than
a will; the court may, notwithstanding that the document or writing was not
executed in compliance with all the formal requirements imposed by this Act, order
that the document or writing, as the case may be, be fully effective as though it
had been executed in compliance with all the formal requirements imposed by this
Act as the will of the deceased or as the revocation, alteration or revival of the
will of the deceased or of the testamentary intention embodied in that other document, as the case may be.
Id.
801. Manitoba Report, supra note 744, at 22. The Commission obviously understood the
distinction between the quantitative standard applied in Queensland, see infra notes 850-87 and
accompanying text for discussion, and the "functional" or "purposive" standard Langbein contemplated. Id. (stating that Langbein uses the word "in the sense of complying in substance as
opposed to form").
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"serve valid purposes in probate" and the decision that the proper
approach was not to reduce or eliminate the formalities, but to modify
02
the approach taken to them.
Although the Report reiterates the intention of the Commission
to recommend a broad approach with no limitations on the power of
the courts to validate defective wills, the intended application of the
rule is not certain. Some parts of the Report suggest that the Commissioners were assuming a functional interpretation of the formalities in
the application of the dispensing power. Although they rejected a
"substantial compliance" approach because of concern that courts
would apply it quantitatively so that "the doctrine might be inapplicable to a document which had a major defect such as a forgotten
signature,"' 03 they subsequently suggest that the likelihood is small
that invalidation of an unsigned document would defeat the decedent's
intent.- The Report strongly suggests that the Commissioners viewed
functional analysis as inherent in the application of any remedial provision. 80 5 If "functional analysis" of the formalities is an element of a
harmless error rule, the result is a narrowing of its potential scope
in instances in which "fundamental" formalities are omitted, since in
such a case the proponent will have a far greater task to prove through
introduction of extrinsic circumstances that the omission was "harmless
error."80 6 The Report does not appear to distinguish clearly between
Langbein's "purposive" substantial compliance and a dispensing power

802. See id. at 14-17.
803. Manitoba Report, supra note 744, at 22 (discussing Queensland statutory substantial
compliance).
804. See id. at 23 (discussing British Columbia report recommending "threshold requirements" for application of dispensing power). As an example of an unsigned will that should be
given effect, the Commissioners cite Langbein's interloper's bullet scenario, an extraordinarily
unlikely situation. Id.
805. See id. at 18.
806. The Report states that "the essential concept" of a harmless error rule is that
the finding of a formal or execution defect would not lead to automatic invalidation
of the will. Rather the proponents of the document would be given the opportunity
to establish that the defect is a harmless one. This would entail satisfying the court
that, despite the defect, the document represents the intent of the testator and
satisfies the purposes of "The Wills Act." For once the intent of the testator is
established, and the purposes "are proved to have been served, literal compliance
with the formalities is no longer necessary." In effect a functional analysis would
be allowed. . . . It is submitted that introduction of such a remedial provision
would alleviate the difficulties that currently exist.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
807. Id. at 22. The Commissioners did remark on the distinction between Langbein's purposive "substantial compliance" and a quantitative standard. See id.
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such as South Australia's.m The provision as finally enacted does not
specifically require the court to determine that the specific error in
execution, revocation, or alteration was harmless to the purposes of
the wills act, but the "substantial compliance" concept incorporated
in the title of the provision potentially suggests such a "purposive"
or "functional" approach.
In In re Pouliot,m the court stated that despite its title, the Manitoba provision does not contemplate application of a "substantial compliance" standard.m The court stated that "[tihe exercise of the power
in s[ection] 23 is not contingent upon substantial compliance with the
formalities of the Wills Act. The threshold requirement is the expression of a testamentary intention in some form of document. '' 810 This
reading of the statute comports with the South Australian approach
rather than either a quantitative or functional substantial compliance
standard.
The Pouliot court interpreted the Manitoba provision as giving the
court very broad discretions", and certainly such an interpretation is
consistent with the expressed intention of the Law Reform Commission
that recommended it. Its full potential scope in application is, however,
still uncertain. Pouliot does suggest that, as in South Australia, the
statutory requirement of a "document" is in effect a threshold require12
ment for the dispensing power.
(b) Western Australia and the Northern Territory
Western Australia and the Northern Territory have enacted dispensing power provisions virtually identical to South Australia's section 12(2).
The Western Australia Law Reform Commission decided to recommend the broad South Australian rule for two reasons: (1) the South

808. 30 Man. R. 178 (1984) (applying the dispensing power to save a defectively altered will).
809. Id. at 179.
810. Id.
811. Id. Maxton describes the Manitoba approach as "radical" in scope in comparison to
other enactments and recommendation. Maxton, supra note 638, at 412. In In re Briggs, 1
W.W.R. 719 (Man. 1985), the only other reported case at this time, § 23 was applied to a
holographic will that would otherwise have been invalidated because it was signed at the beginning rather than at the end. Id. at 724. Since this case involves a minor technical error that
would be remedied under virtually all harmless error rules, it does not resolve the issue of the
potential scope of the Manitoba dispensing power.
812. For discussion of South Australian requirement of a "document," see supra notes
771-72 and accompanying text. Maxton suggests that the Manitoba legislature should have taken
the further step of permitting oral wills in in extremis situations. Maxton, supranote 638, at 411.
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Australian provision "gives the court power to save wills in cases in
which ...justice requires that effect should be given to the testator's
intentions, and in which, under the present law, the court is prevented
from so doing";s13 and (2) the provision had been in effect long enough
for "[l]awyers and other persons dealing with wills [to] be able with
confidence to rely on the South Australian precedents.'s1 4 The Commission clearly recognized the extremely broad scope of the South Australian provision, "which permits probate to be granted of a will which
does not meet any of the requiredformalities, even where the testator
made no attempt to meet those formalities. . ."8,5 In an earlier
discussion paper, the Commission distinguishes between Langbein's
substantial compliance doctrine and the South Australian dispensing
power provision, stating that the dispensing power "is in fact much

wider.

816

The Commissioners recommended retention of the reasonable doubt
standard of proof.1 7 While the Commission "recognize[d] the merit of
the Manitoba Commission's argument" against applying the reasonable doubt standard in probate matters, 818 they were persuaded that
the higher standard would prevent "a flood of fraudulent or unmeritorious applications. '' 819 In addition, they thought that the reasonable doubt
standard would be likely to discourage any reduction in the standard
of care for execution of Wills and that it would "operate as a psychological barrier to courts being unduly easily persuaded."'8 20 The Commission further considered that adoption of a different standard of proof
would create uncertainty as to the relevance of the South Australian
decisions under the Western Australia rule.A2'
The Commission did recommend that the Western Australia provision follow the Manitoba provision in specifically extending the dispens-

813. Western Australia Report, supra note 744, at 45.
814. Id.
815. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
816. Western Australia Discussion Paper, supra note 744, at 15-16. The Commission contested Langbein's characterization of the dispensing power as a "substantial compliance" provision. Id. at 15 n.2 (citing Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note 497, at 1194). "With the
exception that the will must be in documentary form, it appears to enable the court to validate
a testamentary statement where the deceased observed none of the formalities." Id. at 16. The
Commissioners appear to have understood the distinction between a narrow quantitative standard
and the "purposive" or functional approach recommended by Langbein. See id. at 22.
817. Western Australia Report, supra note 744, at 51.
818. Id. at 51.
819. Id. (quoting White, J. in Estate of Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. 473, 479 (1983)).
820. Id. at 52.
821. Id.
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ing power to defective alteration, revocation, and revival. The legislature rejected this recommendation;m however, since the Western
Australia provision has been held to be in parimateriawith the South
Australian provision,8 it can be anticipated that the Western Australia
courts will follow South Australia in extending the dispensing power
to these situations.m
It is unclear how strictly the Western Australia courts will interpret the requirement of a "document" (which apparently remains a
prerequisite for application of the dispensing power in South Australia). A broad dispensing power could presumably extend to vid-

eowills and electronic wills so long as the evidence sufficiently establishes testamentary intent "beyond a reasonable doubt."
(c)

New South Wales

Like Manitoba, the Australian state of New South Wales has
enacted a broad dispensing power provision based on South Australia's,

but which attempts to improve upon the model in several respects.
The New South Wales provision: (1) extends to alterations and revocations; (2) rejects the reasonable doubt standard in favor of a preponderance standard of proof; and (3) expressly authorizes the court to

look beyond the document itself in determining testamentary intentY
822. Id. at 52-55. The Commission remarked that South Australian case law was extending
the dispensing power to cover alterations, revocations, and revivals, but nevertheless recommended that the Western Australia provision specifically address these situations. Id.
823. See Western Australia Wills Act, supra note 597 § 34, which reads:
A document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of a deceased person
is a will of that person, notwithstanding that it has not been executed in accordance
with [the wills act], if the Supreme Court in a probate action is satisfied that there
can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to constitute
his will.
Id.
824. Estate of Crossley, 1989 W.A.L.R. 227, 229. "In my opinion there is no distinction of
substance between the South Australian provision and s[ection] 34 of the Act and I will therefore
turn to decisions in the Supreme Court of that State in the course of these reasons." Id.
825. See, e.g., Estate of Bennett, 146 S.A. St. R. 350 (1986) (revocation); Estate of Lynch,
39 S.A. St. R. 131 (1985) (revival); Estate of Standley, 29 S.A. St. R. 490 (1982) (alteration).
826. For discussion of the South Australian document requirement, see supra notes 771-72
and accompanying text.
827. de Groot, supra note 744, at 93-94 (discussing New South Wales Wills Act § 18A).
See New South Wales Report, supra note 744, § 6.25, at 72. The Commission recommended
that the Wills Act be amended to
confer on the Supreme Court power to admit to probate or otherwise treat as
valid any will, alteration to a will or document expressing an intention to revoke
a will, notwithstanding that it has not been executed with the statutory formalities,
provided that the court is satisfied that the deceased intended the will, alteration
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The New South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended the
"relaxation" of certain of the basic wills formalitiesm in conjunction
designed to provide an ad hoc
with a "general dispensing power ..
examination in other areas where there has been non-compliance with
the requisite formalities so that, subject to appropriate safeguards,
only those documents which the court is satisfied represent the testator's true 'will' can be admitted to probate."-- The Commission
further proposed that the dispensing power provision expressly provide for the admission of declarations of the testators to prove testamentary intent. 0°
The New South Wales Commission rejected Langbein's substantial
compliance model in favor of the South Australian approach because
(1) the South Australian alternative functions well and has generated
a "growing body of practical and judical experience which can be
drawn upon"; and (2) the substantial compliance model may be construed literally by a court to require attempted compliance or a high
level of compliance, rather than "compliance with substance as distinct
from form" as Langbein intended.-a While the Commission appreciated
the distinction between Langbein's substantial compliance model and
a narrow quantitative standard,3 2 they were concerned that courts
applying a statutory "substantial compliance" doctrine might follow
the Queensland courts in interpreting such a provision as a narrow

or revocatory document to take effect as such. Extrinsic evidence, including statements made by the testator should be admissible as to the manner of execution
and the testator's intention.
Id.
828. See, e.g., New South Wales Report, supra note 744, §§ 4.26-.31, at 50-51 (recommending
that the requirement that the will be signed at the end be revised to require that it appear
("on the face of the will or otherwise") that the testator intended to give effect to the will by
signing or by directing someone else to sign on testator's behalf); id. § 4.43, at 54 (recommending
that the requirement that the witnesses sign in the presence of each other be eliminated); id.
§ 5.9, at 61 (recommending changes in requirements for effective revocation).
829. Id. § 6.27, at 72-73.
830. Id. § 6.35, at 74.
The principles of evidence dealing with declarations made by testators in relation
to their wills are rigid and beset by technicalities. The use of such declarations as
a means of proof is severely limited by the application of the hearsay rule. . ..
This Commission . . . recommends that extrinsic evidence including evidence
of statements made at any time by the testator as to the manner of execution of
a testamentary instrument should be admissible." Id. §§ 6.35, .37, at 74-75.
831.
832.

Id. § 6.16, at 70-71.
See id. § 6.15, at 69.
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quantitative standard. "The 'substantial compliance' doctrine, at least
in the form enacted in Queensland, provides no guidance as to the
types of non-compliance which are substantial."
The Commissioners recommended retention of the South Australian
requirement that a court be "satisfied" of the decedent's testamentary
intent as a prerequisite to application of the dispensing power, 5 but

recommended abandoning the reasonable doubt standard of proof,
which they characterized as "anomalous and contrary to the principles
applied in civil litigation, including probate litigation .... "36 They
also were concerned that for a court to apply a reasonable doubt

standard to defects in execution and a civil standard to will contest
issues would create confusion 37 They regarded it as improbable that
a court would exercise the dispensing power without carefully weighing
the evidence and therefore concluded that a preponderance standard
They considered that the
would provide "sufficient safeguards."
South Australian courts had weighed the evidence and applied the
dispensing power "cautiously and responsibly" in cases arising under

the South Australian provision.

9

The Commission expressly declined to revise the wills act formalities to permit either holographic or videotaped wills; 4 moreover,

they specifically stated that a videotape or sound tape is not a "writing"
for purposes of the wills act, though virtually any permanent form of
visual representationwould qualify as such. It seems clear that they

833. Id. For discussion of statutory substantial compliance in Queensland, see infra notes
850-87 and accompanying text.
834. New South Wales Report, supra note 744, § 6.16, at 71.
835. Id. § 6.32, at 73. "It appears to work well, there is a body of judicial exegesis and
there is merit in uniformity." Id.
836. Id. § 6.34, at 74. They conceded, however, that the South Australian experience did
not disclose any difficulty with the application of the reasonable doubt standard. Id.
837. Id.
838. Id.
839. Id. § 6.27, at 73.
840. Id. § 4.23, at 49 (holographic wills should not be introduced); id. § 4.16, at 46 (videotaped
wills should not be introduced). With respect to holographic wills, the Commission pointed out
that holographic wills have not been permitted in Australia and that relaxation of the attestation
requirement could mislead testators to think that any homemade will (included a printed form)
was valid without witnesses. Id. § 4.23, at 49. They rejected videowills as having "one of the
substantial disadvantages of oral wills in that there is likely to be less attention to accuracy of
expression and detail." Id. § 4.16, at 46. They also considered that videowills would undermine
the "channeling function" of formality (see supra notes 512-17 and accompanying text for discussion) because they would take longer for a probate court to review than a written will. Id.
They did indicate that testators could make videotapes in addition to the will to preserve
evidence of testator's physical and mental condition. Id.
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intended the dispensing power they were recommending to be broad
enough to extend to unwitnessed holographic wills, since they reject
any threshold requirement (including signature)81 other than the requirement of a "document. '' 42 It is not clear whether they intended
the dispensing power to extend to "videowills" or other electronic
wills. The issue is whether the Law Reform Commission intended the
word "document" (recommended as a "threshold requirement" for application of the dispensing power) 843 to be a broader term than "writing." If so, it would be possible for a taped will to be admitted to
probate as a "document" executed with testamentary intent, despite
the testator's failure to comply with the writing requirement. Such
an interpretation would be consistent with what is otherwise a very
broad conception of the dispensing power.
The New South Wales Commission recommended that signature
not be made a threshold requirement for application of the dispensing
power.8 They thought that the dispensing power could appropriately
be applied not only in the narrow circumstances Langbein originally
thought would be appropriate for application of the substantial compliance doctrine, but also in cases in which a testator "simply overlooked signing a document he or she proceeded to have witnessed, " 5
or in which "mirror wills were accidentally swapped and signed by
the wrong testator. ' ' 16 It is not clear whether the Commission would
have approved South A.ustralia's extension of the dispensing power
to wills that are completely unexecuted,8 7 although the language of
the recommendation (conferring power on the Supreme Court to apply
the dispensing power to a document "notwithstanding that it has not
been executed with the statutory formalities")' s suggests that they
were recommending a provision broad enough to apply to unexecuted

841.

Id. § 6.29, at 73.

842. Id. § 6.28, at 73.
843. Id.
844. Id. § 6.29, at 73.
845. Id. See Estate of Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. 423 (1984) (testator invited neighbors to
witness her will before going on a trip but neglected to sign it herself; court held that there
was sufficient evidence of testamentary intent for will to be admitted to probate).
846. New South Wales Report, supra note 744, § 6.29, at 73. See Estate of Blakely, 32
S.A. St. R. 473 (1983) (testator mistakenly signed spouse's will and she signed his; dispensing
power applied to save technically "unsigned" will).
847. See Estate of Richardson, 40 S.A. St. R. 594 (1986); Estate of Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R.
242 (1986) (both cases holding that the dispensing power may be applied to save an unexecuted
will if the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the decedent's testamentary intentions).
848. New South Wales Report, supra note 744, § 6.25, at 72.
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documents. The New South Wales Law Reform Commission further
recommended that the South Australian model be modified to specifically extend to alterations and revocations.8 9
(2) Statutory substantial compliance
The legislature of Queensland, Australia enacted a statutory harmless error rule recommended by its Law Reform Commission as a
codification of Langbein's substantial compliance standard.m The
Queensland provision permits the court to admit to probate "a testamentary instrument executed in substantial compliance with the
formalities prescribed by [the wills act] if the Court is satisfied that
the instrument expresses the testamentary intention of the testator. "85
The ambiguity of the term "substantial compliance" seems to have
produced results directly contrary to what Langbein had in mind in
proposing a functional or purposive concept of compliance with the
wills acts..

2

The Queensland courts have interpreted the statute as a

narrow quantitative substantial compliance standard so strictly limited
in scope that even wills containing minor deviations from the presence
requirements have been held beyond the reach of the dispensing
power.
Langbein, whose 1975 article provided the impetus for the Queensland enactment, has been extremely critical of its application by the
courts, characterizing the measure as "a flop. '" The legislative history
849. Id. The South Australian case law has accomplished this result under § 12(2). See,
e.g., Estate of Bennett, 146 S.A. St. R. 350 (1986) (revocation); Estate of Lynch, 39 S.A. St.
R. 131 (1985) (revival); Estate of Standley, 29 S.A. St. R. 490 (1982) (alteration). But see Estate
of Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. 242 (1986) (will with alterations not admitted to probate because evidence
indicated it was intended to be a draft).
850. Wills Amendment Act 1987 § 9, amending Wills Act 1970 [hereinafter Queensland
Wills Act § 9].
851. Id.
852. Miller, supra note 638, at 583 (stating that the term "substantial compliance" can refer
to compliance with substance rather than form of wills act or it can mean substantial in amount);
New South Wales Report, supranote 744, § 6.16, at 70-71 (stating that "substantial compliance"
is an ambiguous term and Queensland provision provides no guidance as to types of non-compliance that are substantial). Both Maxton and the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia
seem to have understood Langbein's proposed doctrine as a narrow quantitative standard.
Maxton, supra note 638, at 404 (stating that Queensland provision "adopts Langbein's narrow
approach to the doctrine of substantial compliance, and, in fact, was specifically seen and approved of by Langbein"); British Columbia Report, supra note 744, at 41-42 (stating that Langbein proposed substantial compliance doctrine to remedy "technical defects" in execution; substantial compliance doctrine presumes attempted execution that fails due to technical defect and
would usually save only wills "closely resembl[ing] a standard form will").
853. See, e.g., In re Johnston, [1985] 1 Q.R. 516; In re Grosert, [1985] 1 Q.R. 513.
854. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 1.
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of the provision, however, indicates that the Queensland courts' application of the statute's substantial compliance doctrine is consistent
with both the recommendations of the Law Reform Commission and
with the plain meaning of the provision as drafted by the legislature.
The Queensland Law Reform Commission, with whom the provision
originated, misconceived Langbein's substantial compliance doctrine,
and the standard they intended to recommend was not Langbein's
flexible concept of substantial (in the sense of substantive)- functional
compliance. After recommending that a "relaxed" standard of substantial compliance be enacted, the Commission stated that
[i]t will be for the court to work out what it understands by
substantial compliance, but it is envisaged that the courts
will be cautious in their approach to the latitude given, and
that only in cases of accident and minor departures will it
be possible to give effect to the obvious intention of the testator, as in cases where the court has hitherto wished to
admit an instrument to probate but has felt unable to do so
because of the shackles of its policy of meticulous com6
pliance.8
The provision as finally enacted perpetuates the Commission's misconception of substantial compliance.8 7 In contrast to a functional substantial compliance standard, the Queensland statute appears on its
face to require the court to make two determinations in order to
validate a defective will: (1) that the execution of the document complied with substantially all of the formal requirements; and (2) that
the document was executed with testamentary intent. s
The Queensland courts have narrowed the statute further by their
failure to incorporate a flexible functional approach in the determination of harmless error in deciding under what circumstances the dispensing power may be applied to a defective will. A fundamental
aspect of Langbein's approach is analysis and "ranking" of the for-

855. See Miller, supra note 638, at 566-67, 583.
856. Queensland Report, supra note 744, at 7 (emphasis added).
857. The Commissioners noted in their report that Langbein had "seen and approves of'
their recommendation. Id.
858. See de Groot, supra note 744, at 96 (stating that Queensland requires more than the
court be satisfied the document was executed with testamentary intent; court must also be
satisfied that the testator substantially complied with will-making formalities); Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 44 (stating that substantial compliance in Queensland is a
separate requirement that must be established independently of testamentary intent and is a
quantitative standard applicable only to minimal defects).
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malities in terms of their importance to the wills act purposes;8 9
whether defective execution can be cured through proof of testamentary intent depends on the nature of the defect and whether the error
or omission prevents the document from fulfilling the purposes of the
wills act. ° Langbein and virtually all of the commentators who have
applied functional analysis to the wills act have concluded that the
least "fundamental" formalities are those (such as the presence and
publication requirements associated with attestation) that serve
primarily a "protective" function. 1 In his 1975 article, Langbein wrote
that "[a] principal achievement of the substantial compliance doctrine
should be to relieve against the invalidation of wills in Whose execution
some of the minor formalities surrounding the attestation ceremony
have been omitted or deficiently performed."' He considers it "reprehensible" that a defect in strictly complying with these formalities
automatically invalidates the will in instances in which the proponents
could show that the document was executed with testamentary intent,
that is, the error did not in fact result in fraud.se
The Queensland courts have not incorporated functional analysis
into their interpretation of the Queensland statute. In In re Johnston,84
for example, the court concluded that defective compliance with the
presence and publication requirements put the will beyond the readh
of the substantial compliance statute, even if the court had been convinced that the document was executed with testamentary intent.M
The Johnston court asserted that the failure of the testator to comply
with the publication and presence requirements revealed "substantial

859. See Langbein, HarmlessErrorRules, supranote 5, at 52 (stating that South Australian
case law has produced implicit "ranling"of formalities in terms of their importance to the wills
act purposes); Langbein, SubstantialCompliance, supra note 32, at 515-26 (analyzing the wills

formalities and evaluating the relative importance of each to the four wills act purposes).
860. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 515-26 (stating that substantial compliance would admit noncomplying document to probate if court determined it was meant

as a will and its form satisfied the purposes of the wills act, but omission of fundamental formalities will usually make it difficult or impossible for proponents to carry burden of proof of
showing that document was intended to be a will). For discussion of the substantial compliance
doctrine, see supra notes 696-43 and accompanying text and Miller, pt. 2, supra note 696.
861. See Langbein, HarmlessErrorRules, supra note 5, at 17 (stating that presence defects
are almost always innocuous because they are peripheral to the main policies of the wills act);
Langbein, SubstantialCompliance,supra note 32, at 516-17, 521-22 (stating that the "protective
function" is poorly served by formalities; though attestation may be "fundamental," the minor
ceremonies associated with it are not).
862. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 521.
863. Id. at 516.
864.
865.

1 Q.R. 516 (1985).
Id. at 519.
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departures from even the basic formal requirements."s- The court
said that "[t]he two criteria necessary to permit the court to [grant
probate] are substantial compliance with the prescribed formalities,
and satisfaction that the document expresses the testamentary intention of the testator."s 7 The court distinguished the scope of the Queensland substantial compliance statute from the South Australian dispensing power, stating that "[t]he South Australian section, although more
stringent in the requirement of proof of the testamentary intention,
does not require substantial compliance with the formalities. Consequently, the South Australian courts have concentrated attention
upon proof of testamentary intention on the part of the testator. "
The court said that if the Queensland statute had been in pari materia
with the South Australian statute, "I should willingly come to the
same result as that reached [in the South Australian presence cases].
However, I am afraid that the Queensland legislation requires a
slightly different approach. '" 9
The Queensland court cited Langbein in support of its analysis in
Johnston, specifically "Langbein's comment that 'the substantial compliance doctrine is a rule neither of maximum nor minimum formalities,
and it is surely not a rule of no formalities.' Clearly a question of
degree is involved. '' 870 But the court also said that "[t]here must of
course be a limit on what can amount to substantial compliance,"'
an essentially quantitative qualification of the concept. The court

866. Id. (emphasis added). In Johnston, the process of getting the will witnessed seems to
have involved a time lag of several days. When the second witness signed, the decedent's
signature was already on the will. Id. at 516-17. The court said:
It is difficult to hold that this will was executed in substantial compliance
with the formalities prescribed. The testatrix did not sign in the presence of either
the attesting witnesses, and the respective attesting witnesses were never together
at the same time. Instead of the single occasion envisaged by [the Wills Act], there
were three separate occasions when the execution and attestation procedures took
place. . . . Neither attesting witness saw the form of the document. In each case
a folded piece of paper was produced and the "witness" did not see any of the
contents. In particular they did not see whether it had been filled out and they
could not say whether it is now in the same condition as when they signed. In
Mrs. Marshall's case the testatrix said that it was a will, but in Mrs. Porter's case
she simply described it as a "document" and asked her to witness it. In neither
case did the witness know . . . that it was a will.
Id. For discussion of the Johnston case, see Miller, supra note 462, at 567.
867. Johnston, 1 Q.R. at 517-18.
868. Id. at 519.
869. Id.
870. Id. at 518 (quoting Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 513).
871. Id.
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thought that the reenactment of the wills act formalities indicated that
the legislature did not intend the substantial compliance statute to be
construed in a way that would significantly undermine the reenacted
wills act.872

The courts deciding In re Grosert7 and In re Henderson,s74 reach
similar results applying similar reasoning. In Grosert, the court,
though convinced that "there can be no doubt that the instrument
expresses the testamentary intention of the testator, ' 75 concluded
that defective compliance with the presence requirements violated
"what I would regard as a most important provision [of the wills act]
....,1876 The court held that if there has not been substantial compliance
with the formalities, testamentary intention is irrelevant.m In In re
Henderson, the court was satisfied that a document executed under
a misconception that the attestation of one witness was sufficient providing that the witness was a justice of the peace and the document
was executed with testamentary intent. However, the court held that
the error was beyond the reach of the substantial compliance statute
on the grounds that the statute requires "cumulative substantial compliance."87s
Langbein bitterly remarked in his 1987 article that after Grosert,
"[i]t is now hard to imagine in what circumstances the Queensland
courts might find an execution defect insubstantial, since they have
... declared the most innocuous of the recurrent execution blunders,
presence defects, as 'most important."''' 9 In the 1988 case In re Mat-

872. Id.
873. 1 Q.R. 513 (1985).
874. No. 860 of 1985 (Queensl. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 1985) (Macrossan, J.), affd full court
(May 13, 1986), appeal denied [1986], 17 Leg. Rep. S.L. 4.
875. 1 Q.R. at 515.
876. Id. at 514-15.
877. Id. at 515.
878. Henderson, No. 860 of 1985, slip op. at 5. For discussion of this case, see Langbein,
Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 44-45. Langbein points out that South Australia has
applied the dispensing power to save a partially attested will executed under identical circumstances. Id. at 22, 44-45 (citing Estate of Phillips, No. 263 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13,

1984) (White, J.)).
879. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 45. There have been unreported
cases applying the Queensland statute to save defective wills. Langbein discusses In re McIlroy
in his 1987 article. Id. at 42-43 (citing In re McIlroy, No. 375 of 1984 (Queensl. Sup. Ct. Nov.
2, 1984) (McPherson, J.)). In that case, the Queensland statute was applied to excuse a presence
defect. The case was decided without an opinion, however, and as Langbein remarks, "was
wholly overlooked in the ...

subsequent cases ...

that appear to have buried the reform."

Id. at 42.
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a Queensland court distinguished Johnston and Grosert in

holding that a partially attested will had been executed in substantial
compliance with the wills act and had been executed with testamentary
intent.81 The court gave special consideration to the fact that at the
time of execution only one witness was reasonably available,

remark-

ing that, "This is only to say again that each case will depend on its
own facts and that

. .

substantial compliance will remain a matter

of degree."
The reasoning in Matthews is consistent with Langbein's functional
approach. The court, in effect, excused the testator's failure to have
the will attested by two witnesses in light of circumstances clearly
demonstrating testamentary intent and the court deemed the will to
be in substantial compliance with the wills act. A more recent case,
however, distinguishes Matthews, relying on the rule in the earlier
cases in holding that a codicil was not executed in substantial compliance with the Queensland Wills Act. The court said that a party
relying on substantial compliance to excuse a defect in attestation
bears the onus of establishing "with some degree of precision what
happened and when [with respect to the attestation of the document]."8

Langbein concluded in his 1987 article that the Queensland experience would be likely to deter other jurisdictions from adopting harmless error legislation based on a substantial compliance standard.He stated that,
The capsule lesson that will be taken from Queensland is
that statutory substantial compliance was tried and found

In In re Gaffney, discussed in de Groot, supra note 744, at 95, the court excused the failure
of the testator to sign the will at the end, noting "a court may admit to probate a testamentary
instrument executed in substantial compliance with the prescribed formalities if the court is
satisfied that the instrument expresses the testamentary intention of the testator. I am so
satisfied." Id. (citation omitted).
880. 1 Q.R. 300 (1989).
881. See id. at 301-03.
882. Id. at 303. The court said that it would be "unduly harsh . . .to deny efficacy to a
testator's expressed testamentary intention merely because he had only one witness available
and not two. One can readily perceive of circumstances in which ... only one witness is available
at a time when it is of central importance to a testator to express his testamentary wishes." Id.
883. Id.
884. In re Eagles, 2 Q.R. 501 (1990). In Eagles, the two attesting witnesses to a codicil
were not present at the same time. One signed with the testator, but there was uncertainty
about the time lapse before the other signed the codicil. Id.
885. Id. at 506.
886. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 45.
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wanting....
will continue
jurisdictions
place, future
power.m

Although the substantial compliance doctrine
to be the only means of remedy available in
where legislative reform has not yet taken
legislation will take the guise of the dispensing
(3) Attempted compliance

The Law Reform Commission of the Australian State of Tasmania
recommended an interesting variant of the substantial compliance
rule.m The Tasmanian Commission proposed that the courts of that
jurisdiction be granted a general power to declare a defectively executed will valid "only where the deceased has at least attempted to
comply with [the wills act] requirements" and "the defect is so inconsequential and harmless to the purpose of the formalities that the
court is satisfied that it can give effect to the intentions of the testator
without defeating the purpose of [the wills act]." 81 The power could
be applied to wills defectively executed "by mistake, accident, or other
reasonable cause."'' The Commission characterized its proposal as "a
doctrine of substantial compliance."a91 The Tasmanian "attempted compliance" variant was conceived as "a relaxation of the technical requirements" intended to make it easier for people without "the time, or
opportunity, or inclination" to prepare a formal will. 8a
The intended scope of the Tasmanian recommendation is uncertain.
"Attempted" compliance, like "substantial" compliance, is an ambiguous concept. Miller has pointed out two possible interpretations of the
Tasmanian standard. One possibility is that the proponent of a defectively executed will seeking to establish "attempted compliance" would
be required to show that the testator understood the formalities but
failed through mistake or inadvertence to comply. 3 Such an interpre887. Id. (citation omitted). For a recent article recommending reconsideration of the Queensland approach so that "elements of [Langbein's] concept [of substantial compliance] may yet be
incorporated into our approach... in terms of the development suggested in In re Matthews,"
see de Groot, supra note 744, at 99.
888. Tasmania Report, supra note 744, at 10.
889. Id. (emphasis added).
890. Id.
891. Id.
892. Id. at 9. The Commission declined to recommend any change in that jurisdiction's
requirements for due execution. Id. 'The formalities serve several functions: they help to identify
the testator, reduce the possibility of coercion, and prevent forgery. They also introduce an
element of ceremony into the disposal of assets and choice of representatives which is appropriate
for such an important occasion; and help to guard against the making of hasty or ill-considered
decisions. .. ." Id. at 10.
893. Miller, supra note 638, at.584.
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tation is consistent with the Commission's reference to "mistake" and
"accident" as circumstances in which the rule could appropriately be
applied.-I It is unclear whether the rule would extend to the case of
the testator who did not understand the formalities but who attempted
to execute a will based on his or her notions of the requirements .
The Commission recommended that the rule apply to the defective
execution; however, one must query whether ignorance of the requirements of the law would constitute "reasonable cause." (Arguably, the
Commission considered "reasonable cause" to cover a very broad range
of circumstances, including the defectively executed wills of persons
who "did not have the time, or opportunity, or inclinationto prepare
a formal will. ..."89)
As the Commission recognized, an "attempted compliance" standard could be construed as broadly as the South Australian dispensing
power, assuming that it is construed to require only that the testator
attempted to execute a will rather than that the testator attempted
to comply with the wills act formalities. If all that is required under
such a standard is for the proponent of a defective will to establish
that the testator attempted to execute a will, "attempted compliance"
could be applied to cases such as Hodge8 9 in which the testator deliberately failed to comply with the South Australian wills act requirements. 91 However, the Tasmanian Commission specifically rejected a
standard that would permit a defective will to be validated "if it
represented a genuine attempt to express the testator's wishes . . .
irrespective of whether the deceased had attempted to comply with
''
the formalities. "
The Commission considered that such an approach had produced
"uncertain litigation" in South Australia.9 The Commission preferred
a rule that "preserves the spirit of the formalities, if not the letter"9 1
by requiring the proponent of a defectively executed will to establish
that the defect is "inconsequential and harmless to the purpose of the
formalities. '" Here also the recommendation is ambiguous. It is unclear whether the Commission meant that the proponent ought to

894.
895.
896.
897.
898.
899.

See Tasmania Report, supra note 744, at 10.
See Miller, supra note 638, at 584.
Tasmania Report, supra note 744, at 9 (emphasis added).
40 S.A. St. R. 398 (1986).
Id. at 399.
Tasmania Report, supra note 744, at 10.

900. Id.
901.
902.

Id.
Id.
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have to show that the defect is harmless to the purposes of the wills
act and therefore by definition, inconsequential (an interpretation that
would be completely consistent with Langbein's substantial compliance
doctrine), or whether the Commission meant that the proponent ought
to have to show both that the defect is "inconsequential" in the sense
of trivial or technical and that it is harmless to the wills act purposes
(an interpretation that would seemingly produce results similar to
Queensland's restrictive quantitative substantial compliance standard).
The Tasmanian Law Reform Commission concluded that the formalities themselves should not be minimized or otherwise altered.m
They specifically decline to recommend extending the writing requirement to include recordings on the ground that "the potential for fraud
outweighs any benefits that such a proposal might have."
(4) Threshold requirements
The British Columbia Law Reform Commission, after careful review of the various forms of harmless error rules and their underlying
policies, proposed a modified form of dispensing power statute applicable only to defects in attestation.'0, The proposed statute would
explicitly require a document signed by the testator as a threshold
requirement for application of the provision,9 but application would
not depend on whether the decedent had attempted to comply with
the wills act.
In defining 'threshold requirements," the Commission expressly
declined to recommend expanding the definition of "writing" to include
videotapes, tape recordings, floppy disks, and other devices that do
not reproduce words in a "visible form" that can be executed.90 While

903. Id.
904. Id.
905. British Columbia Report, supra note 744, at 42-50. The Commission recommended the
following provision:
Notwithstanding Section 4, a document is valid as a will if
(a) it is in writing,
(b) it is signed by the testator,
(c) the testator dies after this section comes into force, and the court is satisfied
that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the will and intended it to
have testamentary effect.
Id. at 54.
906. Id. at 51-53.
907. Id. at 50.
908. Id. at 51-52.
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they conceded that enlarging the definition of writing may be necessary
in the future, they concluded that at present such a step is premature9
because the technology is still in a state of development and "we are
not prepared to attempt to identify any new and acceptable medium
'
for recording testamentary intentions."910
In requiring signature as a threshold requirement for application
of the dispensing power, the Commission rejected the view "that the
possibility of an interloper's bullet, or other similar and equally unlikely
possibilities warrant the deletion of the requirement of a signature.911
They considered that to permit unsigned documents to be considered
would lead to litigation over every draft or memorandum.9 2 They
pointed out that signature serves the evidentiary and channeling functions and that "the harm which would ensue from relaxing this particular requirement outweighs any benefit which would accrue from its
abolition. ' ' 913 The effect of this approach is to permit unattested, partially attested, or defectively attested wills to be cured by application
of the dispensing power if testamentary intent is established. 91 4
The British Columbia Law Reform Commission rejected the South
Australian reasonable doubt standard of proof in favor of "the civil
litigation standard of proof on the balance of probabilities" usually
applied in probate matters. 915 The Law Reform Commission suggested
that substance as well as form might be considered in determining
testamentary intent - the court's suspicion may be aroused if a will
involves "unusual types of dispositions, or legatees whose inclusion as
objects of the testator's bounty is unexpected. ' ' 9 16 Ultimately, "[t]he
less the document resembles a standard will, the stricter the proof
that will be required."' 917
Langbein dismissed the British Columbia proposal as "a timid recommendation."918 Maxton also suggested that the measure does not

909. Id. at 52.
910. Id.
911. Id.
912. Id. at 52-53.
913. Id. at 53.
914. See Miller, supra note 638, at 585.
915. British Columbia Report, supra note 744, at 53. "A consideration . . . was the fact
that the civil litigation standard is not in itself immutable. In a lawsuit 'proof is inextricably
intertwined with 'belief,' and the readiness of a court to be persuaded of the existence of a
certain state of affairs will depend upon factors other than the mere mechanical weighing up
" Id.
of evidence ....
916. Id. at 54.
917. Id.
918. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 47.
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go far enough.9 19 Miller, on the other hand, analogized the effect of
the proposal to the minimizing of formalities under the UPC,9 stating
that
[s]uch an approach reaffirms the importance and value of
the standard formalities, but provides an escape route from
the limitations of literal compliance in certain circumstances.
There can, of course, be no relaxation in the threshold requirements laid down, so they remain a limiting factor with
a potential for frustrating the testator's intention.m
It is questionable whether the British Columbia approach would
in fact apply more narrowly than substantial compliance as originally
conceived by Langbein. In his 1975 article, Langbein conjectures that
substantial compliance would rarely validate unsigned wills except in
extraordinary circumstances, because omission of the signature so
gravely undermines the purposes of the wills act that the proponent
rarely would be able to carry the burden of proof.9 He also suggests
that the doctrine rarely would save unattested wills (unless the jurisdiction permitted unwitnessed holographic wills) because attestation
is "nearly as fundamental in the statutory schemes as signature and
writing."= He wites that in states that do not permit unwitnessed
forecloses the substantial comholographic wills, "the legislature ..
pliance doctrine in cases of total failure of attestation. "9 A threshold
requirements provision may actually have broader application to attestation defects than substantial compliance since it would presumably
permit unattested wills to be given effect in appropriate circumstances.
However, it would not save a mistakenly signed will in a "switched
wills" situation or in a case in which the testator died at the moment
of signing, even if there was no doubt of the decedent's intentions.
3.

Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503

The harmless error provision adopted by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws is modeled on South Australia's broad dispensing

919.
920.

Maxton, supra note 638, at 410-11.
Miller, supra note 638, at 585.

921. Id.
922.
923.

Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 518.
Id. at 521.

924. Id.
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power statute, as modified by the Manitoba version.9 The drafting
committee states in the comment to section 2-503 that the purpose of
the provision is to allow the probate court "to excuse a harmless error
in complying with the formal requirements for executing or revoking
a will. "-6

The UPC provision permits a probate court to treat as a will "a
document or writing added upon a document" that has not been executed in compliance with the section 2-502 requirements for an attested
or holographic will "as if it had been executed in compliance with that
section." This is applicable if the proponent produces "clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing
to constitute" a will, a revocation or alteration of an existing will, or
a partial or complete revival of a revoked will.9 7 The comment to
section 2-503 reflects the drafters' intention that the application of the
provision to defectively executed wills be limited to wills containing
attestation defects and certain defects in the signature of the testator.9
The Commissioners therefore seem to envision a narrower interpretation of the dispensing power than that of the South Australian courts.

925. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990). The drafting committee states that the
measure is intended to accord with legislation in force in Manitoba and several jurisdictions in
Australia. Id. For relevant portions of the text of the provision, see supra text accompanying
note 11.

926.

UNIF. PROB. CODE

§ 2-503 comment (1990).

927. Id. § 2-503.
928. Id. § 2-503 comment. The measure also applies to defective, revoked or altered wills.
Id. The drafters considered that
[e]vidence from South Australia suggests that the dispensing power will be applied
mainly in two sorts of cases. When the testator misunderstands the attestation
requirements of Section 2-502(a) and neglects to obtain one or both witnesses, new
Section 2-503 permits the proponents of the will to prove that the defective execution did not result from irresolution or from circumstances suggesting duress or
trickery - in other words, that the defect was harmless to the purpose of the
formality. By excusing attestation errors, the measure reduces the tension that
formerly existed between the attestation-free world of Section 2-502(b)-type holographic wills and the two-witness requirement for attested wills under Section
2-502(a). Ordinarily, the testator who attempts to make an attested will but blunders
will still have achieved a level of formality that compares favorably with that
permitted for holographic wills under the Code.
The other recurrent class of case in which the dispensing power has been
invoked in South Australia entails alterations to a previously executed will. ...
Lay persons do not always understand that the execution and revocation requirements of Section 2-502 call for fresh execution in order to modify a will; rather,
lay persons often think that the original execution has continuing effect.
Id. (citing Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 5, at 15-33).
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In South Australia, courts have applied section 12(2) to save wills that
were not only unattested but also unsigned;9 however, the comment
to section 2-503 implies that the provision would seldom, if ever, save
unexecuted or oral wills.9 0 This view of the scope of a broad dispensing
not take into
power is consistent with Langbein's view, which does
9
31
Australia.
South
in
cases
will
account the unexecuted
In Estate of Richardson,93 2 section 12(2) was applied to an unsigned,
unattested will;m and in Estate of Vauk,9 a subsequent case, the
court concluded that the registrar of probate could admit an unexe-

cuted will if convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the testator
intended the document to constitute a will.9 Both opinions appear to

929.

See, e.g., Estate of Richardson, 40 S.A. St. R. 594 (1986); Estate of Vauk, 41 S.A.

St. R. 242 (1986).
930. The comment incorporates the judicial gloss which was imposed on South Australia's
section 12(2) and which was cited by Langbein as an important limitation on the probate court's
ability to enforce unexecuted or unwritten wills. See supranotes 775-76. The comment states:
The larger the departure from Section 2-502 formality, the harder it will be to
satisfy the court that the instrument reflects the testator's intent. Whereas the
South Australian and Israeli courts lightly excuse breaches of the attestation requirements, they have never excused noncompliance with the requirement that a
will be in writing, and they have been extremely reluctant to excuse noncompliance
with the signature requirement .... The main circumstance in which the South
Australian courts have excused signature errors has been in the recurrent class
of cases in which two wills are prepared for simultaneous execution by two testators,
typically husband and wife, and each mistakenly signs the will prepared for the
other.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990) (citations omitted). The Commissioners appear to
be unaware of, or to have disregarded, the other South Australian cases in which a probate
court has (1) admitted evidence of the testator's intent despite the testator's failure to sign the
will at all; and (2) held that the proponent succeeded in proving "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that the testator intended the unsigned document to constitute a will.
The apparent suggestion of the Commissioners that section 2-503 could not be applied to
save an unwritten will is reinforced by the Comment to section 2-502, which states that "[any
reasonably permanent record is sufficient [to satisfy the requirement for a 'writing']; but a
tape-recorded or video-taped will is not 'in writing."' UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment
(Discussion Draft, 1988) (citing Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983)). Langbein suggests
in his 1975 article that a recorded will is less effective in satisfying the "ritual function," but
does indicate that substantial compliance might be applied to validate a tape recorded will in a
holographic jurisdiction under certain narrow circumstances, and the UPC does recognize holographic wills. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 519.
931. For Langbein's analysis of cases decided under the South Australian dispensing power,
see Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 33-41.
932. 40 S.A. St. R. 594 (1986).
933. Id. at 595-96.
934. 41 S.A. St. R. 242 (1986).
935. Id. The court's discussion of the facts strongly implies that the registrar of probate
should be convinced by the facts to admit the will to probate. See id.
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take for granted the applicability of the dispensing power to unexecuted wills. The Richardson court reaches this conclusion with virtually no analysis; the court in Vauk, however, reviewed both the law
and the facts in some detail in an opinion addressed to the registrar
of probate. 93 6 Although the comment to the 1988 draft does not specifically state that section 2-503 could never save an unsigned will, the
9 3
7
committee quotes the judicial gloss derived from Estate of Graham,
which Langbein and the Graham court assert would ordinarily prevent
application of the dispensing power to unexecuted wills. 93
The comment to section 2-503 suggests that its application could
potentially be limited to cases in which (1) the testator has either
attempted to comply with the wills act but "blundered" in carrying
out the requirements; or (2) the testator "misunderstands" the requirements.939 The South Australian courts clearly have not limited applicability of the dispensing power to such cases. In Estate of Hodge, 4
for example, section 12(2) was applied to a will that the testator
deliberately left unexecuted after having been advised that the will
required witnesses to be valid. In Estate of Kelly,-' the court enforced
an unattested will that had been prepared by a testator who had
studied law. In neither of these instances, was a blunder or a misunderstanding of the formalities involved. The UPC comment seems to
reflect Langbein's interpretation of the South Australian cases,
whereas the later cases appear to focus solely on intent.
The comment to section 2-503 focuses on instances in which the
testator "misunderstands" the requirements for due execution or effective amendment or else attempts to comply (as in the "switched wills"
cases in which the testator mistakenly signs a spouse's will), but bungles the execution.942 This language seems to incorporate a notion of
"attempted compliance" as a major factor in determining applicability

936. The Vauk court stressed the fact that the testator prepared the documents shortly
before committing suicide under circumstances showing the intention to prepare a will. Id. at
247-48.
937. 20 S.A. St. R. at 205. For discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying note 770.
938. See supra note 770 and accompanying text.
939. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990) (dispensing power most likely to apply
in two sorts of cases: (1) cases in which the testator misunderstands the attestation requirements;
and (2) testator misunderstands the requirements for altering a will).
940. 40 S.A. St. R. 398 (1986).
941. 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (19&3).
942. Id.
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of the dispensing power.4 3 In addition, the Commissioners indicate
that application of section 12(2) to a defectively executed will may
require the proponents to prove that "the defect was harmless to the
purpose of the formality."
Both "attempted compliance" and the
emphasis on harmlessness to the purposes of the formality are more

characteristic of Langbein's analysis than of the South Australian
courts' analysis.9- The comments to section 2-503 thus seem to reflect
Langbein's view of the appropriate scope of the dispensing power

rather than the actual scope of the power as applied in South Aus6
tralia.
It is not clear whether section 2-503 could be applied in any case
to videotaped or recorded willsY' 7 The revised requirements for an

attested or holographic will have not been expanded to permit videotaped wills. In addition, the comment to the 1988 draft of the pro-

vision indicates that such documents do not meet the requirement that
a will be "in writing."8 The final (1990) version of the comment is

equivocal on this point. In contrast to the 1988 draft, the 1990 comment
merely states that there is a case holding that a videotaped will is
not "in writing."'

9

Whether section 2-503 could validate such a will if

943. Id. For discussion of a recommended harmless error rule specifically requiring
"attempted compliance," see Tasmania Report, supra note 744, discussed supra notes 888-904
and accompanying text.
944. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990). Harmlessness to the wills act purposes
means that 'the defective execution did not result from irresolution or from circumstances
suggesting duress or trickery." Id.
945. Compare Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 32, at 515-22 (stating that
in applying substantial compliance doctrine, court considers whether despite the defect in execution, the court must determine whether the will "satisfied the purposes of the wills act" by
considering the importance of the purposes served by the formality) with Estate of Williams,
36 S.A. St. R. 423, 425 (1985) (King., C.J.) (holding that there is no reason to suppose that
the legislature intended to limit circumstances in which section 12(2) would operate or that the
formality of signature is less dispensable than the other formalities). Compare Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 26-27 (discussing the Williams case and concluding that the
opinion of Judge Legoe properly emphasized the testator's attempt at compliance as a factor of
"fundamental importance," because attempted compliance indicates that inadvertence rather
than irresolution produced the defect) with Estate of Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. 198 (1978) (holding
that attempted compliance was not required for application of section 12(2); and applying provision
to save a will in which testator "made no 'attempt" to satisfy the presence requirements).
946. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 5, at 15-41 (analyzing South Australian cases and concluding with suggestions for "reforming the reform"); supra notes 758-87 and
accompanying text (discussing scope of South Australian dispensing power provisions).
947. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
948. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) comment (Discussion Draft 1988).
949. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) comment (1990) (citing Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d
829 (Wyo. 1983)).
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the court was convinced that the document was prepared with testamentary intent is not completely clear. However, the comment to
the 1990 version of section 2-502(a) states that a will not meeting the
requirements of section 2-502(a) may be valid under section 2-5039and the general comment to section 5 states that section 2-503 is to
be applied to further the purpose of validating wills whenever possi9
ble. 51
V.

CONCLUSION

The UPC harmless error rule is the product of a rethinking of one
aspect of the law of succession. What is innovative about the reform
originating in the work of John Langbein and the South Australian
courts' experiment with the dispensing power is the notion of using
the formal requirements of the statutes of wills as a means to an end
rather than ends in themselves.
The problem with the reform contemplated by UPC section 2-503
and some of the other 1990 revisions to the UPC is that they do not
address the conflict between the premises underlying the wills act and
the emergence of a separate but parallel system for disposing of property at death that Langbein categorically refers to as the "nonprobate
system. '952 The increasingly widespread impact of the "nonprobate
system" has resulted in an unsystematic, judicially-created reform of
the law of succession. Although the UPC attempts to harmonize the
"nonprobate" and probate systems, the reform does not erase the
disparity in the treatment of testamentary transfers depending upon
their classification as wills or will substitutes.
Section 2-503 makes it possible for the proponent of a defective
will to prove that the testator intended to give it effect,9 5 but it does
not produce consistency between the procedures required for execution
of a will and a will substitute. Wills still are distinguished as documents
requiring compliance with a laundry list of statutorily-determined formalities as a prerequisite to their enforcement without judicial factfinding. The "formalities" required for will substitutes remain largely a
matter of business practice and convention, except when the statute
of frauds applies. They are self enforcing devices subjected to the
scrutiny of a court only if their validity is challenged.

950.
951.
952.
953.

Id.
See UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 5 general comment.
See Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 17, at 34.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990).
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The harmless error rule thus brings the two systems more into
alignment without questioning the fundamental illogic of having separate systems for determining succession of property at death. The
UPC continues to determine into which system a transfer falls based
solely on its classification as a will or a "nonprobate" disposition (will
substitute). Surely if the system needs reform to accommodate developments in the law of succession, it also needs to address the more
fundamental issue of the continued viability of the probate system
itself.
Moreover, the "harmless error" rule raises some troubling issues.
By definition, such a rule implies that the wills act "requirements"
are in fact no longer required. The UPC now in effect permits four
types of testamentary transfers to be enforced as "wills": self-proving
wills, 9- attested wills, 9 holographic wills, 9- and wills established by
extrinsic evidence under section 2-503.957 The last category of wills
need not comply with the formalities required of the other three; they
are not subject to any legislatively determined standard of formality.
The UPC drafters instead have delegated to the courts the power to
decide which formalities can be dispensed with and under what circumstances.
The UPC approach to the problem of giving effect to testamentary
intent is a "quick-fix" solution to a problem that has resulted from a
fundamental shift away from traditional notions of testation and testamentary conduct. The UPC retains the statutory laundry list of
formal "requirements" and continues to phrase these requirements in
mandatory terms. Radical measures, however, require radical
methods. The drafters of section 2-503 should have considered eliminating the "requirements" as such in favor of standards for determining
under what circumstances the burden of proving will validity falls on
the person contesting its validity and under what circumstances it
should fall on the will's proponent. Such a provision would be consistent
with Lindgren's conception of a "two-tiered" approach to the formalities.
The UPC revisions contemplate several reforms, some of which
are unlikely to achieve widespread acceptance. If the purpose of the
revisions was to articulate principles for reform of the law of succession, the drafters could have gone much further. The UPC should be

954.

Id. § 2-504.

955. Id. § 2-502(a).
956. Id. § 2-502(b).
957. Id. §§ 2-502(c), 2-503.
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fundamentally revised and the revisions should not be limited to principles of technical probate. A model succession act is needed. Section
2-503 and the other recent revisions to the UPC represent piecemeal
adjustments likely to create additional pressure on the probate system
without addressing the fundamental question of whether the existing
probate system continues to serve the function it served at a time
when probate was virtually synonymous with the law of succession.
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